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What Drives European Spinoff Value Effects? 
Impact of Corporate Governance, Information Asymmetry, and 
Investor Irrationality on Firm Values 
 
Abstract 
The thesis explores the magnitude and determinants of spinoff value effects using 
robust methodologies and different theoretical perspectives.  From a sample of 170 
European spinoffs in the period 1987-2005, I find that spinoff announcement returns 
are significantly positive while the long-run shareholder value performance of post-
spinoff firms is insignificant when the cross-sectional return dependence problem is 
controlled. This is consistent with market efficiency overall in relation to spinoffs. 
However, this overall efficiency may conceal irrational investor behaviour towards 
certain types of spinoffs. 
 
Assuming investor irrationality, I examine whether investor sentiment affects spinoff 
wealth effects and spinoff decisions. I use four different proxies to measure investor 
demand for corporate focus and glamour stocks, and observe a positive association 
between these proxies and spinoff announcement returns. In addition, I find that 
offspring, born of spinoffs to cater to investor demand for glamour stocks, 
significantly underperform various benchmarks including the performance of less 
glamourous offspring.   
 
An improvement in operating efficiency of post-spinoff firms may not be realised if 
post-spinoff firms have weak corporate governance and agency conflicts are not 
mitigated. I investigate this issue by examining changes of corporate governance 
mechanisms around spinoffs. I observe that spinoff firms with a controlling family 
shareholder have higher announcement stock returns but lower post-spinoff 
performance than others. Moreover, controlling family shareholders generally reduce 
their stock ownership in post-spinoff firms, indicating that they may undertake 
spinoffs to reshuffle their wealth portfolios. I also find that board monitoring and 
takeover threats for post-spinoff firms positively affect the long-run performance of 
post-spinoff firms.  
 
This thesis further inspects the relationship between information asymmetry between 
the pre-spinoff parent and the stock market, and spinoff value effects. By employing 
four different information asymmetry proxies, I find no evidence that a spinoff 
resolves information asymmetry problems. In contrast, I document some evidence that 
the information asymmetry problem may be exacerbated following spinoffs when the 
liquidity of post-spinoff firms is decreased.  
 
Taken together, my findings suggest that managers and shareholders should assess the 
desirability of a spinoff more carefully and take investor irrationality into account.  
 
This is the first study that focuses on European spinoffs over a long period and tests 
various theories concerning the sources of value. It also provides the first time 
empirical evidence on the validity of the catering theory in the context of spinoffs.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
Corporate spinoff is a special type of corporate restructuring. Through a spinoff, a 
publicly traded firm offers shares of a subsidiary to its shareholders on a pro rata 
distribution basis. Following this spinoff transaction, the newly floated company has 
an independent existence and is separately valued in the stock market. The divestor 
continues to exist, albeit downsized. Although there is no cash flow generated from a 
spinoff transaction, spinoff announcements are often associated with positive market 
reaction. On average, the abnormal returns to firms undertaking spinoffs are in the 
range of 2.4–4.3% as shown in different time periods and in different countries 
(Daley, Mehrotra and Sivakumar, 1997; Hite and Owers, 1983; Krishnaswami and 
Subramaniam, 1999; Slovin, Sushka and Ferraro, 1995; Veld and Veld-Merkoulova, 
2004). Furthermore, some US studies document evidence that post-spinoff firms earn 
significant and positive long-run stock returns. For example, Desai and Jain (1999) 
find that, for a sample of 155 US spinoffs between the years 1975 and 1991, the 
abnormal returns for pro-forma combined firms (both post-spinoff parent and 
offspring) are significant at 19.82% over 36 months. While the motivation often given 
for spinoffs is corporate focusing, the precise source of such significant value gains is 
still a subject of significant debate.  
 
On the one hand, academic researchers have proposed several hypotheses based on an 
efficiency view to explain the spinoff value gains. Corporate focus hypothesis argues 
that a spin-off of non-core assets can reserve managerial resources for the core 
business and improves the operating efficiency of remaining assets of the parent 
(Daley et al., 1997; Desai and Jain, 1999). A spinoff can also create shareholder value 
by reducing agency costs associated with diversification (Allen, Lummer, McConnell 
and Reed, 1995; Berger and Ofek, 1995, 1999; Comment and Jarrell, 1995; Denis, 
Denis and Sarin, 1997). Information asymmetry hypothesis contends that a spin-off 
enhances firm value because it mitigates the information asymmetry between 
managers and external investors about the profitability and operating efficiency of 
different divisions of parent firm (Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 1999).  
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Prior studies also propose that spin-off value gains may stem from the wealth transfer 
from debtholders to shareholders (Parrino, 1997; Maxwell and Rao, 2003) and the 
relaxation of regulatory constraints on post-spinoff firms (Schipper and Smith, 1983). 
These hypotheses are based on rational managers seeking to maximise shareholder 
values without a presumption of irrationality in the stock market.  
 
On the other hand, some researchers and practitioners regard spinoffs as a mechanism 
for managers to exploit irrational demand of investors. Behavioural finance literature 
has shown that investors often make systematic mistakes in decision making due to 
common cognitive biases, such as conservatism, representative heuristic, and 
overconfidence (for related literature reviews see Barberis and Thaler, 2003; 
Hirshleifer, 2001; and Shleifer, 2000). The behavioural approach suggests that, if 
investors are irrational in valuing stocks, managers may be able to boost short-run 
share prices by separating elements of firms that investors value more highly. There is 
evidence that some spunoff subsidiaries, such as high-tech or internet subsidiaries, are 
highly overpriced relative to their parents in the late 1990s and eventually earn 
significant negative long-run returns (Lamont and Thaler, 2003; Mitchell, Pulvino and 
Stafford, 2002). This evidence suggests that, when irrational investors assess the 
desirability of a spinoff, they may over-extrapolate the recent performance of similar 
stocks in the subsidiary’s industry.  
 
The extant empirical evidence for these above explanations of spinoff value effects is 
mixed or scanty. First, it is not clear whether spinoffs create superior long-run returns.  
Earlier empirical studies have documented evidence of market underraction to spinoff 
announcements, which means the slow assimilation of information revealed by the 
spinoff news into stock prices. For example, Cusatis, Miles and Woolridge (1993) 
find, for a sample of US spinoffs completed between 1965 and 1988, post-spinoff 
firms earn significant abnormal returns in the three-year period subsequent to the 
spinoff completion. They attribute the post-spinoff price drift to an incomplete market 
response to positive information about the benefits with potential takeovers. 
 
However, Fama (1998) questions the validity of long-run post-spinoff abnormal 
returns. Fama specifically points out that the long-run return methodology used by 
Cusatis et al. does not take into account the cross-sectional event-firm-return 
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dependence problem. He further contends that testing market efficiency requires 
appropriate benchmarks and most abnormal returns documented in long-run event 
studies would disappear when robust return methodologies were to be used. Since 
most prior studies on spinoffs do not consider cross-sectional dependence in 
calculating long-run abnormal returns, it is unclear whether spinoffs create superior 
stock returns in the long run when a robust return calculation methodology is used. 
 
Second, there is no empirical study directly testing the impact of investor irrationality 
on spinoff value effects although some news reports have indicated that investors may 
overreact to spinoff news and managers tend to spin off overvalued subsidiaries (e.g. 
see Dennis, 2006). This view implies that stock markets may be inefficient in valuing 
certain types of spinoffs, i.e. the initial market reaction to spinoffs may be too high.  
 
Third, the corporate focus hypothesis does not explain the spinoff value effects well.  
Veld and Veld-Merkoulova (2004) examine the long-term wealth effects of European 
spinoffs and find that focus-increasing spinoffs do not outperform non-focus-
increasing spinoffs in the long run. This finding is contradictory to the early US 
evidence that firms emerging from focus-increasing spinoffs have significantly better 
performance than those emerging from non-focus-increasing spinoffs (e.g. see Daley 
et al., 1997; Desai and Jain, 1999).  
 
There may be two different reasons for the mixed evidence on the corporate focus 
hypothesis. The first reason is that focus-increasing spinoffs in Veld and Veld-
Merkoulova (2004) may include spinoffs of overvalued subsidiaries. As suggested by 
the behavioural model of spinoffs, spinoffs of overvalued subsidiaries have lower 
long-term performance than other types of spinoff because investors may initially 
overreact to the former.  
 
The second reason could be that focus-increasing spinoffs in Veld and Veld-
Merkoulova (2004) may include spinoffs of family firms, which are very common in 
Europe as pointed out in Faccio and Lang (2002). The benefits of focus-increasing 
spinoffs may not be realised when post-spinoff firms have weak corporate governance 
and agency problems remain severe. Chemmanur and Yan (2004) develop a corporate 
control model to explain spinoff value effects. According to their model, a spinoff 
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creates value by facilitating market discipline on managers of post-spinoff firms since 
post-spinoff firms are more focused and easier to be acquired than pre-spinoff firms. 
Such takeover control benefits may not apply to spinoffs of family firms since family 
shareholders are often excessively interested in maintaining control over the 
companies even in the presence of potentially value-increasing acquirers (Burkart, 
Panunzi and Shleifer, 2003). Thus, it is important to examine whether post-spinoff 
firms have an improvement in corporate governance and whether the corporate 
governance structure of post-spinoff firms is related to spinoff value effects.  
 
Fourth, there is contradictory evidence on the information asymmetry hypothesis. 
From a recent sample of US spinoffs, Veld and Veld-Merkoulova (2005) observe that 
the information asymmetry proxy measured by residual stock volatility prior to the 
spinoff announcement has an insignificant impact on the spinoff announcement 
returns. Again, this finding is different from the early evidence documented in 
Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) that the information asymmetry level of pre-
spinoff firms significantly and positively affects spinoff announcement returns.  
 
There may be two reasons for the inconsistent evidence on the information asymmetry 
hypothesis. First, the supporting evidence for the information asymmetry hypothesis 
documented in Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) may be sample-specific. The 
spinoff sample examined in Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) may consist of 
firms that have severe information asymmetry problems prior to the spinoff 
announcements. The recent US spinoff sample examined in Veld and Veld-
Merkoulova (2005) may mainly contain firms that undertake spinoffs for non-
information-related reasons. Second, the evidence in Veld and Veld-Merkoulova 
(2004) may be inconclusive. They only use one information asymmetry proxy, the 
residual standard deviation of the market-adjusted daily stock returns, to measure the 
information asymmetry level of spinoff firms. In contrast, Krishnaswami and 
Subramaniam (1999) use five different information asymmetry measures, including 
three proxies based on equity analysts’ earning forecast data and two proxies based on 
stock return volatility data. They observe that the information asymmetry proxies 
based on analysts’ forecast data have greater explanatory power than the residual 
standard deviation in explaining the spinoff announcement effects.      
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To address these afore-mentioned issues, this thesis conducts a comprehensive 
examination of the value creation from corporate spinoffs for a sample of completed 
European spinoffs in the period between January 1987 and December 2005. 
Investigating both the short-run and long-run market reaction to spinoff 
announcements, this study aims to address the following two related research 
questions. First, do corporate spinoffs really create shareholder value? Second, what 
are the determinants of spinoff value effects?   
 
In the first empirical chapter, I investigate the stock and operating performance of 
firms involved in spinoffs. For the long-run stock performance of post-spinoff firms, I 
use a number of different return methodologies to control for the cross-sectional 
return-dependence problem. As the measurement of long-run stock returns is 
controversial, I also inspect the long-run accounting returns of post-spinoff firms. 
Using different robust return methodologies, I expect to provide convincing evidence 
on market efficiency in valuing spinoff news.  
 
In the subsequent three empirical chapters, I explore the underlying sources of spinoff 
value effects. Using a standard event study methodology, I investigate the 
determinants of spinoff announcement effects by testing the relative validity of 
behavioural, governance-based, and information-based models for explaining spinoff 
announcement gains. I also examine whether these models can explain the variation 
of the long-run spinoff performance since the recent finance literature has 
demonstrated that the initial market reaction to corporate events may be inefficient.  
 
Main findings of the thesis are summarised as follows: 
1. The average of announcement period abnormal returns to firms conducting 
corporate spinoffs is significantly positive. The positive spinoff value effects 
do not substantially differ across sample countries. This evidence suggests that 
European stock markets widely view corporate spinoffs as value-enhancing 
transactions.  
 
2. There are insignificant long-run abnormal stock returns to post-spinoff firms. 
The significance of post-spinoff buy-and-hold abnormal returns substantially 
reduces when I use robust return measurement methodology as proposed in 
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Jegadeesh and Karceski (2004), Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) and Mitchell 
and Stafford (2000). The calendar-time regression approach using the Fama 
and French (1993) three-factor model or the Carhart (1997) four-factor model 
shows that investing in post-spinoff firms does not deliver superior long-run 
abnormal returns. Using the calendar-time abnormal portfolio approach, as 
advocated in Mitchell and Stafford (2000), yields similar results. Moreover, 
neither parent nor offspring earn significant long-run abnormal accounting 
returns in the three-year post-spinoff period. Therefore, my results indicate 
that the overall market reaction to European spinoffs is efficient.  
 
3. The overall efficiency of European stock markets may conceal irrational 
investor behaviour towards certain types of spinoffs. To examine this 
possibility, I inspect the relationship between investor sentiment and the 
market reaction to spinoff announcement returns. I document a significant and 
positive association between investor demand for corporate focus (and 
glamour stocks of offspring) and the spinoff announcement returns. The strong 
association holds even after controlling for the value factors suggested in prior 
studies such as increased corporate focus and reduced information asymmetry. 
Therefore, my results indicate that investor sentiment does affect the market 
reaction to spinoff announcements.  
 
4. Based on a behavioural approach, I further propose the catering theory of 
corporate spinoffs that managers may undertake spinoffs to cater to temporary 
investor demand. I contend that managers of undervalued parent firms have 
strong incentives to cater to investor demands by spinning off overvalued 
subsidiaries in order to maximise short run share prices. A possible reason for 
managers to conduct non-value-maximising spinoffs is that they may benefit 
from realising stock options or trading equities of post-spinoff firms due to 
their private information (Allen, 2001). I use three different measures to 
indicate such catering spinoffs. I find that the announcement returns to 
catering spinoffs are significantly higher than those to other types of spinoff. 
However, offspring following catering spinoffs underperform those from other 
types of spinoff. This evidence suggests that initial investor beliefs of the 
long-run performance of overvalued subsidiaries are unfounded and eventually 
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expectations are replaced with results. 
 
5. The benefits of an increase in corporate focus of post-spinoff firms may not be 
realised if these firms have weak corporate governance and agency conflicts 
are not mitigated. I find that spinoffs of family firms have higher 
announcement returns but lower long-run performance than those of non-
family firms. I also observe that post-spinoff firms that are subject to takeover 
bids over a three-year period have better stock performance than those that do 
not receive a bid. In addition, I document evidence that an increase of board 
independence in post-spinoff firms is positively associated with the long-run 
post-spinoff stock returns. Taken together, my results are in line with the 
prediction of the governance-based model that enhancement of corporate 
governance in post-spinoff firms is positively associated with the spinoff value 
creation.  
 
6. I find little evidence supporting the information asymmetry hypothesis. In 
general, spinoff parents and industry- and size-matching non-spinoff firms 
have a similar level of information asymmetry problems prior to spinoff. 
Furthermore, there is no improvement in the information asymmetry measures 
and the analyst coverage following a spinoff. The long-run spinoff 
performance is also negatively associated with the information asymmetry 
measures of a pre-spinoff parent firm, which is contradictory to the prediction 
of information asymmetry hypothesis that a spinoff creates value by reducing 
information asymmetry. Thus, it is unlikely that a European spinoff is 
motivated by the information asymmetry problem. A further examination 
reveals that the information asymmetry problem may be exacerbated when the 
organisational complexity of post-spinoff firms is reduced. One explanation 
for this finding is that refocusing firms lose the benefits of liquidity premium 
in the stock markets (Chang and Yu, 2004) and the market’s incentive to 
collect information is reduced when the firm’s liquidity is reduced (Goldman, 
2005).  
 
However, my results should be interpreted with the following limitations in mind. 
First, my spinoff sample size is quite small because spinoff transactions have only 
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become popular in Europe in recent years. Thus my results are subject to data 
limitation problems. Second, although I consider the country-level shareholder 
protection in cross-country analysis, I have not controlled a number of important 
differences across European countries. For example, European countries differ 
substantially in terms of their accounting standards and capital market regulations, 
which will have an impact on the spinoff value effects. Third, although I have 
employed several recently-suggested return methodologies to assess market efficiency 
to evaluate spinoffs, these methodologies have their statistical and model 
misspecification problems. Fourth, my proxy variables for investor irrationality may 
capture factors other than market misvaluation. For example, the market-based 
industry valuation of spun-off subsidiary may simply reflect the growth potential of 
spun-off subsidiary and managers may not conduct spinoffs to exploit market 
misvaluation. To obtain more convincing results, future research may consider other 
variables to measure managerial incentives to exploit market misvaluation, such as 
managerial stock-based compensation. Fifth, certain corporate governance variables 
that I used contain personal biases. For instance, the classification of independent 
directors is based on my own assessment of directors’ relationship with a sample firm 
by reading directors’ profiles in annual reports and related news reports. Finally, I 
have not examined the endogeneity issue in this thesis, which may affect the 
interpretation of my results. Future research should consider this issue since corporate 
spinoffs are self-selection events and firms involved in spinoffs are non-random.  
 
The rest of this thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 surveys the existing literature 
on the motives and consequences of corporate spinoffs. Chapter 3 reviews the 
arguments for and against the market efficiency as well as the related return 
measurement issues. Chapter 4 presents the research questions and develops testable 
hypotheses based on different theoretical perspectives. Chapter 5 employs several 
robust return methodologies to inspect stock market efficiency in valuing corporate 
spinoffs. Chapter 6 investigates the impact of investor irrationality on the spinoff 
wealth effects and examines if some spinoffs are undertaken to exploit market 
misevaluation. Chapter 7 explores whether a spinoff creates shareholder value by 
mitigating agency conflicts. Chapter 8 tests the information asymmetry hypothesis for 
spinoff value gains. Chapter 9 discusses the main findings of this study and offers 
suggestions for future research.  
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Chapter 2 Literature Review on Spinoff Value Effects 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The precise mechanism for a corporate spinoff to create shareholder values is ambiguous. 
Existing explanations of spinoff value effects focus on how changes of organisational 
structure following a spinoff help improve the operating efficiency of post-spinoff firms. 
However, the empirical studies report mixed evidence for explanations derived from the 
efficiency view. This chapter surveys the extant literature on spinoff value effects and 
identifies the limitations of past empirical studies.    
 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 defines corporate spinoffs. Section 2.3 
presents explanations based on the efficiency view to justify spinoff value effects. Section 
2.4 describes a behavioural view of spinoff value effects. Section 2.5 identifies the 
limitations of extant empirical studies of spinoff value effects. Section 2.6 concludes this 
chapter.  
 
2.2 Spinoff Definition  
Corporate spinoff is a restructuring transaction to reduce firm size by divesting one or 
more subsidiaries. In a spinoff, shares of a firm’s subsidiary are distributed pro-rata 
among the existing shareholders of the company. There is no cash transaction taking 
place. After the spinoff, the shareholders of the spinoff parent hold shares in both the 
parent and spunoff subsidiary company. In this thesis, the divestor is called parent and the 
spunoff subsidiary is termed offspring.  
 
It is worth noting that there are two alternative forms of corporate restructuring to reduce 
the firm size. One is the asset sale, in which part of a firm’s assets are sold to outsiders 
very often for cash. Corporate spinoff differs from asset sale because the former has no 
cash flow implications and it cannot be motivated by financing needs, which is often the 
key rationale for asset sale (Afshar, Taffler and Sudarsanam, 1992; Alexandrou and 
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Sudarsanam, 2001; John and Ofek, 1995; Lang, Poulsen and Stulz, 1995; Lasfer, 
Sudarsanam and Taffler, 1996). The other is the equity carveout, in which some of the 
shares of a subsidiary are sold to the public and the divested subsidiary is also listed on 
the stock market. Equity carveout is similar to corporate spinoff since both transactions 
make the subsidiary become public. However, equity carveouts also result in cash flows 
to the parent and the parent company often holds a substantial stake on the carved out 
subsidiary. Thus, equity carveout is often undertaken as an alternative mechanism to 
obtain external finance either for the parent or subsidiary (Allen and McConnell, 1998; 
Vijh, 1999). In sum, corporate spinoff is a special type of restructuring to reduce firm size. 
The absence of cash flow in spinoff transaction implies that there must be other 
underlying economic forces driving the division of a large firm into two or more smaller 
ones. 
 
The 1990s witnesses a growing trend of corporate spinoffs. The annual transaction value 
of completed US spinoffs rose from US$5.7 billion in 1990 to US$140.4 billion in 1999; 
on average 62 deals were completed per year during this period (Sudarsanam, 2003, 
p.347, Table 11.3). This trend has reversed since the high tech bubble burst in the early 
2000. In 2005 there were only 17 completed spinoffs in the US and their transaction 
value was just US$ 14.0 billion. In general, spinoff announcements are applauded by 
investors. For example, in February 2001 Canadian Pacific announced that it was going 
to spin off four of its subsidiaries, including Canadian Pacific Railway and PanCanadian 
Petroleum, and would only retain the business in Canadian Pacific Hotels. On the day of 
the spinoff announcement, the shares of Canadian Pacific increased by $5.60 to $57.15, 
resulting in a return of almost 11% within one day. Such a significant stock return on the 
spinoff announcement date conveys a clear message that a spinoff transaction enhances 
shareholder values. The subsequent two sections describe different views on the spinoff 
value effects. Empirical predictions for both views are also discussed.    
 
2.3 The Efficiency View of Spinoff Value Effects 
Spinoff is involved with assets and liabilities reallocation across post-spinoff firms but 
also the recontracting of the relationship between managers and shareholders in post-
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spinoff firms. These contemporaneous changes during a spinoff transaction may account 
for the variation of shareholder gains from corporate spinoffs. The rest of this section 
reviews a number of hypotheses which explore the value implication of those 
rearrangements of resources and relationships through the spinoff transaction.  
 
2.3.1 Corporate Focus Hypothesis 
Corporate focus literature argues that enhanced corporate focus leads to an increase in 
firm value (Lang and Stulz, 1994; Comment and Jarrell, 1995; Berger and Ofek, 1995). In 
the context of corporate divestiture, a spinoff of unrelated businesses can reduce 
organisation’s complexity and eliminate the negative synergy stemming from the 
interference between distinct divisions. Therefore, firms undertaking focus-increasing 
spinoffs will witness favourable market reactions, which incorporate investor expectation 
of an improvement in both operating performance and stock performance for post-spinoff 
firms. Extant empirical studies have shown that the focusing status of a spinoff is 
positively associated with the short-run market reaction to spinoff announcements (e.g. 
see Daley et al., 1997; Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 1999; Desai and Jain, 1999).  
 
Desai and Jain (1999) investigate the long-run stock performance of post-spinoff firms. 
They find that parent firms involved in focus-increasing spinoffs earn significant positive 
abnormal returns of 25.37% over the three-year period subsequent to the spinoff 
completion while parent firms involved in non-focus-increasing spinoffs earn 
insignificant negative abnormal returns of -10.51% over the same holding period. 
Similarly, spunoff subsidiaries involved in focus-increasing spinoffs earn significant 
positive abnormal returns of 54.45% over the three-year period subsequent to the spinoff 
completion, while parent firms involved in non-focus-increasing spinoffs earn 
insignificant negative abnormal returns of -21.85% over the same holding period. Their 
findings lend strong support to the corporate focus hypothesis.  
 
This corporate focus hypothesis is examined in Veld and Veld-Merkoulova (2004) for a 
European sample but receives only limited support. It is somewhat surprising that, for 
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their spinoff sample, the focus-increasing measure is positively associated with spinoff 
announcement returns but negatively related to the long-run stock returns to post-spinoff 
firms albeit of no statistical significance.  
 
An explanation for the mixed evidence on the corporate focus hypothesis may be that the 
benefits of refocusing spinoffs are not realised when the corporate governance in post-
spionoff firms is weak and the agency conflicts are not mitigated. This concern is 
particularly important since many restructuring firms have weak corporate governance 
before the restructuring announcements. Therefore, the fundamental issue for the 
corporate restructuring is to mitigate the agency conflicts not just the asset redistribution. 
 
The extant literature has presented some evidence that refocusing transactions, including 
spinoffs, create value by correcting mistaken strategies due to agency problems. Berger 
and Ofek (1999) have conducted detailed analysis of antecedents and outcomes of 
corporate refocusing programmes, including both focus-increasing spinoffs and asset 
sales of unrelated businesses. They find that refocusing announcements are often 
preceded by corporate control events, such as failed takeover threats and shareholder 
activisms. In contrast, control firms, which have similar operating characteristics to those 
of refocusing firms but do not refocus, do not experience such a high frequency of 
corporate control events. Berger and Ofek argue that agency problems are a contributing 
factor in firms maintaining value-destroying diversification strategy. In addition, the 
diversification value-effect measure1 for refocusing parents is significantly lower than 
that for control firms. Following the refocusing transaction, the diversification value-
effect measure for a refocusing firm increases significantly. Taken together, the evidence 
indicates that refocusing transactions, such as a focus-increasing spinoff, create 
shareholder values by reducing the agency costs of diversification.   
 
                                                 
1 Berger and Ofek (1995) propose a measure of diversification’s value effect, which is the natural log of the 
ratio of a multi-segment firm’s actual value to its imputed value. The imputed value of a multi-segment 
firm is the sum of the imputed value of each segment, which is the product of the median ratio, for single-
segment firms in the same industry, of total capital to one of three accounting items (assets, sales, or 
earnings before interest, tax and depreciation). Negative excess value indicates that diversification reduces 
the value of segments below that of their stand-alone counterparts. 
  
 13
Allen et al. (1995) investigate the source of spinoff value gains in a similar spirit. They 
trace the origin of the spunoff subsidiaries and identify a sample of 73 spinoffs in which 
the spunoff subsidiaries were originally purchased through acquisitions. They propose a 
“correction-of-a-mistake” hypothesis for the spinoff value effects. They argue that 
corporate spinoffs create shareholder values by reversing the value losses from earlier 
mistaken acquisitions. They find supporting evidence for the argument. First, the 
acquiring firm’s stock price reaction around the announcement of takeover that is spun 
off later is negative, indicating that the prior acquisition is indeed a mistaken strategy 
based on the market reaction. Second, the stock price reaction to the announcement of 
spinoffs of prior acquisitions is positive, but is negatively associated with the stock 
returns to the earlier acquisitions. To put it differently, the greater the prior acquisition 
loss, the bigger the price reverse when the spinoff is announced. However, they document 
no evidence that the announcement returns to spinoffs of earlier acquisitions are higher 
than those to other types of spinoff. Therefore, reversing an earlier mistaken acquisition is 
just one value source for focus-increasing spinoffs. It is possible that a spinoff recovers 
value losses of other suboptimal strategies that are due to agency problems.  
 
The above-mentioned studies demonstrate that diversification is costly and managers 
often execute the value-enhancing refocusing strategy only after they face pressure from 
external forces such as shareholder activisms. However, there is little direct evidence on 
the link between agency problems and spinoff value effects. To my best knowledge, there 
is one study that has explored the role of corporate governance mechanisms in the value 
creation from spinoffs. Seward and Walsh (1996) analyse the design of internal 
governance mechanisms in offspring and relate the attributes of offspring’s governance 
structure to the short-run market reaction to spinoff announcements. They observe no 
relationship between the strength of internal governance mechanism and spinoff 
announcement returns. However, their evidence may be inconclusive because they 
wrongly assume that stock markets would foresee the future internal governance structure 
in offspring at the spinoff announcement date.   
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2.3.2 Information Asymmetry Hypothesis 
A spinoff can also create value by mitigating the information asymmetry in the market 
about the operating performance of distinct divisions of a multi-segment divesting firm. 
Two simultaneous changes in the information environment of the divesting firm may 
account for the transparency benefits of spinoff. First, separate financial reports of parent 
and offspring make disclosure policy more informative to investors and improve market 
understanding of firm operation (Lang and Lundholm, 1996). Second, following spinoff, 
there is an increase in the number of analysts following the parent firm and the accuracy 
of analysts’ forecast for the parent earnings, thereby facilitating improved financial 
intermediation for the parent’s stock (Gilson, Healy, Noe and Palepu, 2001). Since 
information asymmetry often results in the market undervaluation of a firm, a firm with 
higher level of information asymmetry prior to spinoff will exhibit higher excess returns 
upon spinoff announcement (Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 1999).  
 
However, a spinoff may not necessarily improve the information transparency level of 
post-spinoff firms. Thomas (2002) questions the information transparency benefits of 
spinoff by emphasizing the information diversification advantage of the conglomerate 
firm. He argues that a diversified firm may have less information asymmetry problems 
than a focused firm because the forecast errors across divisions may ‘balance out’ and the 
aggregate nature of reporting will imply a more accurate forecast for a diversifier than for 
a focuser.2 This beneficial effect is similar to the information benefits of trading baskets 
of stocks relative to the trading of individual stocks that constitute the baskets.  
 
A further counter argument against the information asymmetry hypothesis is that the 
substantial reduction of size for the spinoff parent firm may reduce its attractiveness to 
equity analysts and institutional investors. Therefore, the information asymmetry problem 
                                                 
2 There is anecdotal evidence in the financial press for information diversification benefit. For example, the 
merger of Time Warner and American Online in 1999 combined not only different industries but also 
entirely different philosophies of valuation, posing an evaluation challenge for analysts following the 
combined company. However, the possibility of offsetting forecast errors across these businesses is 
proposed as a mitigating factor. (See, Paul Sherer and Elizabeth MacDonald, “AOL and Time Warner 
Leaves Street Guessing on New Animal’s Value”, The Wall Street Journal, January 13, 2000.)   
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will not be mitigated following a spinoff. For instance, GKN, a British engineering 
conglomerate, spun off its industrial services business in August 2001 and was dropped 
out of the Financial Times (London) Stock Exchange (FTSE) 100 index due to the size 
reduction. One analyst points out that the dropout of the FTSE-100 for GKN substantially 
lowers its publicity to investment funds and analysts, thus making its future access to 
capital markets more difficult (Sudarsanam, 2003, Chapter 11). Goldman (2005) uses a 
theoretical model to explain this effect that the market’s incentive to collect information 
is reduced following a spinoff when the post-spinoff firm’s liquidity is reduced.   
 
Finally, Huson and MacKinnon argue that the informed traders have higher incentives to 
trade stocks of focused firms than to trade stocks of diversified firms since the 
information advantage of informed traders is likely to be segment-specific and is unlikely 
to be useful for their trading of a diversified firm’s stocks.  
 
Empirical evidence on the information asymmetry hypothesis is also mixed. 
Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) document a strong association between 
information asymmetry measures and spinoff announcement returns for the US spinoff 
sample. Huson and MacKinnon (2003) observe that the information asymmetry level 
significantly increases subsequent to a spinoff based on the market microstructure data 
such as the bid-ask spread. Veld and Veld-Merkoulova (2004, 2005) find information 
asymmetry measures have insignificant explanatory power in explaining the spinoff value 
effects. A possible explanation is that the sample of Krishnaswami and Subramaniam 
(1999) consists of spinoff firms with severe information asymmetry problems while the 
samples of other studies mainly contain firms that conduct spinoffs for non-information-
related reasons.  
 
2.3.3 Corporate Control Hypothesis 
In most cases, a spinoff enables separately listed companies to let each of them specialize 
in its own business. For example, Desai and Jain (1999) and Veld and Veld-Merkoulova 
(2004) find that 103 out of 144 US spinoffs and 73 out of 108 European spinoffs increase 
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corporate focus of the divesting firms, respectively. The ‘pure play’ and small size 
attributes of post-spinoff firms makes them susceptible to external control contests, which 
generate takeover premium for shareholders. Cusatis et al. (1993) observe that about 14% 
of their sample post-spinoff firms are taken over in a subsequent three-year period. Their 
takeover target post-spinoff firms earn, on average, additional 4-9% long-term abnormal 
returns relative to other post-spinoff firms. Based on this evidence, they argue that 
spinoffs create value primarily by providing an efficient method of transferring control of 
corporate assets to potential bidders since post-spinoff firms are generally smaller, more 
focused, and thus easier for acquisition than pre-spinoff parent firms.  
 
Chemmanur and Yan (2004) build a theoretical model to explain the spinoff value effects 
based on the impact of future takeover threats for post-spinoff firms. In their model, the 
improvement of stock returns to post-spinoff firms is a consequence of the existence of 
takeover threats. An improvement of stock performance can even happen without the 
actual occurrence of takeover bids because managers of post-spinoff firms tend to work 
harder to avoid potential takeovers and consequent job losses.  
 
It is worthwhile mentioning that market for corporate control is just one form of 
corporate governance mechanisms (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996). Following the 
reasoning of Chemmanur and Yan (2004), a spinoff may still have superior long-run 
performance when post-spinoff firms enhance internal control mechanisms. A 
comprehensive examination of the corporate control hypothesis is to examine the 
relationship between changes in corporate governance in post-spinoff firms and the long-
run spinoff performance.  
 
The value benefits of enhancing corporate governance are to more closely align the 
potentially divergent interests of managers and shareholders, which result from the 
separation of ownership and control in public companies (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). The existing literature has proposed various internal and external 
mechanisms to curb agency conflicts and limit agency costs, which are outlined below.  
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Internal corporate governance mechanisms include executive compensation, inside 
ownership, board directors, large shareholders, and lenders. First, proper executive 
compensation may reduce agency costs arising from differences in risk preferences and 
investment horizons between shareholders and managers. A manager who is compensated 
via performance-contingent pay on a correct time horizon should incentives to take risks 
to maximize long-term shareholder values (Core and Guay, 1999; Jensen and Murphy, 
1990). Second, the insider ownership can align managerial interests with those of 
shareholders as it effectively turns managers (agents) into owners (principals). In the 
absence of managerial entrenchment, a higher level of managerial ownership should 
reduce agency costs and managerial opportunism to expropriate shareholder wealth 
(McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1988). Third, the board 
directors act as shareholder representatives in the duty of overseeing and disciplining 
management. A board consisting of majority independent directors has both the expertise 
and reputation concern to make better corporate decisions such as CEO selection and 
corporate acquisitions (Borokhovich, Parrino, and Trapani, 1996; Byrd and Hickman, 
1992). Fourth, large shareholders (or blockholders) provide an additional monitoring role. 
Although it is too costly for small shareholders to actively monitor managers, 
blockholders have both the means and incentives to do so (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). 
Fifth, debt can be an effect control mechanism to monitor self-interested managers 
(Jensen, 1986). 
 
External mechanisms include the market for managerial labour, product market, analysts, 
the market for corporate control, and the legal system for shareholder protection (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997). Managers have reputation concern to perform well on their current 
posts in order to find better employment in the future. Therefore, a competitive labour 
market may motivate a manager to align his or her interests with those of a firm’s 
shareholders (Gomes, 2000). A competitive product market can effectively discipline 
managers’ opportunism (Hermalin, 1992). Security analysts are also an important 
mechanism of corporate control since they provide more firm-specific information to 
stock markets and help external investors to asses the managerial performance (Chung 
and Jo, 1996). The market for corporate control disciplines poorly performing managers 
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by removing them from their positions through mergers, tender offers or proxy fights 
(Franks and Mayer, 1996). The legal system on shareholder protection also plays an 
important role in controlling managerial opportunism to expropriate shareholder wealth 
(La Porta et al, 1998). 
 
A spinoff transaction is involved with significant changes in corporate governance 
mechanisms. For example, managers have to consider the design of internal control 
structure in post-spinoff firms. The analyst coverage and the probability of receiving 
takeover bids for post-spinoff firms will also change since post-spinoff firms differ from 
pre-spinoff parents in many aspects such as size and operating structure. Again, extant 
studies have not explored whether these changes in corporate governance mechanisms 
help resolve agency problems and whether these changes determine the long-run spinoff 
performance.   
 
2.3.4 Wealth Transfer Hypothesis 
Wealth transfer hypothesis proposes that shareholders of spinoff firms may expropriate 
the value of debtholders through a disproportionate distribution of debts across post-
spinoff firms. Parrino (1997) documents a supportive case in which large wealth is 
transferred from senior security holders (US$195 million losses) to stockholders 
(US$81million gains) around the announcement of Marriott’s spinoff because the parent 
was assigned with weaker assets but larger debts than the offspring. Maxwell and Rao 
(2003) also present evidence consistent with the wealth transfer hypothesis that the 
spinoff announcement gains are positively associated with losses to debtholders, which 
are measured as the negative abnormal bond returns in the month of spinoff 
announcement. The expected bond returns are calculated based on monthly bond returns 
to spinoff parents.  
 
Maxwell and Rao (2003) further specify two potential sources of wealth transfer from 
debtholders to shareholders. First, spinoff results in loss of collateral and liquidity of the 
parent because assets are reallocated to the offspring. Thus, the parent and offspring have 
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different levels of financial risks. For example, Mehrotra, Mikkelson and Partch (2003) 
find that although post-spinoff firms have shown similar levels of financial leverage, the 
parent and offspring significantly differ in their interest coverage ratios. Second, spinoff 
eliminates coinsurance benefits of prior diversification where different division cash 
flows are imperfectly correlated. A follow-up conjecture is that the dissimilarity of cash 
flows between parent and offspring is positively associated with value losses to 
debtholders. Maxwell and Rao (2003) document supporting evidence for these two 
conjectures.  
 
However, Veld and Veld-Merkoulova (2005) re-examine the wealth transfer hypothesis 
with daily bond return data of spinoff parents. They observe no evidence that bondholders 
of spinoff parents do not experience value losses during the spinoff announcement period. 
Thus, the conclusion of Maxwell and Rao (2003) may be subject to the methodological 
errors since the abnormal bond returns calculated with monthly bond return data are more 
likely to be inaccurate than those computed with daily bond return data.     
 
2.3.5 Regulatory Constraints Hypothesis 
Relaxation of regulatory constraints on one of the post-spinoff firms can be a motive to 
engage in a spinoff. Schipper and Smith (1983) mention two separate cases in which this 
may apply. The first case occurs when a parent spins off a rate-regulated utility. In this 
case, the spunoff subsidiary can no longer be subsidised by cash flows from unregulated 
operations of the spinoff parent. According to Schipper and Smith (1983) a loss in 
subsidy may lead to an increase in the speed and/or magnitude of rate increases. The 
second case happens when a US multinational firm spins off a foreign subsidiary in order 
to exempt the latter from restrictions imposed by the US Congress on domestic firms 
operating abroad. Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) compare abnormal returns to 
parents for sub-samples with and without a regulation motive. They do not find 
significant differences between these samples. Schipper and Smith (1983) also compare 
sub-samples with and without tax and regulatory advantages. They find higher abnormal 
returns for the sub-samples with tax and regulatory advantages. However, the difference 
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between the two samples is not significant at the 10% level. Gibbs (1999) and Veld and 
Veld-Merkoulova (2004) argue that there are no motives for European companies to make 
spinoffs particularly attractive to satisfy regulatory purposes.  
 
2.4 The Behavioural View of Spinoff Value Effects 
Section 2.3 examines the theoretical explanations of spinoff value effects based on the 
efficiency view. However, some researchers and practitioners have cast doubts on the 
traditional explanations of spinoff value effects, in which spinoff value effects are due to 
efficiency improvement for post-spinoff firms. They point out some cases where spinoffs 
are not undertaken to maximise shareholder values in the long term. Specifically, 
managers tend to spin off assets which are attractive to investors, or are overvalued by 
markets.  
 
The presumption of such behavioural view is that markets are inefficient and investors 
have irrational demand for certain assets, resulting in such assets being overvalued. The 
consequence of stock market misvaluation is that managers tend to cater to investor 
demand by spinning off an overvalued subsidiary, relative to the parent, to shareholders 
in order to maximise short-run share prices. By doing so, managers of spinoff firms can 
enjoy pecuniary benefits from the increase of stock-based compensation due to the price 
run-up following the spinoff announcement. There is some evidence supporting this 
conjecture. Allen (2001) documents a strong relationship between the insider trading of 
stocks of post-spinoff firms and the long-term performance of post-spinoff firms. He 
contends that managers have private information and view spinoffs as a special 
opportunity to reshuffle their equity holdings. 
 
A notable example of a spinoff of overvalued subsidiary is the spinoff of Palm by 3Com, 
which is described in detail in Lamont and Thaler (2003). In anticipation of a full spinoff 
within nine months, 3Com floated 5% of its high-tech subsidiary Palm on March 2nd 2000. 
Immediately following the listing, Palm had an even higher market capitalisation than its 
parent 3Com which still held a 95% stake in Palm. The underlying motive for 3Com to 
spin off Palm seemed to meet the irrational investor demands for high-tech stocks. 
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Unsurprisingly, the long-term performance of Palm was substantially lower than the 
initial market expectation. The stock price of Palm declined from $104.13 per share to 
$0.10 per share over the three-year period subsequent to its floatation. 
 
However, the spinoff of overvalued subsidiaries is not limited to the peak days of stock 
markets in the late 1990s. Recent years have seen the spinoff of old economy oil and 
metal stocks, which are hot sectors now. Therefore, managers try to cater to the time-
varying demand of investors by returning the subsidiaries in hot sectors to shareholders.   
 
Another possible behavioural reason for the significant focus-increasing spinoff value 
effects is because investors like focus-increasing transactions. Baker, Ruback and 
Wurgler (2004) argue that there is a time-varying pattern for investor demand for 
corporate diversification. In the 1960s, diversifying acquisitions experience positive 
market reactions while related acquisitions are penalised by stock markets (Matsusaka, 
1993). The diversification premium for acquisitions then declines in the 1970s and 
becomes negative in the 1980s (Morck et al., 1990). The changing investor appetite for 
conglomerates may equally explain the growing trend of corporate refocusing 
transactions since the 1980s (Berger and Ofek, 1995; Comment and Jarrell, 1995, Kaplan 
and Weisbach, 1992; Porter, 1987). A follow-up conjecture is that the spinoff value 
effects may be partly attributed to the temporary investor demand for corporate focus.  
 
Many empirical predictions of the behavioural view are similar to those suggested in 
prior explanations based on the efficiency view. The positive association between the 
focusing status of a spinoff and the spinoff announcement returns is predicted by the 
behavioural view since it argues that managers undertake spinoffs to exploit the 
misevaluation of different businesses of a conglomerate and/or to cater to investor 
demand for corporate focus. The positive association between information asymmetry 
measures and spinoff announcement returns is also predicted by the behavioural view 
because investors are more likely to overestimate the value consequences of a spinoff 
when the information uncertainty of the spinoff parent firm is high (Zhang, 2006).   
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The behavioural view of spinoff value effects also has a number of unique predictions. 
First, the market reaction to spinoff news is substantially influenced by investor demand 
for stocks of a spunoff subsidiary. Second, investor demand for stocks of a spunoff 
subsidiary may be irrational. Third, the managers have a rationale to exploit market 
mispricing of different businesses of a conglomerate by spinning off the overvalued 
subsidiaries to shareholders. Fourth, the spunoff subsidiaries from spinoffs to exploit the 
market mispricing tend to underperform the benchmark or spunoff subsidiaries from 
other types of spinoffs in the long term. However, at present, there is no empirical study 
testing the behavioural view of spinoff value effects because behavioural finance is an 
emerging field and there are difficulties in finding good proxy variables for investor 
irrationality. Therefore, it is ambiguous to say if the behavioural view can explain the 
evidence that is inconsistent with corporate focus and information asymmetry hypotheses 
as documented in the Veld and Veld-Merkoulova (2004 and 2005).  
 
2.5 Suggestions for Empirical Studies on Spinoff Value Effects 
There are several inferences which can be drawn from the review of the literature on 
corporate spinoff value effects. First, future empirical studies should compare both the 
behavioural view and the efficiency view in examining the spinoff value effects. The 
behavioural view of spinoff value effects can partially resolve why there are generally 
positive market reactions to spinoff announcements but long-term performance of post-
spinoff firms differs substantially across different periods and locations. Managers may 
cater to time-varying and location-varying investor demand for corporate focus by 
spinning off subsidiary businesses. However, extant empirical studies have not tested this 
behavioural view and thus are likely to report conflicting evidence on the efficiency view 
for different sample periods and countries.   
 
Second, future empirical studies should explore the issue of whether focus-increasing 
spinoffs create shareholder values by reducing agency costs associated with 
diversification.  Allen et al. (1995) find that the announcement period abnormal returns 
for spinoffs that begin with an acquisition are negatively correlated with the original 
acquisition announcement period abnormal returns. In other words, the spinoff gains 
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represent the re-creation of value destroyed at the time of an early acquisition. This 
evidence is in line with the argument of the governance-based hypothesis that a spinoff 
creates value by mitigating agency problems. Nevertheless, there is no direct evidence on 
the relationship between the agency costs and spinoff value effects. Berger and Ofek 
(1999) document the evidence on the association between the agency costs and 
refocusing value effects. However, the majority of refocusing transactions that they 
examine are asset sales. Thus, future empirical study examining the corporate focus 
hypothesis on corporate spinoffs should present clear evidence on this issue.  
 
Moreover, there is no empirical test on the impact of corporate governance on the long-
run spinoff performance. Cusatis et al. (1993) have documented evidence that the long-
term stock performance of post-spinoff firms is positively associated with the acquisition 
for the post-spinoff firms. However, they do not examine the impact of other corporate 
governance mechanisms. In essence, the governance-based hypothesis argues that 
spinoffs create shareholder value by reducing agency costs of spinoff parent firms if the 
strength of corporate control mechanisms is enhanced following the spinoff.  
 
Third, the information asymmetry hypothesis should be examined in more detail in future 
empirical studies. The evidence for the information asymmetry hypothesis is mixed. Veld 
and Veld-Merkoulova (2004) find weak empirical evidence for the information 
asymmetry hypothesis for a sample of European spinoffs. For their sample, there is a 
significant and positive association between the information asymmetry measures and 
spinoff announcement returns. However, they observe a negative relationship between the 
information asymmetry measures and long-run returns to post-spinoff firms. Therefore, it 
is important to examine whether there are significant changes of information asymmetry 
measures around a spinoff and whether the changes of information asymmetry measures 
are related to the long-term performance of post-spinoff firms.   
 
2.6 Summary 
This chapter reviews the arguments of both the efficiency view and behavioural view for 
the spinoff value effects. The efficiency view suggests that the underlying source of 
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spinoff value gains is the improvement of operating efficiency for post-spinoff firms, 
although the exact mechanisms of the improvement may vary. The behavioural view 
argues that the spinoff value effects can be driven by investors’ behavioural biases in 
valuing corporate spinoffs. The literature survey in this chapter demonstrates that extant 
studies have reported contradictory evidence for the explanations based on the efficiency 
view. This may be explained by the behavioural view but empirical evidence on the 
behavioural view is scanty. Future empirical research on corporate spinoffs should 
compare different predictions from these two views in explaining the spinoff value effects.  
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Chapter 3 Review of Literature on Stock Market Efficiency 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the theoretical arguments and empirical evidence on the market 
efficiency perspective on spinoffs. Arguments from both standard finance and 
behavioural finance are introduced and compared. The empirical evidence for each 
argument is surveyed. Further, important methodological issues in testing market 
efficiency are discussed. Finally, the extant empirical evidence on the long-run stock 
returns to spinoff announcements is critically assessed.   
 
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the efficient markets 
hypothesis. Section 3.3 summarises the empirical evidence and behavioural explanations 
for market misreaction. Section 3.4 summarises different asset pricing models proposed 
in past studies. Section 3.5 examines various return measurement methodologies for 
measuring long-run abnormal stock returns. Section 3.6 reviews the extant evidence of 
long-run abnormal stock returns to spinoffs. Section 3.7 concludes.   
  
3.2 The Efficient Markets Hypothesis 
Traditional finance assumes that investors rationally process all available information in 
the decision-making process. Based on this assumption, the Efficient Markets Hypothesis 
(EMH) contends that, if stock markets are efficient, stock prices should fully incorporate 
the expectations and information of all market participants. Rubinstein (2001) proposes 
that the EMH can even hold when investor rationality assumption is relaxed because (1) 
rational investors can quickly undo price deviations from fundamental values caused by 
irrational investors3; (2) irrational investors cannot survive for a long time due to their 
                                                 
3 This trading is also known as arbitrage, an investment strategy to profit from exploiting price differences 
of identical or similar financial instruments, which prevents market prices deviating from fundamental 
values of underlying securities. However, recent research has clearly indicated that rational investors do not 
always arbitrage mispricing caused by irrational investors because arbitrage tend to be very costly and 
highly risky (e.g. see Lamont and Thaler, 2003; Mitchell et al., 2002). 
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bad investment strategies; (3) mistakes of irrational investors can be self-cancelling at the 
aggregated level provided that these mistakes are randomly distributed. 
 
In Fama (1970), the EMH is subdivided into three forms. In a weak form efficient market, 
current stock prices reflect all information contained in past market trading data. If 
current stock prices reflect all publicly available information, the market is semi-strong 
form efficient. Finally, strong form efficient markets reflect all information, public or 
private. Based on a literature review of early studies, Fama (1970) concludes that the 
evidence against the EMH is rather sparse. Fama (1991) updates his review of the 
literature on market efficiency and changes the three forms of market efficiency to a) tests 
for return predictability, b) event studies, and c) tests for private information. In this paper 
he claims that event studies provide the cleanest evidence on the market efficiency since 
stock prices respond quickly to corporate event announcements, usually within just a few 
days.  
 
3.3 Market Misreaction and Behavioural Finance 
In recent years, however, a growing trend of research challenges the EMH by questioning 
the completeness and the unbiasedness of the immediate market reaction to corporate 
event announcements. On the one hand, an extensive body of empirical literature finds 
that markets appear to initially underreact to a broad range of corporate events. 
Specifically, stock markets positively react to positive news events while returns 
subsequent to the positive news events still show positive, long-horizon abnormal price 
drifts (e.g. see Grullon and Michaely (2004) and Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen 
(1995) for stock repurchases; Ikenberry and Ramnath (2002) for stock splits; Michaely, 
Thaler and Womack (1995) for dividend initiations). Similarly, negative news events 
generally experience a negative market reaction in the beginning and tend to be followed 
by negative price drifts in the long term (e.g. see Michaely et al., (1995) for dividend 
omissions; Taffler, Lu and Kausar (2004) for going-concern audit report disclosures).  
 
On the other hand, some empirical articles document that investors overreact to corporate 
news, with long-run return reversal subsequent to the news announcement. A notable 
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example of market overreaction is the carveout of Palm by 3Com which is described in 
Section 2.4. Market overreaction to corporate news is not limited to share offering cases 
in the internet bubble in the 1990s. A recent study by Antweiler and Frank (2006) 
demonstrates that US stock markets typically overreact to various types of corporate 
news. Based on an examination of 245,429 Wall Street Journal corporate news stories 
from 1973 to 2000, they observe that on average there is a reversal of market reaction to 
corporate news story so that pre-event and post-event abnormal returns have the opposite 
sign.  
 
Given the considerable evidence of market inefficiency, a behavioural stream of research 
has developed, seeking to attribute the observed market inefficiency to irrational 
investors who suffer from various cognitive biases. Following Tversky and Kahneman 
(1974), there has been a large finance literature demonstrating that investors are not fully 
rational in processing information and frequently make systematic mistakes in decision 
making due to common cognitive biases (for related literature reviews see Barberis and 
Thaler, 2003; Daniel, Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2002;  Hirshleifer, 2001; Shleifer, 2000).  
 
Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) present a behavioural model in which investors 
suffer from two cognitive biases, conservatism and representative heuristic. Conservatism 
means that investors are slow to change their prior beliefs in the face of new evidence 
conveyed in high-weight events. High-weight events are events carrying substantial 
valuation information. The representativeness heuristics suggests that investors have the 
tendency to focus too strongly on high-strength events. High-strength events are events 
marked by size or extremity, such as a long string of positive earnings changes. Barberis 
et al. (1998) argue that investors underreact to corporate news due to the conservatism 
bias while overreact to consistent patterns of good or bad news because of the 
repsentativeness heuristics. 
 
Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) provide a model based on two other 
cognitive biases, overconfidence and biased self-attribution. Investors are overconfident 
about their abilities to process private information, resulting in overreaction. Biased self-
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attribution refers to how investors respond to future signals regarding their private 
information. If the private information is subsequently confirmed by a public signal, the 
biased investors become even more overconfident. On the other hand, if there is a 
disconfirming signal, investors attribute the new information to chance and insufficiently 
revise their confidence downward. Eventually, when all information is revealed to the 
market, misvaluations are corrected, resulting in price reversals.  
 
A third model is provided by Hong and Stein (1999). Rather than describing investors 
with cognitive biases, Hong and Stein consider two types of investors, newswatchers and 
momentum traders, each of which is rational with respect to available information. 
According to the model, private information regarding fundamentals diffuses slowly to 
the newswatchers. This gradual information diffusion leads to undereaction and, hence, 
momentum in stock returns. Momentum traders cannot process fundamental information; 
they are only able to observe the behaviour of the newswatchers. They follow the 
newswatchers’ trades, arbitraging away any leftover underreaction. Herding by 
momentum traders eventually leads to overreaction. Reversals occur when prices return 
to their fundamental values. This model predicts stronger momentum in stocks for which 
information diffuses slowly. Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) provide supporting evidence by 
showing momentum trading is most profitable in the smallest stocks and those with the 
lowest analyst coverage after controlling for firm size.  
 
Although these different theoretical behavioural models are based on different 
assumptions, they all explain why market misreaction exists in certain circumstances. 
However, empirical evidence for these models is mixed. Fama (1998) argue that these 
behavioural models fail to give a consistent explanation for empirical findings of market 
misreaction since some empirical evidence is not always consistent with the theoretical 
predictions of these models. Take the behavioural model of Barberis et al (1998) as an 
example. Their prediction of long-term return reversal is consistent with the findings on 
seasoned equity offerings (Loughran and Ritter, 1995), new change listing (Dharan and 
Ikenberry, 1995) and returns to glamour acquiring firms in mergers (Rau and Vermaelen, 
1998). Those events are characterised by positive long-term abnormal post-event returns 
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and negative abnormal post-event returns. However, their model fail to explain events 
characterised by long-term post-event abnormal returns of the same sign as long-term 
pre-event returns, such as dividend initiations and omissions (Michaely et al., 1995) and 
stock splits (Ikenberry and Ramnath, 2002). 
 
Considering the ambiguity of event news and re-examining market reaction to four types 
of events previously reported as anomalies, Kadiyala and Rau (2004) argue that markets 
generally undereact rather than overreact to news. However, such conclusion is 
questionable because no strong theoretical justification is presented and further empirical 
tests are warranted.   
  
3.4 Asset Pricing Models 
A definition of efficient markets frequently used in empirical tests is that efficient 
markets are the one in which investors can not be allowed to “earn above-average returns 
without accepting above-average risks” (Malkiel, 2003). Consequently, testing market 
efficiency requires a model of risk and return. A well-specified model of normal returns 
must be used in order to conclude that some returns are abnormal. Fama (1998) suggests 
that because an asset pricing model must be used to test the efficient markets hypothesis, 
tests of the efficient markets hypothesis are subject to a joint hypothesis problem. When a 
study rejects market efficiency, the asset pricing model being used to test market 
efficiency may also be rejected. Because of the importance of models of risk and return in 
testing market efficiency, much of the debate over market efficiency has revolved around 
the joint hypothesis problem. 
 
Models of expected returns have played an important role in the testing of the efficient 
markets hypothesis since a rejection of efficient markets involves finding abnormal 
returns. Whether asset pricing models capture the risks or styles they claim to is a debate 
closely related to the literature on efficient markets. Models of expected returns begin 
with the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) (Sharpe, 1964). However, a large number of 
empirical studies have shown that the relationship between beta and returns does not exist 
(e.g. see Fama and French, 1992). In addition, beta has a significant difficulty in 
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explaining the returns to portfolios formed on market capitalisation and the ratio of book 
value to market value (Fama and French, 2004 and 2006).  
 
Since size and book-to-market characteristics appear to capture a large portion of the 
variation in the cross-section of returns, size and book-to-market factors were used by 
Fama and French (1993) to augment the capital asset pricing model and create a three-
factor model: 
1 2 3( ) ( )i f t M f t t tR R R R SMB HMLα β β β− = + − + +                                                         (3.1) 
SMB is the return on a portfolio long in small market capitalization stocks and short in 
big market capitalization stock. HML is the return on a portfolio long in high book-to-
market stocks and short in low book-to-market stocks.  
 
Despite its high explanatory power for cross-sectional stock returns, the Fama and French 
(1993) model is also not without its shortcomings. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993 and 2001) 
show that returns to portfolios formed on past returns cannot be explained by the returns 
to stocks of different size and book-to-market characteristics. The past return 
phenomenon, also known as price momentum, is used by Carhart (1997) for studying the 
returns to mutual finds. Carhart (1997) augments the Fama and French (1993) model with 
the momentum factor: 
1 2 3 4( ) ( )i f t M f t t tR R R R SMB HML UMDα β β β β− = + − + + +                                         (3.2) 
where UMD is the return on a portfolio long in stocks with high past returns and short in 
stocks with low past returns.  
 
A cautionary note should be made. The Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) 
factors are imperfect from a theoretical standpoint since both may be a product of data 
mining (see Berk 1995). There is evidence that Fama-French factors have limited power 
in explaining the cross-sectional stock returns. A recent study by Cremer, Nair and John 
(2005) shows that the three factor model cannot explain stock returns to takeover spread 
portfolios, which refers to an investment strategy that long firms subject to high takeover 
threats and short firms subject to low takeover threats.  Liu (2006) also proposes a capital 
asset pricing model incorporating both beta and a liquidity factor. He finds that the 
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liquidity-augmented model outperforms Fama-French three-factor model in explaining 
cross-sectional stock returns. However, these new multi-factor models face the same data 
mining issue as the Fama-French model. Further empirical work and theoretical models 
on asset pricing are expected to resolve this issue. 
 
3.5 Long-term Event Study Methodology 
Empirical challenges to asset pricing models have prompted researchers to develop a well 
specified and powerful methodology for measuring long-term abnormal stock returns. 
Barber and Lyon (1997) compare two methods for measuring long-term abnormal returns. 
Cumulative abnormal returns and buy and hold abnormal returns are examined using 
random sampling techniques. Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are defined as the 
summed difference in returns over a sample period between the actual return on a sample 
firm and the expected return on a sample firm: 
∑
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where )( ititit RERAR −= . Buy and hold abnormal returns (BHARs) are defined as the 
return on a buy and hold investment in a sample firm less the expected buy and hold 
investment in the sample firm: 
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Barber and Lyon (1997) notice a number of differences between the cumulative abnormal 
return method and the buy and hold abnormal return method. Test statistics are 
misspecified when using the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model to measure 
long-term cumulative abnormal returns. However, when cumulative abnormal returns are 
measured with size and book-to-market matched control firms, test statistics are well 
specified and powerful. Cumulative abnormal returns suffer from measurement bias. 
They are biased estimators of buy and hold abnormal returns. Barber and Lyon (1997) 
advocate using buy and hold abnormal returns since cumulative abnormal returns ignore 
the effects of compounding. In particular, buy and hold abnormal returns using size and 
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book-to-market matched control firms are considered well specified and powerful. 
 
Mitchell and Stafford (2000) compare buy and hold abnormal returns to calendar time 
abnormal portfolio returns. They suggest that the traditional test statistic is inflated when 
using buy and hold abnormal returns. A buy and hold methodology often falsely assumes 
independence among event observations. A bootstrapping procedure that is commonly 
used to correct for known biases of the buy and hold methodology does not account for 
the cross-sectional return dependence among event study observations. Their evidence 
shows that using an adjusted test statistic for buy and hold abnormal returns accounting 
for the correlation between event study observations substantially reduces the 
significance of test statistic. Lyon et al. (1999) and Jegadeesh and Karceski (2004) also 
propose different approaches to adjusting the traditional t-statistic and find that the 
significance of long-run abnormal returns reduces when an adjusted t-statistic is used. 
However, these new approaches require an estimation of variance-covariance matrix for 
monthly stock returns and the statistical inferences can be biased if the sample data are 
not sufficiently large. 
 
Instead of using buy and hold abnormal returns, Mitchell and Stafford advocate calendar 
time abnormal portfolios returns. This is because portfolios account for the correlation 
among observations through the portfolio’s variance term. In the calendar time approach, 
portfolio returns are usually regressed on a factor model and the intercept term or alpha is 
examined for significance. Non-event size/book-to-market portfolios have non-zero 
intercepts when regressed on the Fama and French (1993) model. Mitchell and Stafford 
(2000) suggest using control firm portfolios to correct the model misspecification. 
Control portfolios are created using non-event firms with size and book-to-market similar 
to event firms. Because size and book-to-market are similar for event and non-event 
portfolios, differences in size and book-to-market should not be the main cause of return 
differences between portfolios. In the case of long-term event studies, differences in 
abnormal returns from whether or not a firm has undertaken an event should be isolated 
in testing. Using non-event control firm portfolios, Mitchell and Stafford (2000) find no 
evidence of several long-term anomalies identified by previous researchers. Their 
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findings support the argument of Fama (1998) that most of anomalies will disappear 
when reasonable changes on methodology are made. 
 
In sum, the recent development of abnormal return methodology for long-run event 
studies has cast doubt on the validity of the anomalies documented in earlier studies. The 
use of appropriate return methodology becomes a critical issue in examining the market 
efficiency. 
 
3.6 Corporate Spinoffs and Market Efficiency 
Some research papers document that stock markets initially underreact to corporate 
spinoffs events. Cusatis et al. (1993) examine the post-event stock returns of spunoff 
subsidiaries and their parents for the 1965-1988 period. The abnormal returns are 
measured against the returns to industry- and size- matching firms. They find that both 
parents and subsidiaries have positive abnormal returns in the three years after the event. 
The abnormal returns are, however, limited to post-spinoff firms acquired in mergers. 
Cusatis et al. conclude that the stock market, at the spinoff announcement date, does not 
properly assess the increased probability of takeover and associated takeover premium 
following spinoffs. 
 
Positive abnormal returns to post-spinoff firms are also observed in Desai and Jain (1999). 
They find that parent (subsidiaries) firms involved in focus-increasing spinoffs earn 
significant positive abnormal returns of 25.37% (54.45%) over the three-year period 
subsequent to the spinoff completion. Their evidence suggests that markets do not fully 
appreciate the benefits from an increase in corporate focus for post-spinoff firms during 
the spinoff announcement period.  
 
The empirical evidence of superior returns to post-spinoff firms further suggests that 
investing in post-spinoff firms provides a profitable and feasible investment strategy for 
practitioners. Indeed, the press has continuously recommended investing in post-spinoff 
firms as an investment strategy to beat the market (e.g. Hayes, 1997; Serwer, 1992; Sivy, 
1996; and Siwolop, 1997). Recent financial news also reports that some professional 
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investment funds, such as Investec's Global Strategic Value Fund and hedge fund Gotham 
Capital, still use this strategy in stock selection (Financial Times, 1 March 2006). This 
report is striking since in an efficient market a known investment strategy should not 
remain economically profitable after such a long time.  
 
However, in an influential literature review of long-run event studies, Fama (1998) 
questions the validity of the post-event price drifts documented in the empirical literature.  
In particular, Fama argues that the empirical study of Cusatis et al. (1993) does not 
control for cross-sectional dependence problem. He further points out that a small 
adjustment of the cross-section relation can make the reported t-statistic in Cusatis et al. 
(1993) insignificant. Fama’s critique can also apply to the study of Desai and Jain (1999), 
which uses the traditional t-statistic to measure the significance of long-run post-spinoff 
abnormal returns.  
 
McConnell et al. (2001) have examined the simple investment strategy of buying post-
spinoff firms upon the spinoff completion. They use the buy and hold returns with the 
benchmarks are size- and book-to-market control portfolios and industry- and size- 
matching firms. They document some evidence of superior long-run returns to post-
spinoff firms when they use the bootstrap procedure to compute the t-statistic. However, 
for the calendar-time regression approach, they do not find the positive alphas in the 
regressions on the Fama-French (1993) three-factor model are significant for investment 
strategies with different holding periods. They claim that the findings of Cusatis et al. 
may be due to the biased methodology.  
 
Veld and Veld-Merkoulova (2004) also investigate the long-term stock performance of 
post-spinoff firms for a European spinoff sample. They employ the industry and size 
matching firm approach to compute the buy and hold returns. An approach advocated in 
Lyon et al (1999) is used to calculate the adjusted t-statistic in order to account for the 
cross-section event-firm-return correlation. They also report no superior returns to post-
spinoff firms up to the three-year period subsequent to the spinoff completion.  
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Although recent empirical studies demonstrate that there is no initial market 
underreaction to spinoff news (e.g. McConnell et al., 2001; Veld and Veld-Merkoulova, 
2004), the interpretation of their findings may be inappropriate. First, the recent two 
empirical studies are also subject to methodological biases. For McConnell et al. (2001), 
they do find superior returns to post-spinoff firms when the buy and hold returns are used. 
However, this may be because the bootstrap procedure they use does not account for the 
cross-section correlation problem. Although the calendar-time regression approach 
mitigates the event-firm-return dependence problem, they do not consider the 
heteroskedasticity issue arising from the changing number of event firms in the time-
series data. Loughran and Ritter (2000) criticise the approach of the calendar-time 
regression due to its lower power to detect long-term abnormal returns. Since there is a 
time clustering of corporate events, the averaging the returns to event firms over calendar 
months can substantially reduce the chance to find abnormal returns. An appropriate 
approach may be to use the weighted return over calendar months, where the weight 
refers to of the number of event firms in the holding portfolio for each calendar month.  
 
For Veld and Veld-Merkoulova (2004), the approach of buy and hold returns relative to 
industry- and size matching firm is particularly problematic for their European spinoff 
sample. Since many European stock markets are of small size4, the number of industry 
peers is limited and the closest size matching firm within the same industry may be far 
smaller or larger than the spinoff firm. Therefore, the size is not strictly controlled in 
calculating the abnormal returns in Veld and Veld-Merkoulova (2004). Moreover, the 
matching firm selection is based on the universe of firms listed in local countries. This 
procedure may pick up the firms which have recently completed a spinoff as control 
firms. Such a case is not unusual. Three largest commercial banks in Sweden spun off 
their real estate subsidiaries almost within the same time period in the early 1990s. 
Finally, the adjusted t-statistic approach of Lyon et al may not be appropriate for the 
study of Veld and Veld-Merkoulova (2004) because this approach requires an estimation 
of abnormal return covariance across each pair of event firms. For a sample size of 156 
                                                 
4 For example, there are less than 100 listed firms in the Ireland, on average, over the period from 1990 to 
2005 based on the equity data of Datastream.   
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firms in Veld and Veld-Merkoulova (2004), this approach needs estimating 12,246 
(156(156+1)/2) variance and covariance terms. Since the sample period of Veld and Veld-
Merkoulova (2004) is just 156 months, it is difficult to precisely estimate such a large 
number of parameters when there are 156*156=24,336 monthly stock returns available. 
 
3.7 Summary  
This chapter reviews the literature on stock market efficiency. Standard finance literature 
does not take investor irrationality into account and argues that stock markets are efficient 
in reacting to corporate events. In contrast, behavioural finance literature shows that 
investors suffer from common cognitive biases and tend to make systematic mistakes in 
valuing stocks, therefore resulting in either the initial market underreaction to events or 
the initial overreaction to corporate news. Empirical evidence on market efficiency is 
mixed and difficult to interpret because the empirical study testing market efficiency 
subject to a joint hypothesis problem, which means that researchers have to test both 
market efficiency and the goodness of the asset pricing model used (Ang and Zhang, 
2004; Fama, 1998). However, the review shows that the currently used asset pricing 
models are not well-specified and most abnormal returns documented in long-run event 
studies are based on biased return methodologies. The recent literature has suggested 
several different robust methodologies to measure long-run abnormal returns. Finally, I 
examine past studies on the long-run spinoff performance. I find that most empirical 
studies of spinoffs have not used robust abnormal return methodologies and the validity 
of their conclusions is open to question.  
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Chapter 4 Research Questions  
 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapters 2 - 3 discuss the theories and empirical evidence related to the market reaction 
to spinoff announcements. This chapter identifies the gap in the current research of 
spinoff value effects based on the preceding literature reviews. Two research questions 
are then proposed to explore the market reaction to spinoff announcements.  
 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 identifies the gap in the 
current research on the spinoff value gains and proposes research questions about the 
market reaction to spinoff announcements. Section 4.3 discusses the factors that may 
affect the market reaction to spinoff announcements based on the preceding literature 
reviews. Section 4.4 concludes.  
 
4.2 Literature Gap and Research Questions 
Chapter 2 reviews the literature that focuses on the value sources of spinoff wealth effects. 
Past studies have proposed different explanations for the spinoff wealth effects. However, 
empirical evidence for these explanations is either mixed or scanty. 
 
First, recent finance literature has demonstrated that the short run stock market reaction to 
corporate news is often incomplete or biased, as shown in section 3.3. Some professional 
investment funds even view post-spinoff firms as investment candidates in order to earn 
superior portfolio returns (Dennis, 2006). However, the empirical evidence of the 
superior returns to post-spinoff firms is questioned by Fama (1998) due to the 
methodological concern. Section 3.6 further examines the extant evidence of the long-run 
spinoff stock performance and finds that past studies have not used robust return 
methodology in estimating the abnormal stock returns to post-spinoff firms. Thus, 
whether the stock market is efficiently valuing a corporate spinoff is still unclear.   
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Market inefficiency may occur because investors react to corporate events for non-
fundamental factors. A notable example is that investors may over-extrapolate the past 
performance of event firms to assess the value implications of the event (e.g. see Rau and 
Vermaelen, 1998; Rosen, 2006). Corporate spinoffs are joint events combining both 
focus-increasing divestitures and equity offerings of a subsidiary. Therefore, the market 
reaction to spinoff announcements may be affected by investors’ unrealistic demand for 
glamour stocks when the offspring’s industry is hot sector (e.g. see Montier, 2002, 
Chapter 7). However, there is no empirical test on the relationship between investor 
sentiment and spinoff value gains. Thus, it is unknown whether investor sentiment affects 
the spinoff value gains. 
 
Theories derived from the governance-based model argue that corporate spinoffs enhance 
firm performance by improving corporate governance and mitigating agency problems. 
For example, Allen et al. (1995) find that spinoff announcement gains are negatively 
associated with the value losses from the prior diversifying acquisitions. Given that 
diversifying acquisitions are often due to agency problems (e.g. Amihud and Lev, 1981), 
the evidence of Allen et al. (1995) indicates spinoff gains stem from the reduction of the 
agency conflicts of diversification.  
 
However, the value benefits of efficiency improvement in post-spinoff firms may not be 
realised when the corporate governance in post-spinoff firms is weak and the agency 
conflicts remain severe. As discussed in sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.3, empirical studies have 
not directly examined the relationship between corporate governance and spinoff value 
gains. Therefore, it is not clear whether the governance-based model can explain the 
spinoff value gains.  
 
Hypotheses derived from the information-based model contend that corporate spinoffs 
improve firm valuation by alleviating information asymmetry problems. Theoretical 
models by Habib, Johnsen and Naik (1997) and Nanda and Narayanan (1999) propose 
that spinoffs expand the financial disclosures and increase the informativeness of the 
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stock prices, thus improving the investors’ understanding of post-spinoff firms. 
Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) further present evidence that spinoff value gains 
arise from the reduction of information asymmetry following the spinoffs.  
 
Empirical evidence on the information asymmetry hypothesis is also mixed. 
Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) use financial analyst forecast data to derive 
several information asymmetry proxies such as analyst forecast errors and the dispersion 
of analyst forecasts. They find that these information asymmetry proxies improve 
following spinoffs and the level of information problems for pre-spinoff firms is 
positively associated with the announcement returns to spinoff firms. However, Veld and 
Veld-Merkoulova (2005) use similar information asymmetry proxies but find an 
insignificant association between information asymmetry proxies and spinoff 
announcement returns.  
 
There are two theories that predict no information transparency benefits from spinoffs. 
Thomas (2002) proposes an information diversification hypothesis that diversified firms 
may have less information asymmetry problems than focused firms because analyst 
forecast errors for different divisions of a diversified firm can be offsetting and the 
aggregated earning forecast for a diversified firm is thus more accurate than that for a 
focused firm. Goldman (2005) argues that a spinoff may reduce the liquidity of stocks of 
post-spinoff firms and hence the market’s incentive to collect information is reduced, thus 
resulting in an increase of information asymmetry of post-spinoff firms.   
 
Given mixed evidence on the information asymmetry hypothesis, it is possible that the 
information asymmetry hypothesis may only hold for a sub-sample of spinoff parent 
firms. Past empirical tests on the information asymmetry hypothesis examine the cross-
sectional changes of information asymmetry problems, which may not be able to provide 
a powerful test on the information asymmetry hypothesis. Thus, it remains ambiguous 
whether the information asymmetry hypothesis can explain the spinoff value gains.  
 
To sum up, the extant literature has not fully explained the sources of spinoff 
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announcement gains and the evidence on market efficiency in valuing spinoffs is mixed. 
This thesis aims to fill the literature gap by empirically investigating the short-run and the 
long-run market reaction to spinoff announcement. Specifically, two research questions 
are addressed in this thesis: 
1. Do corporate spinoffs really create shareholder value?  
2. What are the determinants of spinoff value effects?  
 
In the following section, I set out the possible explanations based on the literature reviews 
to answer these two research questions.  
 
4.3 Factors of Spinoff Value Effects 
This section outlines the factors of spinoff value effects, which may explain the short-run 
and the long-run market reaction to spinoff announcements. Further, the research design 
to conduct an empirical investigation is presented. 
 
4.3.1 Market Efficiency 
Section 3.6 shows that there is inconclusive evidence on market efficiency to react to 
spinoff news. Earlier studies document significant and positive long-run abnormal returns 
to post-spinoff firms (e.g. Cusatis et al., 1993; Desai and Jain, 1999). However, Fama 
(1998) argues that most of long-run post-event abnormal returns will disappear after 
reasonable changes in methodology are made. Subsequent research has used different 
return measures and finds no evidence that post-spinoff firms earn superior long run 
abnormal returns (e.g. Veld and Veld-Merkoulova, 2004). However, there are still some 
problems for the return methodologies used in subsequent research. For instance, the 
adjusted t-statistic used by Veld and Veld-Merkoulova (2004) needs to estimate the 
correlation matrix between all months where returns of post-spinoff firms overlap. Given 
that the sample time period is not long, their estimation may be unreliable.   
 
Thus, the final issue that I address in the empirical investigation of spinoff value gains is: 
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are stock markets efficient in reacting to spinoff announcements? In Chapter 5, I use 
several robust return methodologies proposed in the recent literature to estimate the long 
run abnormal returns to post-spinoff firms. To ensure the robustness of results, I use both 
the buy-and-hold abnormal return measures and the calendar time portfolio approach. In 
addition, I analyse the long-run abnormal returns to focus-increasing spinoffs since the 
prior literature suggests that stock markets may only underreact to focus-increasing 
spinoffs. If European stock markets were inefficient, there would be significant positive 
or negative long-run abnormal returns to post-spinoff firms.  
 
4.3.2 Investor Irrationality  
As indicated in section 3.2, behavioural finance theory argues that investors are not fully 
rational and are likely to be subject to cognitive biases in making investment decisions. 
For instance, investors may react to corporate events for non-fundamental-value based 
reasons. Corporate spinoffs are joint events combining divestitures and equity offerings 
of subsidiary firms. Some practitioners contend that corporate spinoffs receive positive 
market reaction because investors have strong demands for corporate focus and/or for the 
subsidiary’s stocks (Dennis, 2006). 
  
Consequently, there is one issue which needs to be addressed: do investor sentiment 
affects the market reaction to spinoff announcements? Corporate spinoffs are joint events 
combining a refocusing divestiture and the equity listing of a subsidiary. Extant literature 
has not examined whether investor sentiment about the refocusing and glamour stocks 
can affect the market reaction to spinoff announcements. In order to examine this 
possibility, I employ several market-based valuation measures for focused firms and for 
the spinoff subsidiary’s industry. I then examine whether these valuation measures are 
related to the short-run market reaction to spinoff announcements.  
 
Provided that stock markets are not always efficient, it is interesting to know whether 
market inefficiency will have effects on managerial decisions. Since managers have 
private information about the firm operation, they may be able to perceive the market 
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misvaluation of different businesses within the firm they are managing. Then I conduct 
further tests to explore whether rationale managers tend to conduct spinoffs to cater to 
investor demand for certain types of subsidiary stocks. All these empirical tests and 
results are reported in Chapter 6.  
 
4.3.3 Corporate Governance 
This governance-based model for spinoff value effects starts from the presumption that 
corporate diversification is detrimental for shareholders due to agency problems. Agency 
theory argues that self-interested managers tend to pursue a value-destroying 
diversification for augmenting their power and prestige (Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990) and 
their compensation (Jensen and Murphy, 1990), to reduce personal wealth risk (Amihud 
and Lev, 1981), and to increase of job security (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989).  
 
Conversely, corporate restructurings can benefit shareholders by increasing corporate 
focus to mitigate these agency costs associated with diversification. Berger and Ofek 
(1999) find managers make value-enhancing corporate refocusing transactions after the 
disciplinary events such as outside shareholder pressure, managerial turnover and 
substantial performance decline. Allen et al. (1995) document evidence that a spinoff 
creates value by reversing the value loss from earlier mistaken acquisition.  
 
Although these above findings imply that restructuring gains come from the reduction of 
agency conflicts, there is no empirical study directly testing this prediction. In addition, 
most of empirical studies focus on the short-run market reaction, which sometimes may 
be inefficient and the conclusions based on the announcement effects may be biased (see 
section 3.3 for related discussion).   
 
I test this governance-based hypothesis by analysing the relationship between the strength 
of corporate governance of firms involved in corporate spinoffs and spinoff value gains. 
If spinoffs are conducted to mitigate agency problems, I expect that (1) spinoff parent 
firms have more severe agency problems than non-spinoff control firms, which can be 
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related to the strength of a firm’s corporate governance mechanisms, (2) spinoff parent 
firms with weak corporate governance earn higher announcement period returns than 
those with strong corporate governance since a spinoff can create more shareholder value 
by reducing agency costs in the former, and (3) post-spinoff firms that have an 
improvement in corporate governance earn higher long-run abnormal stock returns than 
those without an improvement in corporate governance.  
 
I consider a number of different corporate governance mechanisms, including corporate 
board, executive ownership, blockholders, lenders, security analysts, market for corporate 
control, product market competition, and the legal system. All these corporate governance 
mechanisms have been examined extensively in the prior research (for recent review 
articles see Becht, Bolton and Roell, 2002; Denis and McConnell, 2003). However, few 
research has tested the value impact of these governance mechanism altogether. Therefore, 
it is not clear whether the strength of corporate governance mechanisms is related to the 
firm value and which form of corporate governance mechanism leads to shareholder 
value creation in corporate restructurings such as spinoffs.  I propose governance-based 
hypothesis to explain spinoff value effects and conduct empirical tests on these 
hypotheses in Chapter 7. 
 
4.3.4 Information Asymmetry 
A frequently cited reason for managers to undertake a spinoff is to improve investors’ 
understanding of the divesting firm. The market undervaluation problem for a multi-
division firm can arise because investors cannot unambiguously observe divisional cash 
flows (Nanda and Narayanan, 1999). For instance, ITT decided to split itself into three 
distinct parts because “ITT’s fast-growing leisure business” was “submerged by the more 
staid manufacturing and insurance businesses”5. Conversely, a spinoff creates separate 
businesses that investors are able to understand and makes the stock price of post-spinoff 
firms more informative (Habib et al., 1997). Therefore, Krishnaswami and Subramaniam 
                                                 
5 See Lex Column, Financial Times, June 14, 1995. 
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(1999) propose the information asymmetry hypothesis that a spinoff can create 
shareholder value by mitigating the information asymmetry problem. 
 
On the other hand, there are doubts about the information benefits of a spinoff. First, 
corporate diversification does not strictly exacerbate the information asymmetry problem. 
Thomas (2002) proposes an information diversification hypothesis that diversified firms 
have information benefits due to the aggregated nature of financial reports. He points out 
that, if the errors that investors make in forecasting segment cash flows are not perfectly 
positively correlated, the consolidated forecast for a multi-segment firm may be more 
accurate than a forecast for a single-segment firm. Second, the information asymmetry 
problem for a spinoff firm may exacerbate following a spinoff when either post-spinoff 
firm is covered by fewer equity analysts and institutional investors. This will happen 
when a spinoff firm’s size becomes lower than the coverage threshold of those investment 
analysts following a spinoff. Goldman (2005) argues that the market’s incentive to collect 
information is negatively related to a firm’s liquidity. Thus, a spinoff may lead to 
worsening information asymmetry problems since the liquidity of post-spinoff firms 
might decrease.   
 
Empirical evidence on the information asymmetry hypothesis is mixed. Krishnaswami 
and Subramaniam (1999) and Gilson et al. (2001) both find that the accuracy of analysts’ 
earnings forecast for a spinoff firm improves following the spinoff transaction. 
Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) further document a positive association between 
the information asymmetry level of a spinoff firm prior to the spinoff and the market 
reaction to spinoff announcement. Krishnaswami and Subramaniam claim that 
information benefits are a source of spinoff value gains. On the contrary, Veld and Veld-
Merkoulova (2004, 2006) use similar information asymmetry proxies as Krishnaswami 
and Subramaniam (1999) but document no evidence for the information asymmetry 
hypothesis for both samples of European and American spin-offs. In addition, Huson and 
MacKinnon (2003) observe that the information asymmetry level of a spinoff firm 
actually increases subsequent to a spinoff based on the market microstructure data such as 
the bid-ask spread. This contradictory evidence may be due to different information 
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asymmetry measures used in Huson and MacKinnon (2003). 
 
To address this issue, I re-examine the information asymmetry hypothesis of spinoff 
value gains with a sample of European spinoffs. I use four information asymmetry 
proxies, based on both the analysts’ earning forecasts and the market microstructure data, 
to conduct a comprehensive test of the information asymmetry hypothesis. The empirical 
results and analysis are presented in Chapter 8.  
 
4.4 Summary 
This chapter identifies the literature gap and suggests two research questions. Since 
different theories use the market reaction to spinoff announcements to measure the extent 
of spinoff value gains, it is important to examine the efficiency of market reaction to 
spinoff news, which is also the second research question addressed in this thesis. Existing 
finance literature shows that stock markets may overreact or underreact initially to 
corporate news and correct such a reaction in a long run. However, the evidence of long-
run post-event price drift is subject to question primarily due to possible methodological 
deficiencies as discussed in section 3.6. Using more robust return methodologies, I 
investigate whether stock markets react to spinoff announcements in a complete and 
unbiased manner in Chapter 5. Specifically, I use the buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
approach, calendar-time regressions on multi-factor models and calendar-time portfolio 
abnormal returns approach to examine the significance of long-run abnormal returns to 
spinoffs. I also compute the long-run abnormal accounting returns for robustness checks. 
 
One explanation of positive spinoff announcement effects is that investor sentiments 
drive the market reaction to spinoff announcements. In Chapter 6, I study whether 
investor demand for corporate focus (and investor demand for glamour stocks) affects the 
spinoff value gains. I also propose a catering theory of spinoffs to explain managerial 
decisions to spin off overvalued subsidiaries to irrational investors.  
 
In the last two empirical chapters, I use different approaches to test the predictions of the 
governance-based and information-based models. In Chapter 7, I examine whether 
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corporate spinoffs create shareholder value by reducing agency costs. In Chapter 8, I 
investigate whether corporate spinoffs create shareholder value by mitigating information 
asymmetry problems. I use different information asymmetry proxies proposed in earlier 
studies and specifically test several predictions of the information asymmetry hypothesis.   
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Chapter 5 Market Efficiency and Spinoff Value Effects 
 
5.1 Introduction 
As shown in section 3.6, the extant evidence on the long-run spinoff performance is 
mixed. Earlier studies show that both parent and offspring earn significant and positive 
abnormal returns in the three-year post-spinoff period (e.g. Cusatis et al, 1993; Daley et 
al., 1997; Desai and Jain, 1999). Recent research, however, demonstrates that post-spinoff 
firms do not earn superior stock returns in the long term (e.g. McConnell et al, 2000; Veld 
and Veld-Merkoulova, 2004). Fama (1998) contends that most long-run event studies do 
not use robust return methodologies and their conclusions are open to question. In 
particular, Fama points out that the long-run abnormal returns of post-spinoff firms in 
Cusatis et al. (1993) do not account for the cross-sectional return-dependence issue. 
 
In section 3.5, I outline several different return calculation methodologies to control the 
cross-sectional dependence problem. The aim of this chapter is to investigate the spinoff 
value effects with these robust methodologies and assess the efficiency of European stock 
markets in valuing corporate spinoffs. The sample is 170 completed spinoffs in Europe 
between the years 1987 and 2005. There are two testable hypotheses as suggested in 
chapter 3. 
 
The first one is related to the initial market reaction to spinoff announcements, which is 
stated below: 
H1: Spinoff parent firms earn significant and positive announcement returns.  
 
The second one is related to the long-run market reaction to spinoff announcements, 
which is presented as follows: 
H2: Post-spinoff firms do not earn superior long-run stock returns.  
 
I first test hypothesis H1 to examine whether spinoff parent firms experience favourable 
market reactions during the spinoff announcement period. I use the standard event study 
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methodology, the market model, to estimate the abnormal returns to spinoff parent firms 
during the spinoff announcement period (Brown and Warner, 1985; Campbell, Lo and 
MacKinlay, 1997; Dodd and Warner, 1983; Kothari and Warner, 2006). I also apply a 
world market model to compute the abnormal announcement period returns in order to 
account for the impact of global stock markets and foreign exchange rates on the stock 
returns to spinoff parents (Park, 2004). Using different models I report qualitatively 
similar results, i.e. that there is a significant and positive market reaction to spinoff 
announcements.  Further analyses of announcement returns to UK spinoffs and those to 
non-UK spinoffs show that positive spinoff announcement effects exist for both UK and 
non-UK countries. 
 
I then examine the long-run stock returns to post-spinoff firms, which are related to 
hypothesis H2. The empirical investigation employs three different return calculation 
approaches, including the characteristic-based matching approach or the BHAR approach, 
the calendar-time regression approach or the CTRG approach and the calendar-time 
portfolio abnormal return approach or the CTAR approach. The use of different return 
methodologies is motivated by the argument of Fama (1998) that long-run event studies 
should use alternative return approaches to test market efficiency.  
 
Barber and Lyon (1997) argue that the buy-and-hold approach accurately measures the 
true investment experience of investors and the characteristic-based matching approach 
has significant powers in detecting the long-run abnormal returns. The BHAR approach 
in this study uses two different benchmarks, returns to size- and book-to-market-control 
portfolio and returns to industry- and size-matching firm (Barber and Lyon, 1997; 
Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen. 1995; Lyon et al. 1999). The size- and book-to-
market-control portfolio construction is used to capture two important risk factors 
identified in Fama and French (1993). The industry- and size-matching firm construction 
is employed because Fama and French (1997) show that it is important to control the 
industry-specific risks when measuring cross-sectional stock returns. In addition, this 
industry- and size-matching firm approach facilitates the comparison of my results with 
evidence from earlier empirical studies such as Desai and Jain (1999) and Veld and Veld-
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Merkoulova (2004).  
 
An important issue for the BHAR approach is to control the cross-sectional return 
dependence problem. I use the four different methodologies outlined in Section 3.5 to 
assess the significance of long-run abnormal returns to post-spinoff firms. Specifically, 
they are the adjusted t-statistics based on the covariance estimation proposed in Lyon et al. 
(1999) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000), and the serial correlation and heteroskedasticity-
consistent tests proposed in Jegadeesh and Karceski (2004).  
 
Fama (1998) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000) prefer the calendar time regression (CTRG) 
approach to the BHAR approach because the BHAR approach can boost the abnormal 
returns over a long period even if there is no true abnormal return. The CTRG approach 
in this chapter employs two different benchmarks, the Fama-French (1993) three-factor 
model and Carhart (1997) four-factor model. My spinoff sample covers different 
European countries. A way to use the CTRG approach is to estimate these two multi-
factor models for each sample European country and then construct value-weighted factor 
models for the whole sample, where the weight is the monthly stock market value of each 
sample country. However, Griffin (2002) argues that Fama-French factors are country-
specific and a country-weighted factor models have a poor power in explaining cross-
sectional stock returns. Thus, I estimate the Fama-French (1993) three-factor model and 
Carhart (1997) four-factor model only for the UK since the number of sample firms in a 
non-UK European country is too small for using the CTRG approach.  
 
For the empirical testing with the CTRG approach, I weight calendar months by the 
number of post-spinoff firm observations in the month to take into account the managers’ 
timing decision to undertake corporate spinoffs (Fama, 1998; Kothari and Warner, 2006). 
Loughran and Ritter (2000) contend that a calendar-time approach that simply averages 
event observations over “hot” and “cold” periods will have lower power in detecting the 
long-run abnormal returns to event firms. The calendar time approach adjusting monthly 
observation numbers used in this study can mitigate the problem as discussed in 
Loughran and Ritter (2000).  
  
 50
 
I further use the calendar time portfolio abnormal returns (CTAR) approach to calculate 
average abnormal returns to post-spinoff firms for each calendar month, where the 
expected returns on the event portfolio are proxied by returns to size- and book-to-
market-control portfolios and returns to industry- and size-matching firms. Mitchell and 
Stafford (2000) advocate the CTAR approach because it has sufficient power to detect 
abnormal performance relative to the CTRG approach. In addition, Mitchell and Stafford 
argue that the CTAR approach is less subject to the event-firm-return correlation problem 
than the BHAR approach since the potentially correlated sample observations are 
grouped over calendar months. Finally, the CTAR approach is easier to understand and 
implement for professional investment practitioners than the BHAR approach. For the 
CTAR approach, the performance of post-spinoff firms is reported on a calendar time 
basis, which is consistent with the performance reporting practice of fund managers.  
 
As a robustness check, the long-run abnormal BHARs to post-spinoff parent/offspring 
combined firms are regressed on the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) to spinoff 
announcements. This approach allows me to detect whether the positive and significant 
announcement returns are followed by long-run price drifts. The regressions of BHARs 
with different holding periods present consistent evidence that European stock markets 
efficiently react to spinoff announcement news.  
 
Finally, I investigate the long-run accounting returns to spinoff parents and spunoff 
subsidiaries, which also test hypothesis H2. Following Barber and Lyon (1996) and 
Ghosh (2001), three different methods are employed to obtain the benchmark accounting 
returns, including the industry-adjusted returns on assets (ROAs), the industry- and size-
adjusted ROAs, and the industry- and performance-adjusted ROAs.   
 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 outlines the sample selection. 
Section 5.3 reports the stock returns to the sample spinoff parent firms during the spinoff 
announcement period. Section 5.4 presents the evidence on long-run stock returns to 
post-spinoff firms compared with different benchmark returns. Section 5.5 analyses the 
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long-term abnormal accounting returns to post-spinoff firms against several industry-
based benchmarks. Section 5.6 conducts the robustness checks. Section 5.7 concludes.  
 
5.2 Spinoff Sample Selection 
This study analyses a sample of European spinoffs. A European spinoff is defined as a 
spinoff where a European parent firm spins off a subsidiary. This subsidiary can be either 
from the same or from a different country. All European countries are taken into account 
initially, with the exception of the Eastern European countries because I have limited 
financial data for these countries. Both parent and offspring must be independently 
managed and separately valued at the stock market after the completion of the spinoff. I 
also require that the spinoff parent should distribute a majority of its interests in the 
subsidiary to its existing shareholders since the offspring would not be independently 
managed if the offspring were still subject to the control of its parent.  
 
The sample of European spinoffs covers the period from January 1987 to December 2005. 
The spinoff sample is gathered from SDC M&A Database. The sample countries searched 
include Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Norway, 
the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. The 
initial sample consists of 367 spinoffs, where the transactions were announced during the 
sample period. 
 
The data selection process in this study uses the following screening criteria and the 
reduction of observations following the application of a criterion is reported in 
parentheses: 
a) parent firms or offspring firms have no stock price information in Datastream 
(67);  
b) other types of restructuring transaction are mistakenly recorded as spinoffs in 
SDC, such as divestiture of a joint-venture with multi-parents, privatisation deals 
and asset redistribution as part of a merger deal (19)6;  
                                                 
6 The SDC often includes other types of restructurings in the spinoff sample. For example, SDC records the 
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c) less than 50% of interests of offspring are distributed to existing shareholders (9)7;  
d) the same spinoff announcements are double counted in SDC (9)8; 
e) offspring are already listed before the spinoff (6);  
f) parents are not trading in the Europe (6);  
g) the shares of offspring  are sold to either existing shareholders or the market (3); 
and  
h) the announced spinoffs are not completed by the end of year 2005 (78).  
 
I identify the spinoff announcement dates by cross-checking the spinoff transactions with 
the details in the press reports via the Factiva newspaper database. Specifically, I search 
the Factiva database at least one year before the SDC-identified spinoff announcement 
date for the earliest press announcement of the spinoff. When an announcement is 
reported in the news, I search back another year from that date to confirm that there are 
no earlier announcements.  
 
The cross-checking of announcement dates is undertaken because I am primarily 
interested in the initial market reaction to the spinoff announcement. I find that, for my 
sample, 157 out of 170 completed spinoffs have earlier announcement dates in the news 
reports than the SDC-identified announcement dates. In addition, the calculation of 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) based on SDC-identified announcement dates will 
                                                                                                                                                 
spinoff of the Adam and Harvey unit of Stocklake Holdings to its shareholders in July 1991. However, the 
deal was actually part of the liquidation plan of Stocklake Holdings. Stocklake Holdings’ shares were 
delisted in September 1991. Another example is the spinoff of their non-automotive business to 
shareholders by Sommer Allibert SA in 2001 as recorded in SDC. The spinoff was actually undertaken to 
facilitate the acquisition of Sommer Allibert SA by Peugeot Citroen. I remove non-spinoff transactions 
from the spinoff sample when they are either part of a complex restructuring plan or part of a predefined 
merger plan since those transactions are not spinoff and such transaction announcement news often contains 
confounding information. 
7 This sample selection criterion is chosen for two reasons. First, I hope that our results are comparable with 
earlier US studies on corporate spinoffs. Prior US studies typically define a spinoff as a divestiture where 
the majority of shares of the subsidiary are distributed to the parent’s existing shareholders.  Second, I want 
to avoid the cases where parent firms retain the control over offspring firms in the post-spinoff period, 
where the performance of either parent of offspring firm might be substantially affected by the related 
transactions. A more than 50% interest of the subsidiary held by the parent in the post-spinoff period could 
allow parent managers to make such transactions. Thus it is difficult to assess the real long-term value 
creation from a spinoff under such circumstances.  
8 When a parent firm is split into two or three independent firms via a spinoff, SDC sometimes records the 
number of spinoffs as the number of independent post-spinoff firms rather than the number of offspring 
firms. I remove the spinoff announcement about the post-spinoff parent firm from the sample in such cases. 
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be quite different from that based on the earliest announcement dates in the news reports. 
For example, SDC reports that Culver Holdings announced the spinoff of World Travel 
Holdings on May 22nd, 2000. The two-day announcement period (-1, 0) CARs based on 
an estimated market model is -0.66%. However, the actual earliest announcement date is 
December 23rd, 1999 (see ‘Culver Holdings PLC Prop. Offer for Shr Subscriptn’, 
Regulatory News Service, December 23rd, 1999). The two-day announcement period (-1, 
0) CARs based on the earliest announcement date using the same method is 10.54%. 
 
A further check of the SDC-identified spinoff completion dates is conducted with the 
details of a spinoff transaction in the news reports via Factiva and the stock price data in 
Datastream. This cross-checking is undertaken to confirm the completion status of a 
spinoff and to obtain an accurate completion date. I find that SDC sometimes mistakenly 
classifies one spinoff as uncompleted when the spinoff was actually completed.9 When 
there are mistakes in the SDC-reported completion details identified by crosschecking, I 
amend the sample data based on the verified information. 
 
The final sample includes 170 completed European spinoff deals during the sample 
period, including 144 spinoff parent and 170 offspring firms, where 10 parents spin off 
two subsidiaries at the same time, 3 parents spin off three subsidiaries concurrently, and a 
further 13 parents conducted spinoffs at different times during the sample period. The 
number of European spinoffs will be 157 if I consider the firms announcing spinoffs at 
different times as different observations. For the completed spinoff sample, parents 
operate in 46 different industries and offspring operate in 50 different industries (defined 
as the two-digit SIC level). In total, both parent and offspring operate in 59 different 
industries.  
 
The final spinoff sample covers 13 European countries. The earliest year with spinoff 
data available in my sample is the year 1987. Table 5.1 shows the distribution of 170 
                                                 
9 For example, SDC reports that the spinoff of three units (EQ Holdings, Evox Rifa Holdings, and Vestcap) 
by Finvest Oy in March 2000 is pending (at the data collection date, February 2006). Actually, the spinoff 
was completed on November 1st, 2000 (See ‘Finvest Details Demerger Listing Plan’, Reuters News, 
October 26th, 2000). 
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completed spinoff deals by the parent’s listing country and announcement year.  
 
[Insert Table 5.1 about here, see page 77] 
 
5.3 Spinoff Announcement Period Stock Returns 
Existing studies suggest alternative methodologies to estimate the announcement period 
abnormal returns to corporate events, such as market adjusted returns, abnormal returns 
based on the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model, and abnormal returns relative 
to reference portfolios (e.g. size-matching firms). As discussed in section 3.5, argue that 
different methodologies often yield qualitatively similar results for estimating short-run 
abnormal returns to event firms because the statistical problems are trivial within a short 
event window such as the three-day announcement period (Kothari and Warner, 2006). 
Fama (1991 and 1998) also contends that event studies provide the strongest support to 
the efficient market hypothesis because the stock markets respond to corporate 
announcements quickly and completely within several days.  
 
Therefore, I employ a standard event-study methodology, the market model, as described 
in Campbell et al. (1997: Chapter 4) and Kothari and Warner (2006)10. The formula for 
expected return for firm i  in time t  based on a market model is given by: 
it i i MtR Rα β= +                                                                                                                 (5.1) 
Where the parameters iα  and iβ are estimated by regressing the security return, itR , on 
the market return, MtR , for the estimation period. 
 
The abnormal returns are defined as the difference between actual stock returns and 
expected stock returns: 
( )it it itAR R E R= −                                                                                                             (5.2) 
Where itAR is the abnormal return, itR is the realised return and ( )itE R  is the expected 
                                                 
10 The same event methodology is initially proposed in Dodd and Warner (1983) and has been used in prior 
empirical studies on corporate spinoffs, such as Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) and Veld and 
Veld-Merkoulova (2004).  
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return on firm i  for period t . The expected return is calculated with the estimated market 
model with the earlier-mentioned formula.  
 
Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are then computed as the sum of daily abnormal 
returns over the horizon of the study. CAR for firm i  during the period T is given by: 
1
T
iT it
t
CAR AR
=
= ∑                                                                                                                (5.3) 
   
In this chapter, the estimation period for the parameters of the market model comprise 
trading days [-220, -20] relative to the spinoff announcement day, which is day 0. The 
market return is estimated based on the total market return index for each country given 
in Datastream. The total market return index is calculated by Datastream with value-
weighted average returns to representative companies comprised in the index for each 
country it covers. The calculation of total market return index by Datastream includes 
both the capital gains and the dividend yields. The selection of the total market return 
index for each country is to ensure the consistency of stock return results across different 
countries. I then calculate the three-day CARs in the window (-1, +1) for each spinoff 
announcement. I also compute CARs during different event windows, (-10, +1), (-1, 0), 0, 
and (+1, +10). The same approach for abnormal returns to spinoff announcements has 
been used in Veld and Veld-Merkoulova (2004).  
 
Abnormal returns to all spinoff announcements between January 1987 and December 
2005 are reported in Table 5.2. For the full sample, the average CARs over the three-day 
event window (-1, +1) are 4.82%, which are somewhat higher than the announcement 
returns documented in earlier US studies (3.84% in Desai and Jain, 1999; 3.28% in 
Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 1999). The announcement returns over one-day, two-
day, and three-day event windows are all significant at the 1% level, indicating that 
European stock markets strongly react to spinoff announcement news.  
 
[Insert Table 5.2 about here, see page 78] 
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The full sample of spinoff announcements is further split into two sub-groups, UK 
spinoffs and non-UK spinoffs). Examination of announcement returns for these two sub-
samples yields the following conclusions. UK spinoffs are slightly better perceived in the 
market than non-UK spinoffs as the former have an average of 5.48% CARs over the 
three-day event window while non-UK spinoffs have an average of 4.27%. The median 
three-day cumulative abnormal return to UK spinoffs is 3.03%, which is similar to the 
median three-day CARs to non-UK spinoffs of 3.33%. The announcement abnormal 
return pattern remains unchanged if the comparison of announcement period returns is 
based on alternative announcement windows such as the two-day window or the one-day 
window.  
 
As indicated in Panel D of Table 5.2, the difference in CARs between UK and non-UK 
spinoffs is generally insignificant. The only significant difference is the mean difference 
of CARs between UK and non-UK spinoffs for the announcement date, which is 
significant at the 5% level (t-statistic = 2.20). The difference in CARs between UK and 
non-UK spinoffs is statistically insignificant for other event windows. For example, the 
mean (median) difference in CARs between UK and non-UK spinoffs during the three-
day announcement period is 1.21% (0.87%), which has a t-statistic of 0.75 (z-statistic of 
0.52).  
 
Park (2004) argues that event studies in a multi-country setting should use a world market 
model in estimating abnormal announcement returns to events rather than a market model 
with a local market index. Park shows that a world market model incorporating the 
impacts of a local market index, world market index and foreign exchange rate has more 
power in explaining announcement returns to events across different countries. The 
formula for expected return for firm i  in time t  based on a world market model is given 
by: 
1 2 3it i i LMt i WMt i tR R R ERα β β β= + + +                                                                                 (5.4) 
Where the parameters iα , 1iβ , 2iβ , and 3iβ are estimated by regressing the security 
returns on the market return for the estimation period, LMtR  is the return of local stock 
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market index, WMtR  is the return of world stock market index orthogonal to the return of 
local market index, and tER  is the relative change of foreign exchange rates of the local 
currency. 
 
I follow Park’s approach to re-estimate announcement abnormal returns by using the 
Datastream total market return index for a sample country as the local market index, the 
Datastream total global market return index as the world market index, and the US dollar 
to local currency rate in the world market model. The use of a different world market 
index such as the Morgan Stanley EFMA index and the S&P 500 index does not change 
the estimated results. To save space, I do not report results based on alternative world 
market indices.  
 
Table 5.3 reports the abnormal announcement returns to sample spinoff parents against 
the world market model. The estimation results of Table 5.3 are very similar to those of 
Table 5.2. For the full sample, the CARs over the three-day event window (-1, +1) are 
4.83%. Announcement returns to UK spinoffs are comparable to those to non-UK 
spinoffs since the former have an average of 4.76% cumulative abnormal returns over the 
three-day event window while non-UK spinoffs have an average of 4.24%. Thus, the 
world market model does not differ much from the market model in estimating CARs to 
spinoffs. This evidence is consistent with the argument of Kothari and Warner (2006) that 
different return methodologies would produce qualitatively similar abnormal returns for a 
short event window.  
 
[Insert Table 5.3 about here, see page 79] 
 
Overall, my results show that abnormal stock returns to European spinoff announcements 
are significantly positive. In addition, the positive abnormal returns to European spinoff 
announcements are similar to those reported in prior empirical studies, such as Desai and 
Jain (1999), Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999), and Veld and Veld-Merkoulova 
(2004). This evidence supports hypothesis H1 that spinoff parent firms earn significant 
and positive announcement returns. 
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5.4 Long-run Stock Returns to Post-spinoff Firms 
This section reports the long-run abnormal stock returns to post-spinoff firms against 
different benchmarks. Section 5.4.1 analyses the BHARs to post-spinoff firms, where the 
benchmarks are returns to size- and book-to-market-control portfolios and returns to 
industry- and size-matching firms. Section 5.4.2 presents the results for calendar-time 
regression models, where the benchmarks are the Fama-French (1993) three-factor and 
Carhart (1997) four-factor models. Section 5.4.3 shows the calendar-time portfolio 
abnormal returns, where the benchmarks are returns to size- and book-to-market- 
portfolios and returns to industry- and size-matching firms. Section 5.4.4 reports further 
tests on market efficiency in reacting to spinoff announcements.  
 
5.4.1 The Buy-and-hold Abnormal Return Approach 
The buy-and-hold abnormal return, or BHAR, approach measures the average multi-year 
return from a strategy of buying all firms involved with an event and selling at the end of 
a pre-specified holding period versus a comparable strategy investing otherwise similar 
non-event firms. The BHAR approach is favoured by some researchers because BHARs 
are more consistent with the true investor experience than the CARs (Barber and Lyon, 
1997; Lyon et al., 1999)11.  
 
For post-spinoff firms, raw buy-and-hold returns are calculated as follows: 
1)1(
1
,, −⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ += ∏
=
T
t
tiTi rR                                                                                                     (5.5) 
where tir ,  is the return on stock i in month t relative to the spinoff completion date, 0. 
The return over the first partial calendar month is considered as the return in the spinoff 
completion month. The first one-year return includes the first partial calendar month’s 
return and the returns over the next 11 months. The average of the N individual buy-and-
                                                 
11 Fama (1998) is against the BHAR approach to measure long-run abnormal returns because the BHAR 
approach can bias upwards the abnormal returns over a long horizon. 
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hold returns for the T  months subsequent to the completion month is computed as below: 
N
R
R
N
i
Ti
T
∑
== 1
,
                                                                                                                    (5.6) 
 
Buy-and-hold returns are calculated for the matching stock ( bmTiR , ) with the above 
procedure. The buy-and-hold abnormal returns are then given below: 
, , ,
bm
i T i T i TAR R R= −                                                                                                              (5.7) 
 
Then control-portfolio (or matching-firm) adjusted returns, ARs, are calculated as the 
average of the differences in the buy-and-hold returns over the T  months following the 
completion date as  
N
RR
AR
N
i
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TiTi
T
∑
=
−
= 1
,, )(
                                                                                                 (5.8) 
 
The t-statistic to estimate the statistical significance of the ARs is given below: 
Ns
ARt T
/
=                                                                                                                        (5.9) 
where s  is the cross-sectional standard deviation of TAR  for the N  firms in the sample. 
Fama (1998) argues that the calculation of an unadjusted t-statistic for the ARs 
inappropriately assumes that event-firm returns are independent.  
 
The selection of benchmarks for the calculation of long-run excess returns is not 
straightforward because most of previously suggested return methods suffer from 
statistical problems12. Recent empirical studies have argued that matching sample firms 
with control firms based on similar company-specific characteristics provides an 
appropriate benchmark to detect abnormal returns (Daniel and Titman, 1997; Daniel, 
Titman and Wei, 2001; Jegadeesh, 2000).  
                                                 
12 See e.g. Ang and Zhang (2004), Barber and Lyon (1997), Fama (1998), Kothari and Warner (2006), Lyon, 
et al. (1999) for related discussion on the various methods to calculate long-run stock returns. 
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Following their arguments, I use two different characteristics-based benchmarks in 
measuring the long-run abnormal returns to post-spinoff firms. One benchmark is returns 
to size- and book-to-market-control portfolios. The other is returns to industry- and size-
matching firms.  
 
The first benchmark is used to capture the power of size and book-to-market ratio in 
explaining cross-sectional returns (Fama and French, 1993 and 1995). To implement the 
size and book-to-market matching portfolio procedure, all stocks in each sample country 
are grouped into five portfolios based on their market capitalisation at the end of June for 
each sample year13. Each portfolio contains an equal number of stocks. Stocks with the 
smallest market values are placed into portfolio 1, and those with the largest market 
values are placed into portfolio 5. For each stock, I also calculate the book-to-market 
ratio using the most recently reported book value of equity prior to the portfolio 
construction date. I then divide stocks within each size quintile into five equal-sized 
subgroups based on their book-to-market ratio. Stocks with the smallest book-to-market 
ratios are placed into sub-group 1, and those with the largest book-to-market ratios are 
placed into sub-group 5.  
 
After constructing 25 size and book-to-market control portfolios, post-spinoff parent and 
offspring stocks are matched with a portfolio based on the post-spinoff firm’s market 
value and the book-to-market ratio at the spinoff completion date for the sample 
country.14 Then I calculate market-value-weighted average stock returns to the control 
portfolio. If stock returns for a firm in the control portfolio are missing in the 
computation period, I assume that the investment proceeds are reinvested in the 
remaining stocks of the control portfolio on a pro-rata basis. Specifically, the investment 
proceeds will be reallocated to the remaining stocks of the control portfolio 
                                                 
13 Similar to Fama and French (1993), I use a firm’s market capitalisation in June to construct control 
portfolios. Our results remain qualitatively similar when portfolio construction relies on a firm’s market 
capitalisation in other calendar months. 
14 In some cases, Datastream does not have the data of the book value of equity for the sample firms. I then 
calculate the ratio based on the book value of equity given in the annual reports of sample firms, which are 
downloaded from Thomson Research. 
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proportionally, where the reallocation weight is the stocks’ market values. When no 
matched firm is available in the size- and book-to-market control portfolio for the sample 
country15, returns on the total market return index for each country given in Datastream 
is then used16.  
 
I compute these abnormal stock return measures during the post-spinoff period for each 
parent/offspring portfolio. Combining performance data from post-spinoff parent and 
offspring into a single portfolio is to gauge the overall performance gains from a spinoff. 
Specifically, I create a pro-forma combined firm following the spinoff by calculating 
value-weighted abnormal returns of parent and offspring. The value weight is based on 
market values of spinoff parent and offspring on the spinoff completion date. The same 
approach to measure the long-run performance of combined firms is used in Desai and 
Jain (1999), McConnell et al. (2001) and Veld and Veld-Merkoulova (2004).  
 
The second benchmark is employed to control industry-specific risks. Fama and French 
(1997) show that current asset pricing models have not been able to explain industry-
specific risks. My industry- and size-matching firm approach is based on the two-digit 
SIC industry, which is similar to that used by Veld and Veld-Merkoulova (2004) except 
for the following changes. First, I select matching firms which do not undertake a spinoff 
within the five-year period centring on the spinoff completion date of a sample firm 
involved with the spinoff. Second, I require that the industry matching firm’s size is 
within the scope of (50%, 150%) of the market capitalisation of the sample firm. The 
additional size constraint is used to avoid selecting control firms that are too small or too 
large relative to sample firms. This size constraint is particularly important for finding 
matching firms for parents. For my spinoff sample, I find that many spinoff parents are 
very large firms in local stock markets, where sometimes few industry peers can match 
the size of parents.  
                                                 
15 Such cases sometimes occur for some European countries which have a small stock market. For example, 
Ireland has an average of only 73 stocks during the 1990s as indicated by the stock data in Datastream. 
16 Results for long-run post-spinoff performance do not materially change when I use the value-weighted 
stock returns to all listed firms in the sample country as the benchmark returns rather than the total market 
return index for the sample country given in Datastream. 
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As discussed in Section 3.5, there are statistical problems associated with the use of the 
BHAR approach to measure the long-run abnormal returns. I use four different 
approaches to calculate the adjusted t-statistic in order to account for the return 
dependence problem. Following Mitchell and Stafford (2000), I estimate the correlation 
of complete overlapping monthly returns of post-spinoff firms and calculate an adjusted 
t-statistic (MS_t). Similar to Lyon et al. (1999), I estimate the correlation matrix of 
overlapping monthly returns of post-spinoff firms and obtain an adjusted t-statistic 
(LBT_t). Following Jegadeesh and Karceski (2004), I estimate the serial correlation 
consistent t-statistic (SC_t) as well as the heteroskedasticity and serial correlation 
consistent t-statistic (HSC_t), which are based on the estimators for the variance-
covariance matrix. The computation details of different adjusted t-statistics are given in 
Appendix 5.1. Results based on different adjusted t-statistics are generally consistent. 
Since my sample size is not large, I choose to focus on the adjusted t-statistic proposed in 
Mitchell and Stafford (2000), which requires the fewest sample observation to estimate 
the adjusted t-statistic and is less subject to the misestimation problem due to limited data.  
 
The long-term size- and book-to-market-adjusted abnormal returns of the parent, 
offspring, and the pro-forma combined firms in the three-year post-spinoff period are 
reported in Table 5.4. The abnormal returns are calculated as the difference between the 
sample firm returns and the returns on the control portfolio, as per the matching process 
introduced earlier. I examine the long-run performance of post-spinoff firms over the 
three-year post-spinoff period. Therefore, I focus on the post-spinoff firms following 
spinoffs completed between January 1987 and December 2002 in order to have three-year 
post-spinoff data to calculate the long-run performance. 
 
[Insert Table 5.4 about here, see page 81] 
 
Panel A in Table 5.4 demonstrates no significant stock returns to post-spinoff 
parent/offspring combined firms. For instance, the mean and median three-year size- and 
book-to-market-adjusted BHARs to post-spinoff combined firms are 0.06 and -0.03, 
  
 63
respectively. Both the mean and the median are insignificant at conventional significance 
levels (MS_t = 0.59 and z-statistic = -0.19). The results documented in this study differ 
from earlier US findings on corporate spinoff value effects. For example, Cusatis et al. 
(1993) and Desai and Jain (1999) observe that post-spinoff firms perform significantly 
better than matching firms in the three-year post-spinoff period. However, my evidence is 
consistent with Veld and Veld-Merkoulova (2004) who also observe insignificant long-
run abnormal returns to European spinoffs.. 
 
Panel B presents the summary statistics of long-term size- and book-to-market-adjusted 
BHARs to post-spinoff parents. As shown in Table 5.4, abnormal returns to post-spinoff 
parent firms are not-statistically different from zero. Since the sample size is not large, I 
focus on the analysis of the median returns to post-spinoff parents to avoid biased 
statistical inferences. The median BHARs to parents are -0.06, -0.08 and -0.09 for one-
year, two-year, and three-year holding periods, respectively. None of those returns is 
significant at conventional levels. Again, this evidence is different from the US findings 
that post-spinoff parents earn superior long-run stock returns (e.g. see Desai and Jain, 
1999).  
 
Panel C of Table 5.4 further demonstrates that long-run BHARs to post-spinoff offspring 
are insignificant across different holding periods. The mean two-year (and three-year) 
BHARs to post-spinoff offspring is 0.23 (0.26). Both returns would be significant at the 
5% level if a traditional t-statistic were used. Adjusted t-statistics show that the mean 
BHARs to post-spinoff offspring are no longer significant. The median BHARs to post-
spinoff offspring are also insignificantly different from zero for different holding periods. 
Therefore, my evidence indicates that European stock markets generally react efficiently 
to spinoff announcements and post-spinoff offspring do not earn superior long-run stock 
returns. 
 
Table 5.5 reports the long-run industry- and size-adjusted BHARs to post-spinoff pro-
forma combined firms. Panel A in Table 5.5 shows that there are insignificant stock 
returns to post-spinoff parent/subsidiary combined firms. The mean and median three-
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year industry- and size-adjusted BHARs to post-spinoff combined firms are 0.02 and -
0.07, respectively. Both the mean and the median are not significant at conventional 
levels (MS_t = 0.57 and z-statistic = -0.27). Returns in different holding periods such as 
one-year and two-year periods are also insignificant at the 10% level. The binomial tests 
also show that half of sample firms have positive abnormal returns while half experience 
negative abnormal returns. The results documented in Table 5.5 are very similar to those 
reported in Table 5.4.  
 
[Insert Table 5.5 about here, see page 82] 
 
Panel B of Table 5.5 presents the results of long-term industry- and size-adjusted BHARs 
to post-spinoff parents. The abnormal returns to post-spinoff parents are also not-
statistically different from zero. The mean BHARs to post-spinoff parents are 0.01, 0.13 
and 0.07 for one-year, two-year, and three-year holding periods, respectively. The median 
BHARs to post-spinoff parent firms are -0.01, 0.0003 and -0.01 for one-year, two-year, 
and three-year holding periods, respectively. None of those returns is significant at 
conventional levels.  
 
Panel C of Table 5 demonstrates that the long-run industry- and size-adjusted abnormal 
returns to post-spinoff offspring firms are also insignificant across different holding 
periods. The mean two-year (and three-year) BHARs to post-spinoff offspring firms are 
0.16 (0.22). Both returns would be significant at the 5% level if the traditional t-statistics 
were to be used. However, adjusted t-statistics to account for the event dependence 
problems show that the mean BHARs to post-spinoff offspring firms are no longer 
significant. As my sample size is small, the z-statistic for the median long-run abnormal 
returns has more reliable statistical inferences than the t-statistic for the mean long-run 
abnormal returns. As shown in the table, the median BHARs to post-spinoff offspring 
firms are also insignificantly different from zero over different holding periods.  
 
Overall, my evidence suggests that initial stock market reaction to spinoff announcements 
is generally efficient and neither post-spinoff parents nor their offspring earn superior 
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long-run stock returns. This evidence differs from earlier US findings on corporate 
spinoff value effects. For example, Cusatis et al. (1993) and Desai and Jain (1999) 
observe that post-spinoff firms outperform industry matching firms in the three-year post-
spinoff period. However, my evidence is consistent with results from McConnell et al. 
(2001) and Veld and Veld-Merkoulova (2004), which show no long-run abnormal stock 
returns to American and European spinoffs.  
 
5.4.2 The Calendar Time Regression Approach 
As discussed in section 3.5, the adjusted t-statistics in calculating BHARs do not fully 
resolve the event-firm-return dependence problem. An alternative approach to measuring 
long-term stock returns is to track the performance of a portfolio of firms involved in an 
event in calendar time relative to an explicit asset pricing model. The calendar-time 
portfolio approach is recommended in Fama (1998) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000). 
The event portfolio is formed each period to include all firms that experience a similar 
event within the prior n periods, where the n periods refer to a specific investment 
holding period of event firms, such as 12 and 24 months. With these event portfolios, the 
cross-sectional correlations of the individual event firm returns are automatically 
accounted for in the portfolio variance over the calendar time. When assessing the 
abnormal returns, the returns to event portfolios are regressed on the pre-specified asset 
pricing models and the statistical significance of the intercept will indicate the level of 
long-run abnormal returns.  
 
Currently, two different multi-factor asset pricing models are popular for empirical long-
run event studies. The first one is the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model, which 
captures the power of size and book-to-market in explaining the stock returns. 
Specifically, the multi-factor model is given below: 
1 2 3( ) ( )i f t M f t t tR R R R SMB HMLα β β β− = + − + +                                                        (5.10) 
SMB is the return on a portfolio long in small market capitalization stocks and short in 
big market capitalization stock. HML is the return on a portfolio long in high book-to-
market stocks and short in low book-to-market stocks.  
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Recent empirical studies suggest another factor of explaining stock returns: momentum.  
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 2001) show that returns to portfolios formed on past returns 
cannot be explained by the returns to stocks of different size and book-to-market 
characteristics. Carhart (1997) augments the Fama and French (1993) model with the 
momentum factor: 
1 2 3 4( ) ( )i f t M f t t tR R R R SMB HML UMDα β β β β− = + − + + +                                       (5.11) 
Where UMD is the return on a portfolio long in stocks with high past returns and short in 
stocks with low past returns.  
 
The risk-free rate used in this study is the monthly rate derived from the redemption rate 
for one-year government benchmark bonds for each local country given in Datastream. 
The local market index is the Datastream total return index for the local country. The 
measurement of factors for the Fama and French (1993) three-factor models is to form 
5×5 size and book-to-market portfolios based first on the size rank and then on the book-
to-market rank. The measurement of factors for Carhart (1997) four-factor models is to 
form 3×3×3 size and book-to-market portfolios based first on the size rank and then on 
the book-to-market rank and finally on the past-year return rank. The details to compute 
factor loadings of Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) models are reported in 
Appendix 5.2. The average monthly return on the portfolio of parent (offspring) stocks 
less the contemporaneous return on the risk free rate is then regressed against the 
contemporaneous returns of the three factors of the Fama and French (1993) model or 
against the contemporaneous returns of the four factors of the Carhart (1997) model.  
 
Loughran and Ritter (2000) question the robustness of calendar-time regression approach 
because simply averaging monthly returns in each calendar month fails to detect long-run 
abnormal returns and ignores the existence of the “hot” period in which more corporate 
events are completed. To address this concern, I use the monthly-observation-number 
weighted monthly return rather than the simple average monthly return in the regression 
models.  This approach assigns more weight to the hot period, when more corporate 
events are undertaken, than to the cold period. 
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Table 5.6 reports the time-series regressions of post-spinoff firm portfolios. In general, 
the R-squared for time-series regression models are very small. This is due to the small 
sample size problem.  
 
[Insert Table 5.6 about here, see page 83] 
 
Panel A of Table 5.6 reports the Fama-French (1993) model regression results for parents. 
When holding event firms for one year following the spinoff completion date, the model 
intercept (-0.02) is significantly negative (t-statistic = -1.75). However, the whole model 
is insignificant since the F-statistic is just 1.58. When holding event firms for two years, 
the model intercept is positive (0.01) but it is insignificant at conventional levels (t-
statistic = 0.72). Similar results obtain when holding event firms for three years. Panel B 
of Table 5.6 presents the Fama-French (1993) model regression results for offspring.  
 
Panel C of Table 6 reports the Carhart (1997) model regression results for parents. When 
holding event firms for one year following the spinoff completion date, the model 
intercept is negative (-0.01) but is insignificant (t-statistic = -0.68). When holding event 
firms for two years, the model intercept is positive (0.02) but it is not significant at 
conventional levels (t-statistic = 1.45). When holding event firms for three years, the 
model intercept is again positive (0.01) while not significant at conventional levels (t-
statistic = 1.46).  Panel D of Table 5.6 presents the Carhart (1997) model regression 
results for offspring.  
 
5.4.3 The Calendar Time Portfolio Abnormal Return Approach 
There are also statistical problems using the CTRG approach in measuring long-run 
abnormal returns, as mentioned in section 3.5. A most important one is that the 
regressions wrongly assume that the factor loadings are constant over a relatively long 
period (e.g. up to 190 months in this study). This is unlikely since the composition of the 
event portfolio changes over time. Fama and French (1997) have shown that different 
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industries have different factor loadings and Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) observe that 
corporate events tend to cluster through time by industry. The portfolio composition of 
events firms is likely to be heavily concentrated in a few industries at each point in time 
but in different industries over a long period. Therefore, the CTRG approach that assumes 
constant factor loadings can lead to biased estimation results.  
 
I therefore use the calendar time abnormal returns (CTAR) approach to account for this 
problem. The CTAR approach is the average abnormal return of each calendar month for 
all event firms within the prior pre-specified investment periods (such as one year, two 
years and three years). I also require that at least five firms exist in the event portfolio for 
each time point in calendar months. The expected return on the event portfolio is 
estimated by both the 25 size- and book-to-market-control portfolios and the industry- 
and size-matching firms. The benchmarks used in this section are actually those used in 
the BHAR approach. Similar to Mitchell and Stafford (2000), I standardise the monthly 
CTARs by estimates of the portfolio standard deviation in order to control for 
heteroskedasticity. The measurement of long-run abnormal returns to event firms is thus 
based on the time-series mean of the monthly standardised CTARs and standard error of 
the mean.  
 
The results from the CTAR analysis are presented in Table 5.7. The CTARs to post-
spinoff parents are insignificant for different holding periods and for different 
benchmarks. For instance, holding post-spinoff parents for three years on average earn 
negative but insignificant average monthly returns (-0.01) against the size- and book-to-
market-control portfolio (t-statistic = -0.01). Similarly, holding post-spinoff parents for 
three years on average earn positive but insignificant average monthly returns (0.07) 
against the industry- and size-matching firm (t-statistic = 0.94).  
 
[Insert Table 5.7 about here, see page 85] 
 
The CTARs to post-spinoff offspring firms are also generally insignificant for different 
holding periods and for different benchmarks. The only exception is that of the CTARs to 
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post-spinoff offspring firms when the holding period is the two-year period and the 
benchmark is the size- and book-to-market control-portfolio. The average monthly return 
for this case is 0.15, which is statistically significant at the 10% level (t-statistic = 1.87). 
However, none of other CTARs is significant at conventional levels. Therefore, the 
significant CTAR result for a particular return benchmark is likely to be a product of luck 
(Fama, 1998).  
 
Therefore, the CTAR approach reports evidence that is consistent with the results of 
previous approaches. I conclude that post-spinoff firms do not earn superior abnormal 
returns in the long run against different benchmarks. The results documented here differ 
from earlier US findings on the long-run performance of firms involved in spinoffs such 
as Cusatis et al. (1993) and Desai and Jain (1999). The difference may be due to different 
return methodologies used. Since prior studies have not used robust return methodologies 
as I have in this chapter, I conjecture that the significant long-run BHARs to post-spinoff 
firms reported in Cusatis et al. (1993) and Desai and Jain (1999) may be due to biased 
return methodologies used. 
 
5.4.4 Further Regression Tests on Market Efficient 
If markets are inefficient in reacting to spinoff announcements, there should be an 
association between the announcement period returns to spinoff announcements and the 
long-run abnormal returns to firms involved in spinoffs. I test this possibility by 
regressing the long-run BHARs to post-spinoff parent/offspring combined firms on the 
three-day cumulative abnormal returns to parents during the announcement period. The 
regression results are reported in Table 5.8.  
 
[Insert Table 5.8 about here, see page 86] 
 
Results in Table 5.8 show that there is no significant association between long-run stock 
returns to post-spinoff firms and short-run market reaction to spinoff announcements. The 
coefficients for the three-day announcement returns are not significant for different 
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regression models. In addition, the explanatory power of all regressions is extremely 
small. The adjusted R-square ranges from -0.8% to 0.5%. Therefore, there is no evidence 
that stock markets initially underreact to spinoff announcement news. 
 
5.5 Accounting Returns to Post-spinoff Firms 
I use the benchmark-adjusted performance approach suggested in Barber and Lyon (1996) 
to obtain the abnormal accounting returns to post-spinoff firms. I examine the accounting 
performance for pre-spinoff firms for the two-year period prior to the spinoff 
announcement date and the accounting performance for post-spinoff firms for the three-
year period following the spinoff completion date. The performance measures is the cash 
flow return on assets (ROA), measured as the ratio of income before interest, tax, 
depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) to book value of assets. The cash-flow based 
accounting measure is adopted to minimise the impact of managerial manipulation of 
accounting numbers.  
 
The first approach to calculate industry-adjusted ROAs as abnormal accounting returns, 
used in Daley et al. (1997) for post-spinoff firms, is subject to measurement errors 
because firms undertaking spinoffs are usually large and diversified firms in their 
industry and industry median firms tend to be substantially smaller than the spinoff firms. 
As shown in Berger and Ofek (1995) and others, large and diversified firms differ 
significantly from their small and focused industry counterparts in both operating 
performance and market valuation. Ghosh (2001) argues that a research design 
accounting for pre-event performance and size for firms experiencing corporate events is 
superior to the industry-median-adjusted approach. Following Loughran and Ritter (1997) 
and Ghosh (2001), I control for size and pre-event performance in measuring abnormal 
accounting returns. The procedure to estimate different benchmark-adjusted accounting 
returns is illustrated through the following example of ROA computation. 
 
The first measure is industry-adjusted ROA. This proxy is computed as the return on 
assets of the event firm subtracted by the median return on assets for all firms, except the 
event firm, that operate in the same two-digit SIC code industry as the pre-spinoff parent.  
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The second measure is industry- and size-adjusted ROA. This proxy is calculated as the 
median ROA for all firms, except for the event firm, that share the same two-digit SIC 
code industry as the event firm and have asset values within 50% of the asset value of the 
pre-spinoff parent in the same fiscal year.17  
 
The third measure is industry-, and performance-adjusted ROA. First, I calculate an ROA 
for all firms, except for the event firm , that are in the same two-digit SIC industry as the 
event firm and whose ROA is within the range between 50% and 150% of the asset 
values of the event firm  in the same fiscal year. From those firms a firm that is closest to 
the sample firm in terms of ROA in the preceding fiscal year is then selected. The 
industry-and performance-adjusted ROA is computed as the ROA of the event firm 
subtracted by the ROA of the matching firm in the same 2-digit SIC industry.  
 
Results of the accounting performance of firms involved in spinoffs are reported in Table 
5.9. Panel A of Table 5.9 reports the accounting performance for pre-spinoff parents over 
the two-year period preceding the spinoff announcement date. In general, the accounting 
performance of pre-spinoff parents is in line with that of their industry peers. For three 
industry-based benchmarks, the abnormal accounting returns to pre-spinoff parents are 
insignificantly different from zero. 
 
[Insert Table 5.9 about here, see page 87] 
 
Panel B of Table 5.9 presents the accounting performance of post-spinoff parents. The 
results show that post-spinoff parents are not performing better than their industry peers 
in terms of accounting returns. None of the abnormal accounting returns is significant at 
conventional levels. For example, the mean (median) of average three-year industry- and 
size-adjusted ROAs is -0.5% (-0.7%), which is statistically insignificant at 10% level (t-
                                                 
17 The size matching on a smaller scope such as between 70% and 130% often gives no matching industry 
firms. Using a broader industry definition (one-digit SIC code industry) does not solve the data limitation 
problem because most of mainland European stock markets contain less than 500 public firms. To make 
industry- and size-matching feasible and meaningful, I use 50% instead of 30% as in Daley et al (1997).   
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statistic = -0.45 and z-statistic = -0.68).   
 
Panel C of Table 9 shows the accounting performance of post-spinoff offspring. There is 
some evidence that post-spinoff offspring earn positive abnormal accounting returns. For 
the industry- and size-adjusted ROAs, the mean (median) of abnormal ROAs for post-
spinoff offspring is 4.5% (2.3%), which is significant at 5% level (t-statistic = 2.17 and z-
statistic = 2.15). However, the industry-adjusted ROAs are not significant. In addition, 
the abnormal accounting returns to post-spinoff offspring are insignificant for other 
holding periods. I do not examine the industry- and performance-adjusted ROAs for 
offspring because there are no prior performance data available for such firms.   
 
Overall, my results for the accounting returns show that post-spinoff firms do not earn 
superior accounting returns in the long term. This evidence is consistent with the stock 
performance of post-spinoff firms documented in section 5.4. 
 
5.6 Robustness Checks 
Desai and Jain (1999) present evidence that US stock markets may only underreact to 
focus-increasing spinoffs, where parent and offspring operate in different two-digit SIC 
industries. Specifically, Desai and Jain observe that only focus-increasing spinoffs earn 
superior long-run stock returns in the post-spinoff period. In contrast, their sample firms 
following non-focus-increasing spinoffs do not have significant long-run abnormal 
returns. I examine the long-run abnormal returns to post-spinoff firms emerging from 
focus-increasing spinoffs to assess whether this focus-related performance obtains for my 
European sample. 
 
Similar to Desai and Jain (1999), I define focus-increasing spinoffs as those in which the 
parent and the offspring firms do not share the same two-digit SIC industry and non-
focus-increasing spinoffs as those in which the parent and offspring operate in the same 
two-digit SIC industry.  
 
In Table 10, I report the size- and book-to-market-adjusted BHARs to post-spinoff firms 
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following focus-increasing spinoffs and those to post-spinoff firms following non-focus-
increasing spinoffs. Because the sample size of focusing spinoffs is quite small, I use the 
adjusted t-statistic proposed in Mitchell and Stafford (2000) to estimate the mean 
significance in order to avoid biases estimates due to small sample size. The data in Panel 
A of Table 5.10 show that post-spinoff firms following focus-increasing spinoffs do not 
have long-run abnormal returns. For the post-spinoff parent/offspring combined firms, the 
mean (median) of the three-year size- and book-to-market-adjusted BHARs is 0.06 (-
0.03), which has a t-statistic of 0.59 (z-statistic of -0.30). The mean and median returns 
for the one-year (and the two-year) holding period are also insignificant at conventional 
levels.  
 
[Insert Table 5.10 about here, see page 88] 
 
I also examine whether post-spinoff parents following focus-increasing spinoffs earn 
superior long-run returns in Panel B of Table 5.10. Contrary to the findings of Desai and 
Jain (1999), post-spinoff parents following focus-increasing spinoffs have insignificant 
long-run abnormal returns. For instance, the mean (median) of the three-year size- and 
book-to-market-adjusted BHARs to post-spinoff parents following focus-increasing 
spinoffs is 0.05 (-0.08), which has a t-statistic of 0.37 (z-statistic of -0.93). 
 
Results in Panel C of Table 10 demonstrate that the offspring following focus-increasing 
spinoffs have no superior long-run stock returns. The mean (median) of the three-year 
size- and book-to-market-adjusted BHARs to post-spinoff offspring firms from focus-
increasing spinoffs is 0.12 (-0.001), which has a t-statistic of 0.93 (z-statistic of 0.46). 
Again, my results are against the evidence reported in Desai and Jain (1999) that focus-
increasing spinoffs earn significant long-run abnormal returns.  
 
For the purpose of a robustness check, I also analyse the long-run industry- and size-
adjusted BHARs to post-spinoff firms from focus-increasing spinoffs in Table 5.11. 
Results in Table 5.11 indicate that post-spinoff firms from focus-increasing spinoffs 
generally have insignificant long-run abnormal returns. The only exception is that the 
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two-year BHARs to offspring have a mean of 0.16, which is significant at the 10% level 
(t-statistic = 1.72). However, the median (0.10) of two-year BHARs to post-spinoff 
offspring firms is insignificant at the 10% level (z-statistic = 1.01). In addition, the long-
run BHARs to offspring for other holding periods are insignificant. Therefore, the results 
in Table 5.11 are generally consistent with those presented in Table 5.10. 
 
[Insert Table 5.11 about here, see page 89] 
 
Finally, I use the calendar time abnormal portfolio approach to examine whether focus-
increasing spinoffs earn superior long-run returns18. The results are reported in Table 5.12. 
As shown in Table 5.12, investing in post-spinoff firms from focus-increasing spinoffs 
does not have superior portfolio returns. For example, the monthly abnormal returns for 
buying parent firms for three years at the spinoff completion dates have an average of 
0.01, which is insignificant at the 10% level (t-statistic = 0.36).  
 
[Insert Table 5.12 about here, see page 90] 
 
The further analysis of long-run abnormal returns to focus-increasing spinoffs lends 
support to the efficient markets hypothesis. There is no evidence that European stock 
markets underreact to focus-increasing spinoffs.  
 
5.7 Summary 
This chapter examines the efficiency of stock markets in valuing corporate spinoffs. 
There are mixed views on whether stock markets underreact to spinoff announcements. 
On the one hand, the efficient markets hypothesis contends that there is no superior long-
run performance for firms involved in spinoffs. On the other hand, some practitioners 
have argued that investing in post-spinoff firms can earn superior portfolio returns. I 
address this issue by examining both short-run and long-run returns to firms involved in 
                                                 
18 I do not use the CTRG approach here because the reduction of monthly observations for focus-increasing 
spinoffs makes statistical inference from the regressions less informative and less reliable.   
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spinoffs with different return methodologies in order to avoid biased results. I test two 
hypotheses based on the market efficiency view. The first is that spinoff parent firms earn 
superior announcement returns. The second is that post-spinoff firms do not earn superior 
stock returns in the long run. My empirical results support these two hypotheses. 
 
First, I find that spinoff announcement returns are significantly positive for both UK and 
non-UK countries. The spinoff announcement effects hold for different methods to 
estimate abnormal announcement returns to spinoff parent firms. As contended in Fama 
(1991 and 1998), the initial market reaction to spinoff announcements should be quick 
and completed. My findings are consistent with the first hypothesis.  
 
Second, I use three different approaches to examine the long-run stock returns to post-
spinoff firms. The BHAR approach is used as in prior empirical studies but with the 
adjusted t-statistics to account for the return dependence problem. I also use two different 
benchmarks, size- and book-to-market control portfolios and industry- and size- matching 
firms. For both benchmarks, I find none of the BHARs to post-spinoff firms is 
statistically significant across different holding periods.  
 
The calendar time regression approach is used against two popular asset pricing models, 
i.e. the Fama and French (1993) three-factor and Carhart (1997) four-factor models. In 
addition, I use the observation-number weighted average monthly returns to increase the 
statistical power to detect the long-run abnormal returns. I find that none of the model 
intercepts is significantly positive when I use multi-factor models (Carhart, 1997; Fama 
and French, 1993) for the UK sub-sample. Based on my evidence, I conclude that post-
spinoff firms do not have superior long-run returns against the multi-factor models.  
 
I also employ the calendar time abnormal portfolio returns approach to analyse the long-
run abnormal returns. The benchmarks are again the size- and book-to-market control 
portfolios and industry- and size- matching firms. The standardised average monthly 
abnormal returns are not significant for post-spinoff parent firms across different holding 
periods. The standardised average monthly abnormal returns against the size- and book-
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to-market- control portfolios for post-spinoff offspring firms are significant when the 
holding period is two years. However, it is only significant at the 10% significance level. 
When the benchmark changes to industry- and size- matching firms or the holding period 
changes to three-year (one-year), the result is again insignificant.  
 
As a robustness check, I regress the long-run BHARs to post-spinoff combined firms on 
the spinoff announcement returns. I find no evidence that markets initially underreact to 
spinoff announcements. Overall, my results show that there are no superior long-run 
stock returns to post-spinoff firms. The second hypothesis is thus supported.  
 
Third, I examine the long-run accounting performance of firms involved in spinoffs. The 
results are consistent with the stock return results. Post-spinoff firms do not earn superior 
accounting returns in the three-year post-spinoff period either. Therefore, European stock 
markets do not seem to underreact to spinoff announcements. 
 
Fourth, I conduct robustness checks for long-run stock returns to post-spinoff firms from 
focus-increasing spinoffs. Extant studies imply that stock markets may only underreact to 
focus-increasing spinoffs but react efficiently to non-focus-increasing spinoffs. The 
further analysis results show that European stock markets are efficient in valuing focus-
increasing spinoffs as well. 
 
The evidence of this study stresses the importance of using robust return methodologies 
in estimating the long-run abnormal returns. Further, it questions the validity of an 
investment strategy of buying post-spinoff firms to beat the market. Further research 
using more refined methodologies to assess the long-run stock returns to other corporate 
events will be helpful in examining the efficiency of stock markets in reacting to different 
corporate news.  
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Table 5.1 Distribution of European spinoffs by announcement year and country of spinoff parents 
Distribution of European companies that completed a spinoff in the period from January 1987 to December 2005 by 
announcement year and listing country of the spinoff parent firm. A total of 367 spinoff announcements are originally 
identified from the SDC Mergers and Acquisitions Database. Spinoffs are eliminated for the following reasons with 
data reduction number in parentheses: a) parent firms or offspring firms have no stock price information in Datastream 
(67);  b) other types of restructuring transaction are mistakenly recorded as spinoffs in SDC, such as divestiture of a 
joint-venture with multi-parents, privatisation deals and asset redistribution as part of a merger deal (19);  c) less than 
50% of interests of offspring firms are distributed to existing shareholders (9);  d) the same spinoff announcements are 
double counted in SDC (9); e) offspring firms are already listed before the spinoff (6); f) parent firms are not traded in 
Europe (6);  g) the shares of offspring firms  are sold to either existing shareholders or the market (3); and h) the 
announced spinoffs are not completed by the end of year 2005 (78). The final sample includes 144 parent firms (157 
distinct announcements) and 170 offspring firms. Countries are coded as follows: BD for Germany, BG for Belgium, 
DK for Denmark, FN for Finland, FR for France, IR for Ireland, IT for Italy, NL for the Netherlands, NW for Norway, 
PT for Portugal, SD for Sweden, SW for Switzerland, and UK for the United Kingdom.  
Year BD BG DK FN FR IR IT NL NW PT SD SW UK Total
1987                         1 1
1988          1   3 4
1989          1   6 7
1990            1  1
1991          1   2 3
1992          1 1 1 3
1993              2 2
1994        1   1  2
1995        1 1 2 2 6
1996      1 1 1 5 8 16
1997       1 1 1  4 1 6 14
1998 2    1 1 2 5 8 19
1999 1 1 1 1  4 3 1 2 2 5 21
2000   1 4  1   3 13 22
2001 1   3   1 5 11 21
2002        1 1    1 3
2003 1 1 1  2 2   3 10
2004 1 1 1    1 1 5 3 13
2005            1 1 2
Total 6 4 1 7 4 2 12 6 13 1 35 3 76 170
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Table 5.2 CARs to spinoff parents based on the market model  
This table reports the average cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the entire sample of 157 completed spinoffs 
from January 1987 to December 2005.The spinoff announcements are identified from SDC Merger & Acquisitions 
Database. Abnormal returns are calculated with the market model, estimated over a 200-day period for each sample 
firm (from day -220 to day -21 relative to spinoff announcement date). The market model is estimated with the 
following equation: it i i MtR Rα β= + , 
where the parameters iα  and iβ are estimated by regressing the security return, itR , on the market return, MtR , for 
the estimation period. The significance of the mean is tested by t-statistic. The significance of the median is tested by 
the Wilcoxon signed rank test. The binomial test is used to test the significance of the percentage of sample firms with 
positive abnormal announcement returns, with the null hypothesis that the proportion of positive abnormal 
announcement-period returns is 50%. a, b indicates the significance level at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
 Interval Mean%. t-statistic Median% z-statistic % (+) 
Panel A: CARs based on the market model for All spinoffs (N=157) 
-10 to -1 1.75b 2.62 0.79b 2.36 56.05 
-1 to 0 4.24a 6.64 2.64a 7.06 70.70a 
0 3.45a 6.25 1.75a 6.57 68.15a 
-1 to +1 4.82a 6.14 2.61a 6.80 73.25a 
+1 to +10 -0.06 -0.08 -1.14 -1.55 40.76 
Panel B:  CARs based on the market model for UK spinoffs (N=72) 
-10 to -1 1.95 1.59 0.72 1.18 52.78 
-1 to 0 5.26a 4.67 3.02a 4.98 75.00a 
0 4.80a 4.70 2.19a 5.06 70.83a 
-1 to +1 5.48a 4.12 3.03a 4.31 69.44a 
+1 to +10 0.57 0.43 -1.21 -0.32 45.83 
Panel C: CARs based on the market model for Non-UK spinoffs (N=85) 
-10 to -1 1.58b 2.38 0.99b 2.14 58.82 
-1 to 0 3.39a 4.91 2.61a 4.99 67.06a 
0 2.29a 4.50 1.32a 4.20 65.88a 
-1 to +1 4.27a 4.65 3.33a 5.29 76.47a 
+1 to +10 -0.59 -0.72 -1.03b -2.03 36.47 
Panel D: Difference in CARs between UK and Non-UK spinoffs 
-10 to -1 0.38 0.27 -0.27 -0.53  
-1 to 0 1.87 1.42 0.41 1.40  
0 2.51b 2.20 0.87 1.58  
-1 to +1 1.21 0.75 0.70 0.52  
+1 to +10 1.62 0.74 -0.18 -0.24  
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Table 5.3 CARs to spinoff parents based on the world market model 
This table reports the average cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the entire sample of 157 completed spinoffs 
by 144 European firms from January 1987 to December 2005.The spinoff announcements are identified from SDC 
Merger & Acquisitions Database. Abnormal returns are calculated with the world market model, estimated over a 
200-day period for each sample firm (from day -220 to day -21 relative to spinoff announcement date). The world 
market model is estimated with the following equation: 
1 2 3it i i LMt i WMt i tR R R ERα β β β= + + +  
where the parameters i
α
, 1i
β
, 2i
β
, and 3i
β
are estimated by regressing the security returns on the market return 
for the estimation period, LMt
R
 is the return of local stock market index, WMt
R
 is the return to the Datastream 
global market index, and t
ER
 is the relative change of US dollar rates of the local currency. 
The significance of the mean is tested by t-statistic. The significance of the median is tested by the Wilcoxon 
signed rank test. The binomial test is used to test the significance of the percentage of sample firms with positive 
abnormal announcement returns, with the null hypothesis that the proportion of positive abnormal announcement-
period returns is 50%. a, b indicates the significance level at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
 Interval Mean%. t-statistic Median% z-statistic % (+) 
Panel A: CARs based on the world market model for All spinoffs (N=157) 
-10 to -1 1.64b 2.46 0.75b 2.26 56.05 
-1 to 0 4.25a 6.62 2.52a 7.06 69.43a 
0 3.47a 6.30 1.86a 6.66 67.52a 
-1 to +1 4.83a 6.14 2.74a 6.86 72.61a 
+1 to +10 0.04 0.06 -1.17 -1.47 40.13 
Panel B:  CARs based on the world market model  for UK spinoffs (N=72) 
-10 to -1 1.69 1.36 0.65 0.98 54.17 
-1 to 0 5.29a 4.70 2.97a 5.04 75.00a 
0 4.76a 4.76 2.63a 5.07 68.06a 
-1 to +1 5.52a 4.15 2.88a 4.40 69.44a 
+1 to +10 0.86 0.64 -0.73 -0.07 45.83 
Panel C: CARs based on the world market model for Non-UK spinoffs (N=85) 
-10 to -1 1.60b 2.46 0.88b 2.22 57.65 
-1 to 0 3.36a 4.84 2.49a 4.89 64.71a 
0 2.30a 4.51 1.66a 4.28 67.06a 
-1 to +1 4.24a 4.61 2.36a 5.29 75.29a 
+1 to +10 -0.64 -0.78 -1.28b -2.18 35.29 
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Table 5.3 (continued) 
Interval Mean%. t-statistic Median% z-statistic % (+) 
Panel D: Difference in CARs between UK and Non-UK spinoffs 
-10 to -1 0.08 0.06 -0.23 -0.67  
-1 to 0 1.93 1.46 0.48 -1.53  
0 2.55b 2.24 0.97 -1.62  
-1 to +1 1.28 0.79 0.52 -0.61  
+1 to +10 1.50 0.95 0.55 -0.65  
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Table 5.4 Long-run size- and book-to-market-adjusted BHARs to post-spinoff parent/offspring combined 
firms, parents, and offspring 
This table reports long-run size- and book-to-market-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) for 129 
European post-spinoff parent/offspring combined firms, 129 parents and 142 offspring in the period between 
January 1987 and December 2002. Panel A reports the t-statistic associated with the abnormal returns and the 
percentage of positive abnormal returns for post-spinoff parent/offspring combined firms. Panel B reports the data 
for post-spinoff parent firms. Panel C reports the data for post-spinoff offspring firms. The reported t-statistic is 
adjusted for cross-sectional dependence (SC_t and HSC_t are based on Jegadeesh and Karceski, 2004; LBT_t is 
based on Lyon et al., 1999; MS_t is based on Mitchell and Stafford, 2000). The benchmark for size- and book-to-
market-adjusted BHARs is the returns to a group of firms selected based on the closeness of market capitalizations 
and book-to-market ratios. The significance of the mean (median) is tested by the t-statistic (Wilcoxon test z-
statistic). The binomial test is used to test the significance of the percentage of sample firms with positive 
abnormal announcement returns, with the null hypothesis that the proportion of positive abnormal announcement 
returns is 50%. b and c indicate the significance level at 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 Interval Mean SC_t HSC_t LBT_t MS_t Median z-stat. % (+) 
Panel A: Size- and book-to-market adjusted BHARs for post-spinoff combined firms (N=99) 
(0, +1 year) -0.01 -0.64 -0.75 -0.42 -0.47 -0.001 -0.58 48.84 
(0, +2 year) 0.14 1.33 1.35 1.48 1.31 -0.04 0.76 49.61 
(0, +3 year) 0.06 0.59 0.71 0.65 0.59 -0.03 -0.19 48.06 
Panel B: Size- and book-to-market adjusted BHARs for post-spinoff parents (N=99) 
(0, +1 year) -0.03 -0.48 -0.61 -0.30 -0.33 -0.06 -1.33 44.19 
(0, +2 year) 0.14 0.99 0.78 0.97 0.36 -0.08 -0.44 44.19 
(0, +3 year) 0.01 0.11 0.23 0.09 0.10 -0.09 -1.38 43.41 
Panel C: Size- and book-to-market adjusted BHARs for offspring (N=107) 
(0, +1 year) 0.09 1.10 1.36 0.79 0.82 0.005 0.45 50.70 
(0, +2 year) 0.25 1.79c 2.09b 1.49 0.96 0.06 1.57 56.34 
(0, +3 year) 0.29 1.22 1.41 0.50 1.74c 0.04 1.46 52.11 
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Table 5.5 Long-run industry- and size-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) to post-spinoff 
combined firms, parents, and offspring 
This table reports long-run industry- and size-adjusted BHARs for 129 European post-spinoff combined firms, 129 
parents and 142 offspring in the period between January 1987 and December 2002. Panel A reports the t-statistic 
associated with the abnormal returns and the percentage of positive abnormal returns for post-spinoff 
parent/offspring combined firms. Panel B reports the data for post-spinoff parent firms. Panel C reports the data for 
post-spinoff offspring firms. The reported t-statistic is adjusted for cross-sectional dependence (SC_t and HSC_t 
are based on Jegadeesh and Karceski, 2004; LBT_t is based on Lyon et al., 1999; MS_t is based on Mitchell and 
Stafford, 2000). The benchmark for size- and book-to-market-adjusted BHARs is the returns to a group of firms 
selected based on the closeness of market capitalisations and book-to-market ratios. EX is the month of completion 
date of spinoff. The significance of the mean (median) is tested by the t-statistic (Wilcoxon test z-statistic). The 
binomial test is used to test the significance of the percentage of sample firms with positive abnormal 
announcement returns, with the null hypothesis that the proportion of positive abnormal announcement returns is 
50%. c indicate the 10% significance level. 
Interval Mean SC_t HSC_t LBT_t MS_t Median z-stat. % (+) 
Panel A: Industry- and size-adjusted BHARs for post-spinoff combined firms (N=99) 
(0, +1 year) -0.02 0.09 0.11 0.06 0.08 -0.004 -0.48 48.84 
(0, +2 year) 0.07 0.97 1.23 1.12 1.03 -0.06 -0.16 48.06 
(0, +3 year) 0.02 0.48 0.57 0.49 0.57 -0.07 -0.27 45.74 
Panel B: Industry- and size-adjusted BHARs for post-spinoff parents (N=99) 
(0, +1 year) 0.01 0.09 0.13 0.06 0.13 -0.01 -0.07 48.84 
(0, +2 year) 0.13 0.89 1.06 0.92 0.65 0.003 -0.07 51.16 
(0, +3 year) 0.07 0.41 0.45 0.41 0.50 -0.01 -0.10 48.84 
Panel C: Industry- and size-adjusted BHARs for offspring (N=107) 
(0, +1 year) 0.05 0.62 0.86 0.48 0.79 0.04 0.40 52.11 
(0, +2 year) 0.16 1.10 1.64c 0.97 0.96 0.05 0.99 54.23 
(0, +3 year) 0.22 1.21 1.63 1.28 1.67c 0.11 1.39 54.93 
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Table 5.6 Time-series regressions of post-spinoff parent and offspring portfolios 
This table reports the time series regression results for post-spinoff parent and offspring. Panel A (B) shows the 
coefficients of the following time-series regression for post-spinoff parent (offspring) stocks over the holdings 
periods EX+1 to EX+12, EX+1 to EX+24, and EX+1 to EX+36, where EX is the spinoff completion date: (RP  - 
Rf)t =  α  + β 1 (RM  - Rf)t + β 2 SMBt + β 3 HMLt + εt  
where  (RP  - Rf)t  is the average monthly return on the portfolio of parent (offspring) stocks less the 
contemporaneous return on the local one-month risk-free rate in calendar month t; (RM  - Rf)t is the return on the 
Datastream return index of the country’s stocks less the contemporaneous return on the local one-month risk-free 
rate in calendar month t; SMBt  is the difference between the value-weighted average return on the small-cap 
portfolios and large-cap portfolios; and HMLt is the difference between the value-weighted average return on the 
high book-to-market portfolios and low book-to-market portfolios. Panel C (D) shows the coefficients of the 
following time-series regression for post-spinoff parent (offspring) stocks over the holdings periods EX+1 to 
EX+12, EX+1 to EX+24, and EX+1 to EX+36, where EX is the spinoff completion date:  
(RP  - Rf)t =  α  + β 1 (RM  - Rf)t + β 2 SMBt + β 3 HMLt + β 4 UMDt  + εt  
where  (RP  - Rf)t  is the average monthly return on the portfolio of parent (offspring) stocks less the 
contemporaneous return on the local one-month risk-free rate in calendar month t; (RM  - Rf)t is the return on the 
Datastream return index of the country’s stocks less the contemporaneous return on the local one-month risk-free 
rate in calendar month t; SMBt  is the difference between the value-weighted average return on the small-cap 
portfolios and large-cap portfolios; HMLt is the difference between the value-weighted average return on the high 
book-to-market portfolios and low book-to-market portfolios; and UMDt is the difference between the value-
weighted average return on the high past-year stock-return portfolios and low past-year stock-return portfolios. 
New parent (offspring) stocks are added to the portfolio in the calendar month of the stock’s EX date and stock are 
removed in the calendar month when the holding period ends. The number of observations is the number of 
calendar months used to estimate the time-series regression. The t-statistics (F-statistics) are in parentheses 
(brackets). a, b, c indicates the significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Holding Period α β 1 β 2 β 3 β 4 R2  
Panel A: Regression of Fama-French (1993) three-factor model for post-spinoff parents 
EX+ 1 to EX+12 -0.02c 0.53c -0.10 0.50  0.03 
No. of obs. = 63 (-1.75) (1.74) (-0.24) (0.87)  [1.58] 
EX+ 1 to EX+24 0.01 0.33 -0.05 -0.84  0.04c 
No. of obs. = 116 (0.72) (1.17) (-0.14) (-1.60)  [2.37] 
EX+ 1 to EX+36 0.01 0.31 -0.18 -0.65  0.03c 
No. of obs. = 147 (0.71) (1.49) (-0.68) (-1.62)  [2.59] 
Panel B: Regression of Fama-French (1993) three-factor model for offspring 
EX+ 1 to EX+12 -0.02 0.31 -0.26 0.16  0.01 
No. of obs. =72 (-1.43) (1.15) (-0.68) (0.30)  [1.13] 
EX+ 1 to EX+24 0.001 0.27 0.01 -0.34  0.02 
No. of obs. =117 (0.13) (1.47) (0.04) (-0.99)  [1.80] 
EX+ 1 to EX+36 0.002 0.29c -0.05 -0.39  0.03b 
No. of obs. =150 (0.28) (1.93) (-0.27) (-1.32)  [2.78] 
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Table 5.6 (Continued) 
Holding Period α β 1 β 2 β 3 β 4 R2  
Panel C: Regression of Carhart (1997) four-factor model for post-spinoff parents 
EX+ 1 to EX+12 -0.01 0.25 -0.18 -0.44 -0.74 0.02 
No. of obs. = 63 (-0.68) (0.66) (-0.38) (-0.76) (-1.36) [1.34] 
EX+ 1 to EX+24 0.02 -0.02 -0.39 -1.55a -0.95c 0.07b 
No. of obs. = 116 (1.45) (-0.07) (-1.04) (-2.76) (-1.77) [3.19] 
EX+ 1 to EX+36 0.01 0.06 -0.43 -1.21 -0.70 0.06b 
No. of obs. = 147 (1.46) (0.23) (-1.56) (-2.85) (-1.67) [3.39] 
Panel D: Regression of Carhart (1997) four-factor model for offspring 
EX+ 1 to EX+12 -0.01 0.13 -0.32 -0.68 -0.08 0.01 
No. of obs. =72 (-0.45) (0.38) (-0.74) (-1.26) (-0.15) [1.14] 
EX+ 1 to EX+24 0.01 -0.09 -0.39 -1.26a -0.73b 0.11a 
No. of obs. = 117 (1.30) (-0.42) (-1.65) (-3.59) (-2.16) [4.63] 
EX+ 1 to EX+36 0.01 0.11 -0.26 -0.90a -0.45 0.07a 
No. of obs. = 150 (1.09) (0.61) (-1.36) (-2.98) (-1.49) [3.96] 
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Table 5.7 Mean calendar-time portfolio abnormal returns to post-spinoff firms 
This table reports the mean calendar-time portfolio abnormal returns (CTARs) for post-spinoff parent and post-
spinoff offspring firms. The CTARs are calculated each month as the difference between the event-portfolio return 
and the expected return on the portfolio, standardised by the portfolio residual standard deviation. Each month, 
equal-weight event portfolios contain all post-spinoff parent or offspring stocks. The event portfolio is rebalanced 
monthly to drop all stocks that reached the end of their respective holding period and add all stocks that have just 
emerged from the spinoff transaction. The portfolio expected returns are proxied by value-weighted returns on 
size- and book-to-market-control portfolios and value-weighted returns on industry- and size- matching firms. 
Abnormal returns are calculated as monthly differences of event portfolio returns and portfolio expected returns. 
Mean CTARs and standard errors are calculated from the time-series of monthly CTARs. The t-statistic is in 
parentheses and the number of observations is in square brackets. The number of observations is the number of 
calendar months used to calculate the mean calendar-time portfolio abnormal returns. c indicates the significance 
level at the 10% level. 
 Size- and book-to-market-adjusted 
calendar-time  abnormal returns 
Industry- and size-adjusted  
calendar-time abnormal returns 
Holding Period Parent Offspring Parent  Offspring 
(0, +1 year) -0.09 0.04 0.03 -0.03 
 (-0.87) (0.36) (0.25) (-0.27) 
 [92] [94] [92] [94] 
(0, +2 years) 0.01 0.15c 0.11 0.11 
 (0.17) (1.87) (1.43) (1.42) 
 [156] [158] [156] [158] 
(0, +3 years) -0.01 0.06 0.07 0.09 
 (-0.11) (0.87) (0.94) (1.19) 
 [190] [190] [190] [190] 
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Table 5.8 Regression of long-run BHARs to post-spinoff combined firms on the three-day CARs 
to spinoff parents  
Regression coefficients for long-run BHARs for 129 post-spinoff parent/offspring combined firms from the 142 
spinoffs completed from January 1987 to December 2002. Panel A reports the regression results when the 
dependent variable is size- and book-to-market-adjusted BHARs. Panel B reports the regression results when the 
dependent variable is industry- and size-adjusted BHARs. CAR (-1, +1) is the three-day (-1, +1) CARs to spinoff 
parents based on the market model, estimated over a 200-day period for each sample firm. White 
heteroscedasticity-adjusted t-statistics are in parentheses.  b, c indicates the significance at the 5% and 10% level, 
respectively.  
Variable One-year BHAR Two-year BHAR Three-year BHAR 
Panel A: Dependent variable is size- and book-to-market-adjusted BHARs 
Intercept 0.01 (0.28) 0.17c (1.82) 0.12 (1.39) 
CAR (-1, +1) -0.004 (-1.61) -0.006 (-1.22) -0.01b (-2.50) 
No. of Obs. 129  129  129  
Adjusted R2 0.001  -0.005  0.005  
F statistic 1.15  0.39  1.61  
Sig. level 0.29  0.53  0.21  
Panel B: Dependent variable is industry- and size-adjusted BHARs 
Intercept -0.01 (-0.30) 0.07 (0.59) 0.04 (0.37) 
CAR (-1, +1) -0.0003 (-0.08) -0.00007 (-0.01) -0.003 (-0.54) 
No. of Obs. 129  129  129  
Adjusted R2 -0.008  -0.008  -0.007  
F statistic 0.01  0.00  0.09  
Sig. level 0.95  1.00  0.77  
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Table 5.9 Long-run accounting returns for post-spinoff firms 
This table reports the long-run accounting returns for parent and offspring firms. The return on assets (ROA) ratio 
is the fiscal year’s operating cash flows divided by the beginning-of-fiscal year asset value. Industry-adjusted 
ROAs are computed by subtracting the median value for all firms in the same two-digit SIC code from the 
corresponding spinoff firm variable. Size-adjusted ROAs are computed by subtracting the median value for all 
firms in the same two-digit SIC code, whose asset value is within 50% of the asset value of the parent, from the 
corresponding spinoff firm variable. Performance-adjusted ROAs are computed by subtracting the median value 
for all firms in the same two-digit SIC code, whose ROA value is within 50% of the ROA value of the parent, from 
the corresponding spinoff firm variable. Mean (median) excess ROAs are tested against zero using the t-statistic 
(the Wilcoxon sign rank test-statistic). None of the excess ROAs is significant at conventional levels. 
Holding 
period 
(from, to) 
No. of 
obs. 
Unadjusted 
ROA 
Industry- 
adjusted 
ROA 
Industry- and size-
adjusted 
ROA 
Industry- and 
performance-
adjusted ROA 
(years)  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Panel A: Pre-spinoff parents 
(-2, -1) 145 0.143 0.124 0.008 0.001 0.011 -0.008 -0.011 0.001 
    (0.75) (0.29) (0.73) (-0.29) (-0.82) (0.39) 
(-1, 0) 156 0.116 0.105 -0.009 0.001 -0.022 -0.005 0.006 0.002 
    (-0.59) (0.07) (-1.28) (-0.83) (0.37) (0.68) 
Panel B: Post-spinoff parents 
(0, +1) 157 0.101 0.105 -0.003 -0.005 -0.002 -0.003 0.001 0.005 
    (-0.23) (-0.38) (-0.11) (-0.22) (0.06) (0.85) 
(+1, +2) 120 0.109 0.103 0.007 0.001 0.011 -0.008 -0.011 0.001 
    (0.76) (0.30) (0.72) (-0.28) (-0.81) (0.39) 
(+2, +3) 100 0.090 0.100 -0.009 0.001 -0.022 -0.005 0.006 0.002 
    (-0.59) (0.07) (-1.28) (-0.82) (0.37) (0.65) 
157 0.097 0.102 -0.003 -0.008 -0.005 -0.007 -0.016 -0.001 Average of 
(0,+3)    (-0.28) (-0.51) (-0.45) (-0.68) (-1.20) (-0.05) 
Panel C: Offspring 
(0, +1) 160 0.084 0.100 -0.026 -0.004 -0.029 -0.010   
    (-1.33) (-0.92) (-1.41) (-1.33)   
(+1, +2) 117 0.105 0.110 0.005 -0.002 0.045b 0.023b   
    (0.23) (-0.91) (2.17) (2.15)   
(+2, +3) 101 0.081 0.120 -0.027 -0.014 -0.029 -0.006   
    (-0.67) (-0.30) (-0.65) (-0.22)   
Average of 
(0,+3) 160 0.088 0.105 -0.025 -0.010 -0.014 0.000   
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Table 5.10 Long-run size- and book-to-market adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) to post-
spinoff combined firms, parent s, and offspring following focus-increasing spinoffs 
This table reports long-run industry- and size-adjusted BHARs for 99 European post-spinoff combined firms, 99 
parents and 107 offspring from focus-increasing spinoffs in the period between January 1987 and December 2002. 
Panel A reports the t-statistic associated with the abnormal returns and the percentage of positive abnormal returns 
for post-spinoff parent/offspring combined firms. Panel B reports the data for post-spinoff parent firms. Panel C 
reports the data for post-spinoff offspring firms. The reported t-statistic is adjusted for cross-sectional dependence 
(Mitchell and Stafford, 2000). The benchmark for size- and book-to-market-adjusted BHARs is the returns to a 
group of firms selected based on the closeness of market capitalisations and book-to-market ratios. EX is the 
month of completion date of spinoff. The significance of the mean (median) is tested by the t-statistic (Wilcoxon 
test z-statistic). The binomial test is used to test the significance of the percentage of sample firms with positive 
abnormal announcement returns, with the null hypothesis that the proportion of positive abnormal announcement 
returns is 50%. None of the BHARs is significant at conventional levels. 
 Interval Mean%. t-statistic Median% z-statistic % (+) 
Panel A: Size-  and book-to-market adjusted BHARs for post-spinoff combined firms (N=99) 
(0, +1 years) -0.02 -0.47 0.00 -0.47 49.49 
(0, +2 years) 0.16 1.31 0.03 0.90 50.51 
(0, +3 years) 0.06 0.59 -0.03 -0.30 48.48 
Panel B: Size- and book-to-market-adjusted BHARs for post-spinoff parents (N=99) 
(0, +1 years) -0.03 -0.83 -0.05 -0.67 47.47 
(0, +2 years) 0.20 1.01 -0.07 -0.08 45.45 
(0, +3 years) 0.05 0.37 -0.08 -0.93 46.46 
Panel C: Size- and book-to-market-adjusted BHARs for post-spinoff offspring (N=107) 
(0, +1 years) 0.06 0.93 -0.03 0.04 49.53 
(0, +2 years) 0.14 1.50 0.06 1.16 56.07 
(0, +3 years) 0.12 0.93 -0.001 0.46 49.53 
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Table 5.11 Long-run industry- and size- BHARs to post-spinoff combined firms, parents, and offspring 
following focus-increasing spinoffs 
This table reports long-run industry- and size-adjusted BHARs for 99 European post-spinoff combined firms, 99 
parents and 107 offspring from focus-increasing spinoffs in the period between January 1987 and December 2002. 
Panel A reports the t-statistic associated with the abnormal returns and the percentage of positive abnormal returns 
for post-spinoff parent/offspring combined firms. Panel B reports the data for post-spinoff parent firms. Panel C 
reports the data for post-spinoff offspring firms. The reported t-statistic is adjusted for cross-sectional dependence 
(Mitchell and Stafford, 2000). The benchmark for size- and book-to-market-adjusted BHARs is the returns to a 
group of firms selected based on the closeness of market capitalisations and book-to-market ratios. EX is the 
month of completion date of spinoff. The significance of the mean (median) is tested by the t-statistic (Wilcoxon 
test z-statistic). The binomial test is used to test the significance of the percentage of sample firms with positive 
abnormal announcement returns, with the null hypothesis that the proportion of positive abnormal announcement 
returns is 50%. c indicates the 10% significance level.  
 Interval Mean%. t-statistic Median% z-statistic % (+) 
Panel A: Industry- and size-adjusted BHARs for post-spinoff combined firms (N=99) 
(0, +1 years) 0.003 0.08 0.03 0.21 52.53 
(0, +2 years) 0.13 1.03 0.01 0.42 50.51 
(0, +3 years) 0.07 0.57 0.007 0.39 50.51 
Panel B:  Industry and size-adjusted BHARs for post-spinoff parents (N=99) 
(0, +1 years) 0.03 0.72 0.04 0.99 53.54 
(0, +2 years) 0.22 1.09 0.08 0.69 55.56 
(0, +3 years) 0.16 1.01 0.02 0.73 52.53 
Panel C: Industry- and size-adjusted BHARs for post-spinoff offspring (N=107) 
(0, +1 years) 0.05 0.76 0.002 0.15 50.47 
(0, +2 years) 0.16c 1.72 0.10 1.01 55.14 
(0, +3 years) 0.14 0.99 0.08 0.76 54.21 
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Table 5.12 Mean calendar-time portfolio abnormal returns to post-spinoff firms following focus-
increasing spinoffs 
This table reports the mean calendar-time portfolio abnormal returns for post-spinoff parent and offspring firms. The 
CTARs are calculated each month as the difference between the event-portfolio return and the expected return on the 
portfolio, standardised by the portfolio residual standard deviation. Each month, equal-weight event portfolios contain 
all post-spinoff parent or offspring stocks. The event portfolio is rebalanced monthly to drop all stocks that reached the 
end of their respective holding period and add all stocks that have just emerged from the spinoff transaction. The 
portfolio expected returns are proxied by value-weighted returns on size- and book-to-market control portfolios and 
value-weighted returns on industry- and size- matching firms. Abnormal returns are calculated as monthly differences 
of event portfolio returns and portfolio expected returns. Mean CTARs and standard errors are calculated from the 
time-series of monthly CTARs. The t-statistic is in parentheses and the number of observations is in square brackets. 
The number of observations is the number of calendar months used to calculate the mean calendar-time portfolio 
abnormal returns. None of the portfolio returns is significant at conventional levels. 
 Size- and book-to-market-adjusted 
calendar-time  abnormal returns 
Industry- and size-adjusted  
calendar-time abnormal returns 
Holding Period Parent Offspring Parent  Offspring 
(0, +1 years) -0.001 0.10 0.08 -0.02 
 (-0.03) (0.94) (0.74) (-0.32) 
 [91] [93] [91] [93] 
(0, +2 years) 0.01 0.10 0.07 0.03 
 (0.23) (1.19) (0.81) (0.62) 
 [127] [128] [127] [128] 
(0, +3 years) 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.05 
 (0.36) (0.33) (0.81) (1.19) 
 [176] [176] [176] [176] 
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Appendix 5.1 Calculation of Adjusted t-statistics  
The first adjusted t-statistic is the serial correlation-consistent t-statistic (SC_t) 
proposed in Jegadeesh and Karceski (2004). The approach is outlined as follows.  
  
Let tN denotes the number of stocks in the sample in month t, and N is the total 
number of stocks in the sample. Then define the average abnormal return for each 
event month t across all stocks in the sample that month (this group of firms is defined 
as a monthly cohort) 
⎪⎩
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⎧ >= ∑=
otherwise
NifHtAR
NHtAR
tN
i
t
t
,0
0),(1
),( 1  
 
Let )(HAR  be a 1×T  column vector where the tth element equals ),( HtAR . )(HAR  
is then the average long-run abnormal return of each monthly cohort. Define w as a 
1×T column vector of weights where the tth element is the ratio of the number of 
events that occur in month t divided by N. Thus the sample average abnormal return is 
equal to the monthly weight vector w times the average abnormal return of each 
monthly cohort. Formally, the sample average abnormal return is computed as follows: 
)(')( HARwHAR sample =  
 
The variance of )(HAR sample  is then given by  
'')]([var VwwHARiance sample =  
where V is the TT × variance-covariance matrix of )(HAR . 
  
The approach of serial correlation-consistent t-statistic is to estimate the variance-
covariance matrix and the estimator is denoted SC_V. Allowing for serial correlation 
of monthly returns, the ijth element of SC_V is given by 
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Where TN,j is the number of times where month t and month j both have at least one 
event. 2σ is the variance of monthly cohort H-period abnormal returns including only 
months with at least one event. jρ  is the estimator of jth-order serial covariance. To 
reduce the estimation error, I require at least five cases where month t and t+j both 
have at least one event. If TN,j <5, the covariance is set to 0. 
 
Then the serial correlation consistent t-statistic is given by 
VwSCw
HARtSC sample
_'
)(_ =  
 
The second adjusted t-statistic is the heteroskedasticity and serial correlation 
consistent t-statistic (HSC_t) proposed in Jegadeesh and Karceski (2004). The 
estimation procedure is similar to that of the first approach except for the estimation 
of variance-covariance matrix. The estimator of variance-covariance matrix is denoted 
for HSC_V for the heteroskedasticity and serial correlation consistent t-statistic.  
 
The ijth element of HSC_V is given by 
1
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Then the heteroskedasticity and serial correlation consistent t-statistic is computed as 
follows: 
VwHSCw
HARtHSC sample
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The third adjusted t-statistic (LBT_t) is the one proposed in Lyon et al. (1999). I 
estimate the elements of the variance-covariance matrix for the overlapping long-run 
returns of firm i and firm j as 
))((1 ,,, jtj
s
st
itiji ARARARAR −−−= ∑
+
+=
τ
αατσ  
where the firm i’s abnormal return is calculated from period s  to τ+s , firm j’s 
abnormal return is calculated from period α+s  to τα ++s , and τα <≤0 . ARi,t and 
ARj,t are monthly abnormal returns for firms i and j, respectively, and iAR  and jAR  
are their means calculated over the ατ −  period.  
 
The fourth adjusted t-statistic (MS_t) is the one proposed in Mitchell and Stafford 
(2000) to mitigate the event firm dependence problem. I first estimate the average 
correlation of 3-year BHARs for sample firms with complete (36 months) calendar-
time overlap. Then I calculate the estimated correlation between sample firms with 
less than 36-month overlap by assuming the correlation is decreasing linearly as the 
amount of overlap falls from complete calendar-time overlap of 36 months to no 
overlap between observations (see Table 5A1 for details). The calculated average 
correlation of BHARs with complete overlap for my sample is p=0.0622. Then the 
estimated correlation of 3-year BHARs with 35-month overlap is calculated as 35/36 
* p=0.0604, and so on. The estimated correlation for non-overlapping observations is 
zero. Then the grand average correlation for the BHARs is 0.0174. 
 
The t-statistic without assuming independence for my sample firms (N= 129) is then 
calculated by using the following formula: 
( )
( ) ,
1 1 0.6365
1 (129 1)*0.01151 ( 1)
BHAR independence
BHAR dependence i jN
σ
σ ρ≈ = =+ −+ −
 
  
This adjustment of t-statistics is moderate compared with the adjustment of 0.2463 in 
Mitchell and Stafford (2000) for their seasoned equity offerings sample. 
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Table 5A1 Correlation structure of three-year BHARs for the European spinoff parent firms 
Number of Months 
of Overlap 
Number of Unique 
Correlations n(n-1)/2 
Assumed Correlation 
Structure 
Estimated 
Correlation 
36 92 p 0.0409  
35 168 35/36*p 0.0397  
34 127 34/36*p 0.0386  
33 168 33/36*p 0.0375  
32 124 32/36*p 0.0363  
31 108 31/36*p 0.0352  
30 138 30/36*p 0.0341  
29 127 29/36*p 0.0329  
28 126 28/36*p 0.0318  
27 139 27/36*p 0.0307  
26 128 26/36*p 0.0295  
25 117 25/36*p 0.0284  
24 145 24/36*p 0.0272  
23 158 23/36*p 0.0261  
22 115 22/36*p 0.0250  
21 125 21/36*p 0.0238  
20 149 20/36*p 0.0227  
19 100 19/36*p 0.0216  
18 90 18/36*p 0.0204  
17 138 17/36*p 0.0193  
16 110 16/36*p 0.0182  
15 102 15/36*p 0.0170  
14 132 14/36*p 0.0159  
13 116 13/36*p 0.0148  
12 111 12/36*p 0.0136  
11 130 11/36*p 0.0125  
10 94 10/36*p 0.0114  
9 81 9/36*p 0.0102  
8 113 8/36*p 0.0091  
7 116 7/36*p 0.0079  
6 83 6/36*p 0.0068  
5 80 5/36*p 0.0057  
4 103 4/36*p 0.0045  
3 74 3/36*p 0.0034  
2 74 2/36*p 0.0023  
1 97 1/36*p 0.0011  
0 4058 0/36*p 0.0000  
No. of firms=129 Total=8256  Average=0.0115 
 
  
 95
Appendix 5.2 Portfolio Construction for the Calendar Time Regression Approach 
For the estimation of Fama and French (1993) three-factor model, the SMB, and HML 
portfolios are constructed following the approach of Daniel, Titman and Wei (2001). For 
each calendar month, I use only stocks for which I have the market capitalisation (MV) 
and a book-to-market ratio (B/M).  
 
To construct the portfolios, I sort all stocks that pass the above requirements by MV and 
create tritile portfolios. I then take the portfolio of stocks with the highest MV and re-sort 
all stocks by B/M, thereby creating three B/M portfolios within the high MV group. I 
repeat the same procedure for the low MV groups. After sorting for MV and B/M, I have 
six portfolios. Table 5A2 depicts the portfolio construction procedure. The two trading 
strategies are constructed as follows: 
 
BH))-(SHBM)-(SMBL)-((SL*1/3SMB ++=  
 
BL))-(BHSL)-((SH*1/2HML +=  
 
Table 5A2 Portfolio construction procedure for the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model 
Market Capitalisation (MV) Book-to-market (B/M) Portfolio 
Small High SH 
 Medium SM 
 Low SL 
Big High BH 
 Medium BM 
 Low BL 
 
For the estimation of Carhart (1997) four-factor model, the SMB, HML, and UMD 
portfolios are constructed following the approach of Liew and Vassalou (2000). For each 
calendar month, I use only stocks for which I have the market capitalization (MV), a 
book-to-market ratio (B/M), and at least twelve monthly observations so as to be able to 
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calculate the momentum (MOM). I consider only the 12-month momentum strategy, and 
I implement it by calculating the average of past year's returns, excluding the most recent 
month. 
 
To construct the portfolios, I sort all stocks that pass the above requirements by MV and 
create tritile portfolios. I then take the portfolio of stocks with the highest MV and re-sort 
all stocks by B/M, thereby creating three B/M portfolios within the high MV group. I 
repeat the same procedure for the medium MV and low MV groups. After sorting for MV 
and B/M, I have nine portfolios. I then sort the securities in each of these nine portfolios 
according to MOM and create tritile portfolios within the nine portfolios. I obtain, in this 
manner, 27 portfolios. 
 
Table 5A3 depicts the portfolio construction procedure. “Down” are the bottom third of 
the total stocks with the lowest last year's average return, excluding the most recent 
month. “Up” are the top third of the total stocks with the highest last year's average return, 
excluding the most recent month. “Medium” are the remaining third of the stocks. 
The three trading strategies are constructed as follows: 
 
P27))-(P9P26)-(P8P25)-(P7            
P24)-(P6P23)-(P5P22)-(P4P21)-(P3P20)-(P2P19)-((P1*1/9SMB
+++
+++++=
 
 
P27))-(P21P26)-(P20P25)-(P19            
P18)-(P12P17)-(P11P16)-(P10P9)-(P3P8)-(P2P7)-((P1*1/9HML
+++
+++++=
 
 
P27))-(P25P24)-(P22P19)-(P21            
P18)-(P16P15)-(P13P12)-(P10P9)-(P7P6)-(P4P3)-((P1*1/9UMD
+++
+++++=
 
 
SMB represents the return to a portfolio that is long on small MV stocks and short on big 
MV stocks, controlling for the size and momentum effects. In other words, HML is a zero 
investment strategy that is both size and momentum neutral. Similar interpretations can 
be given for SMB and UMD. The 27 portfolios are value-weighted at construction. In the 
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presence of small capitalization stocks, value-weighted portfolios result in more realistic 
returns. 
 
Table 5A3 Portfolio construction procedure for the Carhart (1997) four-factor model 
Market Capitalisation (MV) Book-to-market (B/M) Past year’s returns (MOM) Portfolio 
Small High Up P1 
  Medium P2 
  Down P3 
 Medium Up P4 
  Medium P5 
  Down P6 
 Low Up P7 
  Medium P8 
  Down P9 
Medium High Up P10 
  Medium P11 
  Down P12 
 Medium Up P13 
  Medium P14 
  Down P15 
 Low Up P16 
  Medium P17 
  Down P18 
Big High Up P19 
  Medium P20 
  Down P21 
 Medium Up P22 
  Medium P23 
  Down P24 
 Low Up P25 
  Medium P26 
  Down P27 
 
The factor returns are calculated for annual rebalancing frequencies. Annually rebalanced 
portfolios use December-end B/M values, June-end market capitalization, and past 12 
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months of returns prior to July. If a stock does not have returns for any month through the 
duration of the holding period, I invest that portion of the portfolio into the market as 
measured by the UK total return index given in Datastream. My portfolio construction 
procedure differs from the one used in Fama and French (1993), in which two 
independent sorts created the HML and SMB. I cannot use independent sorts because of 
the smaller number of securities I have than that of the US market.  
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Chapter 6 Investor Irrationality and Spinoff Value Effects 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The literature review in Chapter 2 shows that corporate spinoffs are value-enhancing 
restructuring transactions. However, corporate spinoffs are joint events which combine 
features of divestitures and equity offerings. Less attention has been paid to the 
managerial rationale of and the market reaction to the offering of equity of the subsidiary. 
Recent literature suggests that shareholder reaction to a corporate announcement can be 
affected by investor sentiment, which means the investor reaction to factors other than the 
value creation logic of the corporate transaction (e.g. see Ljungqvist, Nanda and Singh 
(2006) for initial public offerings and Rosen (2006) for mergers).  
 
Likewise, the positive market reaction to spinoff announcements may result from overly 
optimistic beliefs of investors about the value benefits from the spinoff transaction. For 
investors, corporate spinoffs have two distinctive features, increasing corporate focus of 
the divesting parent and listing a subsidiary. Therefore, there may be a positive 
correlation between the investor sentiment about corporate focus (or glamour stocks) and 
the market reaction to a spinoff announcement. Although to date no empirical study 
specifically has tested the impact of investor sentiment about spinoffs on stockholder 
returns, there is some evidence that such sentiment may affect the market reaction to 
spinoff announcements.  
 
Prior empirical studies have shown that there is a time-varying pattern of investor 
demand for corporate focus and that such demand affects the market valuation of 
diversification or refocusing transactions. For example, diversifying acquisitions 
experienced favourable market reactions in the 1960s (Matsusaka, 1993) but have been 
penalised by markets since the 1980s (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1990). In a recent 
literature review, Baker et al. (2004) put forward that the variation of investor appetite for 
conglomerates over time have may been responsible for the different valuation effects of 
diversifying and refocusing transactions between 1960s and 1980s.  
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Investor sentiment changes over time. Therefore, corporate transactions that are initially 
favoured by stock markets due to investor sentiment may turn out to be value destroying 
for shareholders. The consideration of the relationship between investor sentiment and 
spinoff announcement returns could resolve why there are generally positive market 
reactions to spinoff announcements but long-term performance of post-spinoff firms 
differs substantially across different periods and locations. For instance, with the 
refocusing argument gaining strength among academics and practitioners since the late 
1980s, there has been a fast growing trend of refocusing divestitures with an aim to 
improve shareholder values. However, empirical studies employing recent data have 
demonstrated that corporate focus has no significant impact on long-term performance of 
post-spinoff firms19.  
 
Managers may seek to exploit investor sentiment. If market valuations for different 
businesses of a diversified firm are driven by investor sentiments at any time, managers 
of undervalued parent firms may tend to spin off overvalued subsidiaries because such 
spinoffs maximise the short-run share prices and temporarily relieve the pressures to 
improve the firm performance20. Practitioners have pointed out that managers often spin 
off overvalued subsidiaries to shareholders (e.g. see Montier, 2002, Chapter 7). A recent 
press comment from the Financial Times on the managerial rationale of spinoffs also 
highlights this issue, which is given below:  
“In the late 1990s, a spate of companies donated overvalued technology offshoots 
to their shareholders. Recent months have seen demergers of old economy oil, 
metals and even paper and pulp subsidiaries. Perhaps one clear lesson is that spin-
                                                 
19 For example, Desai and Jain (1999) studied a US sample of 155 spinoffs between the years 1975 and 
1991 and found a highly significant average abnormal return of 19.82% to the post-spinoff parent as well as 
post-spinoff offspring firms in the three-year post-spinoff period. On the other hand, McConnell, Ozbilgin, 
and Wahal (2001) examined a US sample of 96 spinoffs over the period 1989-1995 and document ed 
insignificant abnormal returns to either parent firms or to subsidiary firms. The two sample periods are 
largely non-overlapping. 
20 Spinoffs are large-scale corporate restructurings and it may take a long time for investors to fully 
understand the value benefits (or detriments) of such dramatic restructurings. Sanders and Carpenter (2003) 
argue that managers are likely to use share repurchase programmes to resolve potentially conflicting 
pressures – maximising shareholder wealth in the long term and appeasing shareholders in the near term. 
This argument can also apply to the case of spinoffs.  
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offs sometimes point to asset categories that are overvalued.”  
(“Spin-offs”, Lex Column, Financial Times, 12 February 2005) 
 
I thus propose a catering theory to describe some spinoffs that are undertaken for reasons 
other than operating efficiency improvement. The catering theory is based on a 
behavioural perspective where investors are less than fully rational (for detailed 
discussions on irrational investors, see Shleifer, 2000). Irrational investors are likely to 
react to non-fundamental factors in making investment decisions. For example, there is 
an excessive investor demand for glamour stocks, such as internet (dotcom) stocks during 
the 1990s. The consequence of such investor sentiment is that the stocks subject to such 
excessive demand become overpriced (Baker et al., 2004). Rational corporate mangers 
may then cater to a temporary investor demand by spinning off overvalued subsidiary 
businesses to shareholders. When the positive spinoff announcement returns are partially 
caused by investor sentiment, the initial high expectation on the offspring should 
eventually turn out to be unfounded. Put differently, the stock price of offspring should 
reverse in the long run as sentiments are replaced by reality. Therefore, the catering 
theory also predicts that offspring firms from spinoffs that are undertaken to cater to 
unrealistic investor demand will initially outperform but in the long term underperform 
those from other types of spinoffs.   
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 6.2 develops testable hypotheses 
based on the assumption of investor irrationality. Section 6.3 outlines the test 
methodology. Section 6.4 examines the relationship between investor sentiment and the 
spinoff announcement returns. Section 6.5 investigates both the short-run and the long-
run market reaction to spinoffs that cater to investor demand for glamour stocks. Section 
6.6 concludes. 
 
6.2 Theory Development 
Extant literature demonstrates that irrational investors tend to react to non-fundamental 
factors upon the announcement of corporate transactions. The early empirical 
investigation of the relationship between investor sentiment and stock returns was 
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conducted by De Bondt and Thaler (1985, 1987, and 1990). They find systematic price 
reversals for stocks that experience extreme long-term gains or losses: past losers 
significantly outperform past winners. They interpret this as evidence that investors tend 
to make biased expectation of a stock’s future performance when confronting a series of 
good or bad earnings news21. Later empirical research documents evidence that investors 
often form systematic mistakes on assessing the desirability of different corporate 
transactions based on the past performance of event firms. Ritter (1991) and Loughran 
and Ritter (1995) find that firms that issue equities have high earnings growth prior to 
earnings announcements but have poor long-run performance. Rau and Vermaelen (1998) 
and Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) observe that the bidder with good past performance, 
as reflected in its low book-to-market ratio, underperform the bidders with poor past 
performance in the long run.  
 
It is also possible that investor sentiment may affect the market reaction to spinoff 
announcement news. I consider two cases of investor reactions to non-fundamental 
factors upon the spinoff announcement. First, investors may be over-optimistic about the 
value benefits of a spinoff that increases the corporate focus. Second, investors may be 
over-optimistic about the value benefits of a spinoff that lets investors own a subsidiary 
whose industry stocks are currently attractive to the markets. Therefore, there should be a 
positive association between an investor demand for corporate focus (and stocks of the 
offspring’s industry) and the market reaction to spinoff announcements.  
 
Prior studies have revealed that corporate focus is valued by stock markets differently 
over time. Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987, p40) document that the average return on 13 
leading conglomerates reached 385% from July 1965 to June 1968, against the modest 
gains of 34% of the S&P 425. Klein (2001) observes that the diversification premium 
                                                 
21 There is a hot debate on how to explain the finding of market overreaction documented by De Bondt and 
Thaler. Fama and French (1996) argue that the documented market overreaction is due to mis-specified 
asset pricing models used in the measuring of stock performance by De Bondt and Thaler. Chan, Frankel 
and Kothari (2004) find that investors do not overreact to consistent earnings news based on trends in 
accounting data. However, both Daniel and Titman (2006) and Lee (2006) document evidence that 
investors overreact to intangible information contained in the news after using more robust return 
measurement methodologies.    
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turned into a discount of 1% in 1969-1971 and 17% in 1972-1974. The diversification 
discount has remained around 15% for the US in the 1980s and 1990s (Berger and Ofek, 
1995). Lins and Servaes (1999) even document no diversification discount in Germany in 
the early 1990s. Baker et al. (2004) review the empirical studies on corporate 
diversification and propose that the diversification and subsequent re-focusing wave in 
the US seems to be driven by managerial efforts to cater to a temporary investor appetite 
for conglomerates. 
 
If there is a time-varying pattern of investor demand for corporate focus, such investor 
sentiment will affect the market reaction to announcements of corporate spinoffs that are 
widely believed to be refocusing corporate transactions. Therefore, I propose the first 
hypothesis on the impact of investor sentiments on spinoff announcement returns: 
H3: There is a positive association between the prevailing investor demand for 
corporate focus and spinoff announcement returns. 
 
A large number of studies have found investor over-optimism to equity issues. Using 
annual data from the 1920s on aggregate equity issuance relative to debt plus equity 
issuance, Baker and Wurgler (2000) find that the fraction of equity issuance is negatively 
associated with the overall stock market return in the following year, suggesting reversal 
of investor over-optimism subsequent to equity issues. Shefrin (2002) also proposes that 
overvalued IPOs (defined as new issuers with high market-to-book ratios) will 
underperform in the long-term because investors who buy the issue suffer from an 
unsustainable excess of optimism about the future prospects of the issuing firms. 
Investigating companies issuing stock during the period from 1970 to 1990, Loughran 
and Ritter (1995) find that IPO firms underperform size-matching non-issuing firms by 
about seven percent per year in the five-year post-listed period. Brav, Geczy, and 
Gompers (2000) re-examine the long-term performance of IPO firms in the period 
between 1975 and 1992 with various long horizon test methodologies and observe that 
IPO returns are similar to non-issuing firm returns matched on the basis of size and book-
to-market ratios. Mitchell and Stafford (2000) also observe insignificant long-run 
abnormal returns to IPO firms with the calendar-time portfolio abnormal return approach. 
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However, Brav et al. (2000) still find that small issuing firms with high market-to-book 
ratios underperform various benchmarks in the long term, which is consistent with 
Shefrin’s investor- overoptimism argument. 
 
Since spinoffs are actually a transaction to issue equities of subsidiaries to investors, the 
investor sentiment about the offspring’s industry will affect the market reaction to spinoff 
announcements. Thus, I suggest the second hypothesis on the relationship between the 
investor sentiments and spinoff announcement returns: 
H4: There is a positive association between the prevailing investor demand for stocks of 
the offspring’s industry and spinoff announcement returns. 
 
A growing literature begins to view managerial decisions as rational responses to 
inefficient markets. Based on an information asymmetry model, Baker and Wurgler (2002) 
suggest that firms respond to investors’ over-optimism by issuing equity to exploit a 
“window of opportunity”. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) propose a market timing theory of 
mergers which suggests managers rationally use overvalued stocks to purchase target 
firms22. Baker and Wurgler (2004) develop a theoretical model to explain managerial 
decisions to initiate dividends as a response to investor demand for dividends 23 . 
Ljungqvist et al. (2006) also model an IPO company’s optimal response to sentiment-
driven investors in order to explain the underpricing puzzle of new issues. Their model 
shows that the equity issuers intentionally underprice the issued equities to facilitate a 
quick equity sale to sentiment-driven investors later because a sentiment demand for new 
stocks may disappear prematurely.  
 
Provided that investor sentiment is expected to affect the spinoff announcement returns, 
                                                 
22 A well-know case of market-driven acquisition is the merger of AOL and Times Warner in early 2000. At 
that time, AOL used its highly overvalued stocks to acquire Times Warner, a traditional media giant. This 
high-profile deal eventually turned out to be a value-destroying acquisition (Geoffrey Colvin, “Time 
Warner, Don't Blame Steve Case", February 3, 2003, Fortune)     
23 Hoberg and Prabhala (2006) argue that idiosyncratic risk rather than catering explains the change of 
propensity to pay dividends over time. However, Gemmill (2005) documents evidence that investor 
demand for dividends explains the price changes of dividend shares of “split-capital” closed-end funds in 
the UK, which is difficult to explain with the risk-based consideration since dividend shares are stripped 
from mutual fund portfolios with pre-determined payment rules. 
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managers may rationally react to investor sentiment to undertake spinoffs. I formulate a 
catering model that some spinoffs are undertaken to cater to investor demand for glamour 
stocks rather than to improve the operating efficiency of post-spinoff firms. The catering 
theory argues that if the investor demand for an offspring’s industry stocks is high, 
managers may respond to such demand by spinning off subsidiaries that are currently 
attractive to investors to maximise the firm’s short-run share price. Therefore, the market 
reaction to announcements of spinoffs that cater to investor demand for glamour stocks 
should be more positive than to announcements of other types of spinoff. This argument 
gives rise to my third hypothesis: 
H5: Parent firms of spinoffs undertaken to cater to investor demand for glamour stocks 
earn significantly higher announcement abnormal returns than those of other types of 
spinoffs.  
 
However, the long-run stock performance of an offspring from such glamour spinoffs will 
be lower than that of an offspring from other types of spinoff because the investor 
optimism is eventually replaced by results. Hence, I propose the following fourth 
hypothesis: 
H6: Offspring firms from spinoffs undertaken to cater to investor demand for glamour 
stocks earn significantly lower long-run abnormal returns than those from other types 
of spinoffs. 
 
6.3 Test Methods 
This section sets out the models to be tested. The sample selection procedure is the same 
as that described in Section 5.2. 
 
6.3.1 Investor Sentiment Proxies 
Through a corporate spinoff, a parent increases its corporate focus and a divested 
subsidiary is listed on the stock market. Investors may react to a spinoff announcement 
favourably if they have strong demand for corporate focus and/or the stocks of the 
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offspring’s industry. I construct four investor sentiment proxies to measure investor 
demand for corporate focus and investor demand for offspring’s stocks.  
 
The first two investor sentiment proxies, called focus premium variables in this study, 
measure the prevailing investor demand for corporate focus. These two proxies are 
market-based variables to measure the market valuation of focused firms relative to 
diversified firms. The valuation methodology starts from the procedure to identify both 
focused firms and diversified firms in each European country. Then I calculate the 
aggregate valuation difference between focused firms and diversified firms.  
 
The first focus premium variable, FPMTB, is the difference of natural logarithms of 
market-to-book value (MTBV) of assets ratios between diversified firms and focused 
firms. First, business segment data for all publicly traded firms from the 13 sample 
European countries are collected from Worldscope for the period between 1987 and 2005. 
Worldscope provides financial data for a large number of companies which have been 
previously used by Lins and Servaes (1999) to calculate the diversification discount on 
international firms. I classify firms as diversified when they report sales in two or more 
segments (defined at the two-digit SIC code level), and the most important segment 
accounts for less than 90 percent of total sales. This 90 percent cut-off uses a 
diversification classification similar to the one companies are required to follow in the 
United States (Berger and Ofek, 1995). If a firm has two or more segments but has more 
than 90% of its sales in one segment, this firm will be classified as a focused firm. To 
avoid misclassification of diversified firms into focused firms, I define focused firms as 
those operating in the single two-digit SIC code level based on segment sales data 
available in Worldscope.24  
 
Second, I calculate the value-weighted average MTBV of assets ratios for all diversified 
                                                 
24  In some cases, Worldscope reports that a firm has segments operating in different two-digit SIC 
industries but gives no details of the firm’s segment sales. Following my definition of diversified firms, 
such firms may not necessarily be diversified firms if one segment’s sales accounts for more than 90% of 
the total revenues. To avoid the potential misclassification of focused firms into diversified firms, I remove 
such observations during the calculation of focus premium. 
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firms and focused firms, separately. The calculation of MTBV of assets ratio employs 
firms’ market capitalisation at the month end prior to the spinoff announcement date and 
the most recently available accounting data at the spinoff announcement date 25 . 
Specifically, the market value of total assets for a firm is the sum of its market value of 
equity and its book value of total debt. The book value of total assets is the sum of its 
book value of equity and its book value of total debt. The computation of value-weighted 
average uses the book value of total assets.  
 
Finally, I compute the difference in the natural logarithms of the average MTBV of assets 
ratios of focused firms and diversified firms (i.e. the ratio for focused firms minus the 
ratio for diversified firms). This proxy for investor demand for corporate focus follows 
the same construction approach of Baker and Wurgler (2004) to measure investor demand 
for dividends. They use the difference in logs of the MTBV of equity ratios of dividend 
payers and non-dividend payers to gauge the investor demand for dividends.  
 
The second focus premium variable, FPRET, is the difference in past-year stock returns 
between diversified firms and focused firms. The identification of diversified and focused 
firms for FPRET uses the same approach as for FPMTB. After diversified and focused 
firms are identified, I calculate the cumulative stock returns to diversified firms and those 
to focused firms over the 12-month period prior to the spinoff announcement date. The 
value-weighted past-year returns to diversified and focused firms are then computed. The 
computation weights are based on the market capitalisations of diversified firms and 
focused firms, respectively. Then the investor demand for corporate focus is measured as 
the value-weighted average past-year stock returns to focused firms minus the value-
weighted average past-year stock returns to diversified firms.  
 
                                                 
25 I require a more than four-month gap between the most recent financial year-end and focus premium 
measurement date to avoid the looking-ahead bias when using the most recent accounting data to calculate 
the market valuation ratios. Let me suppose I compute the MTBV of assets ratio, at the date of June 30th 
2004, for BAA PLC, whose accounting year ends at March 31st. The most recent financial year-end for 
BAA for calculation is the March 31st 2003 rather than March 31st 2004 because there is only a three-month 
gap between financial year end of 2004 and the measurement date. This time-gap setting assumes that the 
current year’s financial reports will not be available to the public within four months immediately following 
the financial year end.    
  
 108
The remaining two investor sentiment proxies, called glamour stock variables in this 
study, measure the prevailing investor demand for the stocks of the offspring’s industry. 
 
I consider two market-based measures to capture the investor demand for stocks of the 
offspring’s industry. The first glamour stock variable, SUBMTB, is the industry MTBV 
of assets ratio for the offspring. The industry MTBV of assets ratio is calculated as the 
value-weighted average of MTBV of assets ratios to all firms in the offspring’s industry. 
The MTBV of assets ratio for SUBMTB is computed similarly to that for FPMTB. The 
second glamour stock variable, SUBRET, is the industry past-year stock returns for the 
offspring. The industry past-year stock returns are computed as the value-weighted 
average of past-year stock returns to all firms in the offspring’s industry. For proxies 
SUBMTB and SUBRET, the weight is the market capitalisation of industry peers of the 
offspring’s industry, where the industry is defined at two-digit SIC level26. The definitions 
of these above four investor sentiment proxies are also given in Table 6.1.  
 
[Insert Table 6.1 about here, see page 128] 
 
6.3.2 Glamour Spinoff Proxies 
Not all spinoffs are undertaken to improve operating efficiency. The catering theory of 
spinoff argues that some spinoffs are undertaken to exploit potential market 
misevaluation of different segments of a diversified firm as a rational response to investor 
sentiment. In particular, managers of undervalued parent firms tend to spin off potentially 
overvalued subsidiaries. When the parent business is undervalued while the subsidiary 
business is overvalued, stock markets are likely to misprice different segments of a 
diversified firm and the parent’s managers may face significant shareholder pressure to 
improve the market valuation of the parent firm. In this circumstance, managers of the 
undervalued parents have strong incentives to cater opportunistically to investor demand 
                                                 
26 Alternative measures for SUBMTB and SUBRET are the offspring’s industry valuation ratio minus the 
median value of all valuation ratios of all two-digit SIC industries. In the following section, I use dummy 
variables to indicate the glamour status of an offspring relative to the market median, which are also 
significantly and positively associated with spinoff announcement-period returns.     
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for glamour stocks by spinning off the overvalued subsidiary.  
 
I construct three dummy variables, called glamour spinoff proxies in this study, to 
indicate whether a spinoff is undertaken to cater to investor demand for glamour stocks. 
Whether a segment of a conglomerate firm is undervalued or overvalued following 
spinoffs is not straightforward to measure because there are no sufficient segment data for 
measuring the true values of different segments of a diversified firm. For the first two 
glamour spinoff proxies, I use the market-based valuation for firms in an offspring’s 
industry to estimate the market valuation of the offspring within a conglomerate. The 
market valuation measures are the MTBV of assets ratio for the offspring’s industry and 
past-year returns for the offspring’s industry. When the market-based valuation of the 
parent (offspring) industry is lower than the median of the market valuation for all two-
digit SIC industries, the parent (offspring) business is likely to be undervalued. When the 
market-based valuation for the parent (offspring) industry is higher than the median of the 
market valuation for all two-digit SIC industries, the parent (offspring) business is likely 
to be overvalued.  
 
The first glamour spinoff proxy, GLAMMTB, is a dummy variable that equals one when 
the MTBV of assets ratio for the parent’s industry is lower than the median of the MTBV 
of assets ratios for all two-digit SIC industries in the parent’s country while the MTBV of 
assets ratio for the subsidiary industry is higher than the median of the MTBV of assets 
ratios for all two-digit SIC industries in the parent’s country, and equals zero otherwise. 
 
The second glamour spinoff proxy, GLAMRET, is a dummy variable that equals one 
when past-year stock return for the parent’s industry is lower than the median of past-year 
stock returns for all two-digit SIC industries in the parent’s country while past-year stock 
returns for the offspring’s industry is higher than the median of past-year stock returns for 
all two-digit SIC industries in the parent’s country, and equals zero otherwise. 
 
The third glamour spinoff proxy, GLAMHT, is motivated by the high-tech bubble in the 
late 1990s. This dummy variable, or the high-tech spinoff variable, will equal one when 
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the parent firm operates in a non-high-tech industry while the offspring is in the high-tech 
industry; and equals zero otherwise. The details of the classification of high-tech spinoffs 
are included in Appendix 6.1. The definitions for the above three glamour spinoff proxies 
are also given in Table 6.1. 
 
6.3.3 Empirical Models to Test Investor Sentiment 
The first two hypotheses about the investor sentiment predict a positive association 
between investor demand for corporate focus (subsidiary stocks) and the market reaction 
to spinoff announcements. To test these two hypotheses, I use a multiple regression 
model to analyse the impact of investor sentiments on spinoff announcement gains. The 
regression model is given below:   
( )CARs f Investor Sentiment Proxy,ControlVariables=                                                (6.1) 
where CARs are cumulative abnormal returns to a parent during the three-day spinoff 
announcement period. 
 
There are seven control variables considered in the regression model (6.1) to explain the 
spinoff announcement effects. The first control variable (FOCUS) is corporate focus, 
which is a dummy variable that equals one when the post-spinoff parent and subsidiary 
firms do not share the same two-digit SIC code, and equals zero for otherwise. The SIC 
codes for sample firms are from Worldscope. Prior studies have found that the corporate 
focus variable is positively and significantly associated with spinoff announcement 
period returns and long-run returns to post-spinoff firms (Daley et al., 1997; Desai and 
Jain, 1999; Veld and Veld-Merkoulova, 2004).  
 
The second control variable (INFASYM) is an information asymmetry variable, proxied 
by the residual volatility in daily stock returns for parent firms in the year prior to the 
spinoff announcement date. Specifically, the residual standard deviation variable captures 
the firm-specific uncertainty that remains after removing the total market-wide 
uncertainty. Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) argue that this variable captures the 
information asymmetry between the investors and managers as regards the firm-specific 
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information about the pre-spinoff parent. This information asymmetry proxy is predicted 
to be positively associated with the spinoff value creation.  
 
The third control variable (GROWTH) is a parent’s growth options in its investment 
opportunity set, measured as its MTBV of assets ratio at the end of month prior to spinoff 
announcement date. Following Faccio, McConnell and Stolin (2006), the MTBV of assets 
ratio is computed as the market capitalisation plus book value of preferred stocks and 
book value of debt divided by the sum of book values of equity, preferred stocks and 
debt27.  
 
The third variable is also motivated by the information asymmetry argument. 
Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) document evidence that high-growth firms have 
a high likelihood of engaging in a spinoff to increase their information transparency 
because high-growth firms with information asymmetry problems cannot obtain 
sufficient external capital to finance their positive NPV projects. A conjecture following 
this information-based argument is that high-growth firms will create more shareholder 
values from undertaking spinoffs than low-growth firms. The reason is that a spinoff can 
partially resolve underinvestment problems for the former as argued in Myers and Majluf 
(1984) by improving the information environment of post-spinoff firms. Thus I predict a 
positive association between GROWTH and spinoff value effects. 
 
The fourth control variable (ROA) is a parent’s return on assets in the year prior to the 
spinoff announcement date, which is measured as the earnings before interest, tax, 
depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA) divided by the total assets of the firm. This 
variable is also related to the information asymmetry argument. Nanda and Narayanan 
(1999) put forward that liquidity-constrained firms have strong incentives to undertake 
spinoffs in order to mitigate the information asymmetry problem, thus facilitating post-
spinoff firms’ future access to external finance. Therefore, firms with higher internal cash 
                                                 
27 For the measurement of GROWTH variable, I also require a more than four-month gap between the most 
recent financial-year end on which accounting data are used and the spinoff announcement date to avoid the 
looking-ahead bias. 
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flows are less likely to undertake spinoffs (Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) 
because they benefit less from spinoffs. Hence I expect a negative relationship between 
ROA and spinoff value effects. 
 
The fifth control variable (RELSIZ) is the relative size of a spinoff. Prior studies find that 
the spinoff announcement returns are higher when the proportion of spun-off assets is 
larger (see, e.g. Hite and Owers, 1983; Miles and Rosenfeld, 1983; Krishnaswami and 
Subramaniam, 1999; Veld and Veld-Merkoulova, 2004). Chemmanur and Yan (2004) 
propose a corporate control model to explain the transaction effect. According to their 
model, a spinoff creates shareholder value because post-spinoff firms are smaller than the 
pre-spinoff parent and thus post-spinoff firms are more likely to be acquired following 
the spinoff transaction. To control the transaction size effect, I use the market value of an 
offspring relative to the sum of the market capitalisations of parent and offspring on the 
spinoff completion date28. When a parent spins off more than one offspring at the same 
time, I calculate the relative size as the sum of all offspring’s market values divided by 
the sum of parent and all offspring’s market values on the spinoff completion date. It is 
predicted that the larger the relative size of a spinoff, the higher the shareholder value 
created from the spinoff.  
 
The sixth control variable (ANTIDIR) is an anti-director index that measures the 
effectiveness of a country’s legal system to protect shareholder rights and control 
potential managerial opportunism, which is proposed in La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1998). This anti-director index ranges from zero to six, where the 
lower score refers to a weak protection of shareholder rights. This variable is motivated 
by a growing literature on the country-level corporate governance system. It is often 
argued that managers in Anglo-Saxon countries are more focused on shareholder value 
creation than managers in continental countries (e.g. see Denis and McConnell, 2003; La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1999 and 2000). Likewise, spinoff 
decisions made by managers in a country with better shareholder protection are more 
                                                 
28 I measure the relative size variable on the spinoff completion date because it is the first date on which the 
market capitalisation data for an offspring is available. 
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likely to be shareholder-value-oriented than those made by managers in a country with 
poorer shareholder protection. This anti-director index is thus predicted to be positively 
related to the shareholder value creation from corporate spinoffs.  
 
Finally, I use a dummy variable (HOTTIME) to indicate whether a spinoff is announced 
in hot periods or in cold periods. As illustrated in Table 5.1 in Chapter 5, the number of 
spinoff transactions is noticeably higher during the period 1996-2001 than that of other 
periods29. Therefore, the HOTTIME variable equals one when a spinoff is announced 
between 1996 and 2001, and equals zero otherwise. I use this dummy variable to control 
for potential effects of spinoff decisions that may be purely time-driven. The definitions 
for the above-mentioned control variables are also given in Table 6.1. 
 
6.3.4 Empirical Models to Test Glamour Spinoffs 
The catering theory of spinoff predicts that glamour spinoffs evoke more favourable 
announcement reactions than other types of spinoff but offspring firms following glamour 
spinoffs underperform offspring firms following other types of spinoff. Therefore, the 
short run market reaction to glamour spinoffs and the long run market reaction to 
glamour spinoffs will be of opposite signs. I use two regression models to measure the 
value consequences of glamour spinoffs. The first regression model is to measure the 
short run market reaction to glamour spinoffs, which is given below: 
(CARs f Glamour Spinoff Proxy,ControlVariables)=                                                 (6.2) 
where CARs are cumulative abnormal returns to spinoff announcements. In this study, I 
focus on CARs for the three-day (-1, +1) announcement window, where day0 is the event 
day. The control variables considered in regression model (6.2) are those used in 
regression model (6.1) to measure the impact of investor sentiment on the spinoff 
announcement gains. 
 
                                                 
29 This hot period of spinoffs is largely overlapping with the European merger wave in the period 1995-
2001 as identified in Sudarsanam (2003, Chapter 2). This time-varying pattern of spinoff activity implies 
that, like mergers and acquisitions, spinoffs may cluster in time.  
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The second regression model is to measure the long run market reaction to glamour 
spinoffs, which is offered below: 
(BHARs f Glamour Spinoff Proxy,ControlVariables)=                                               (6.3) 
where BHARs are long-run size- and book-to-market-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns to post-spinoff firms. In the subsequent analyses, I report regression results based 
on three-year BHARs to post-spinoff firms, where the three-year event window starts 
from the spinoff completion date. For post-spinoff parent firms, the control variables 
considered in Equation (6.3) are those used in Equations (6.1) and (6.2). For post-spinoff 
offspring firms, the control variables considered in Equation (6.3) are FOCUS, 
INFASYM, RELSIZ, ANTIDIR and HOTTIME. The variables GROWTH and ROA are 
not used because these two variables are operating characteristic variables of parents 
rather than those of offspring firms.  
 
6.3.5 Summary of Explanatory Variables 
Table 6.2 reports the summary statistics of explanatory variables. Panel A of Table 6.2 
gives summary descriptive statistics of continuous explanatory variables for parents. The 
data for FPMTB suggest that the markets generally value diversified firms slightly higher 
than focused firms prior to spinoff announcement dates. In contrast, the data for FPRET 
indicate that the recent stock performance for focused firms is in line with that for 
diversified firms before spinoff announcements. An offspring’s industry generally has a 
high market valuation and good past-year performance since the variable SUBMTB has a 
mean value higher than 1 and the mean of the variable SUBRET is positive. The 
information asymmetry variable has a mean of 0.02 and a median of 0.02, which are 
somewhat lower than results of earlier US studies. For example, in Krishnaswami and 
Subramaniam (1999), the mean and the median of residual standard deviations for their 
spinoff parents are 0.08 and 0.03, respectively. However, this is not surprising given that 
Veld and Veld-Merkoulova (2004) find that European spinoff parents do not seem to 
suffer serious information asymmetry problems.  
 
European spinoff parents generally operate well before spinoff announcements since the 
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mean value of GROWTH is 2.63 and the mean ROA is 0.10. Further, the data show that 
spinoff transactions are large-scale restructurings since the relative size variable has a 
mean (median) of 0.30 (0.24). This evidence indicates that, on average, a European parent 
divests one third of its assets through a spinoff. 
 
[Insert Table 6.2 about here, see page 130] 
 
Panel B of Table 6.2 illustrates that about 20% of the sample spinoffs can be classified as 
glamour spinoffs. The proportions of glamour spinoffs based on the definitions for 
GLAMMTB, GLAMRET, and GLAMHT are 25%, 21%, and 17%, respectively. A 
significant proportion of high-tech spinoff in my sample is in line with my catering 
theory argument, which suggests that a number of spinoff transactions could be driven by 
the investor demand for high-tech stocks during the 1990s. As indicated by the mean of 
the variable HOTTIME, about 58% of spinoff transactions are announced in the period 
between 1996 and 2001. 
 
Panels C and D of Table 6.2 provide summary statistics for the continuous and dummy 
explanatory variables for offspring, separately. The data pattern of Panels C - D is 
qualitatively similar to that of Panels A - B in Table 6.2.  
 
6.4 Investor Sentiment and Spinoff Announcement Returns 
I examine the relationship between investor sentiments and the market reaction to spinoff 
announcements. According to my hypotheses H3 and H4 in section 6.2, the relationship 
between investor sentiments and the market reaction to spinoff announcements should be 
significantly positive. Table 6.3 reports the regression results for the empirical tests. As 
illustrated in Table 6.3, investor sentiment proxies are highly significant in explaining the 
announcement returns to spinoffs.  
 
[Insert Table 6.3 about here, see page 132] 
 
Models in Panel A of Table 6.3 each employ one of the four investor sentiment proxies in 
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multiple regressions that explain the spinoff announcement returns. In model 1, the 
coefficient for FPMTB is 5.83, which is statistically significant at the 5% level (t-statistic 
= 2.21). In model 2, the coefficient for FPRET is 79.7630, which is statistically significant 
at the 5% level (t-statistic = 2.24). Clearly, investor demand for corporate focus has a 
significant and positive impact on the market reaction to spinoff announcements. In 
model 3, the coefficient for SUBMTB is 0.67, which is statistically significant at the5% 
level (t-statistic = 2.30). In model 4, the coefficient for SUBRET is 44.24, which is also 
significant at the 5% level (t-statistic = 2.07). Likewise, investor demand for the 
subsidiary stocks positively affects the market reaction to spinoff announcements.  
 
For models 1 - 4, control variables such as FOCUS and RELSIZ have significant and 
positive coefficients as argued in prior studies. The proxies for information problems, 
INFASYM, GROWTH, and ROA, are generally insignificant for all regression models. 
The anti-director index also has low power in explaining the spinoff announcement 
returns. Finally, the coefficient of HOTTIME variable is positive but insignificant across 
different regression models. Given the relatively strong explanatory power of investor 
sentiment proxies in regressions, I conclude that investor sentiment is an additional factor 
that explains the value gains to spinoffs. 
 
In Panel B of Table 6.3, I consider both focus premium and glamour stock proxies in each 
multiple regression. The general conclusions remain unchanged. The coefficients for both 
the focus premium and glamour stock proxies are highly significant for different 
regression models. The adjusted R-squared for regression models 5 - 8 are generally not 
less than 0.20. Therefore, my regression results support hypotheses H3 and H4 by 
confirming that investor demand for corporate focus and for glamour stocks jointly 
determine spinoff announcement returns.  
 
                                                 
30 The large coefficient of 79.76 for FPRET is because that the difference of past-year stock returns between 
focused and diversified firms is very small, as indicated in the summary statistics of explanatory variables 
in Table 3. 
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6.5 Catering to Investor Demand and Spinoff Value Effects 
This section analyses the value effects of spinoffs that are undertaken to cater to investor 
demand for glamour stocks, which are related to hypotheses H5 and H6 proposed in 
Section 6.2 
 
6.5.1 Short Run Market Reaction  
Hypothesis H5 proposes that spinoffs which cater to investor demand for glamour stocks 
are better perceived by markets than other types of spinoff. To test this hypothesis, I 
conduct univariate analysis to examine whether glamour spinoffs have higher 
announcement returns than other types of spinoffs. Table 6.4 presents the cumulative 
abnormal announcement returns to completed spinoffs by sub-samples based on glamour 
spinoff proxies.  
 
[Insert Table 6.4 about here, see page 134] 
 
As shown in Table 6.4, glamour spinoffs have significantly higher announcement returns 
than other types of spinoff. For the glamour spinoff proxy GLAMMTB, glamour spinoffs 
have a mean (median) three-day CARs of 8.24% (4.74%) while other types of spinoffs 
have a mean (median) three-day CARs of 3.69% (1.88%). The mean (median) difference 
of CARs between glamour spinoffs and other spinoffs is significant at the 5% (1%) level 
(t-statistic = 2.38 and z-statistic = 3.03). The results remain similar when other glamour 
spinoff proxies are used. Therefore, the univariate analysis results support the hypothesis 
H5 that spinoffs that cater to investor demand for glamour stocks earn higher 
announcement returns than other spinoffs.   
 
To further test the value impact of glamour spinoffs, I regress CARs to spinoffs on 
glamour spinoff proxies. The regression model is regression model (6.2) given in Section 
6.3.4. The regression results are presented in Table 6.5.  
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[Insert Table 6.5 about here, see page 135] 
 
For the three regression models in Table 6.5, coefficients for glamour spinoff proxies are 
highly significant across three models. The coefficient for GLAMMTB is 3.16, which is 
significant at the 10% level (t-statistic = 1.80). The coefficient for GLAMRET is 3.41, 
which is significant at the 5% level (t-statistic = 2.61). The coefficient for GLAMHT is 
5.83, which is significant at the 5% level (t-statistic = 2.45). Thus, in general, my 
regression results support the prediction of H5 that spinoffs which cater to investor 
demand for glamour stocks have more favourable announcement reactions than other 
spinoffs. 
 
6.5.2 Long Run Market Reaction  
Hypothesis H6 argues that offspring from a spinoff which caters to investor demand for 
glamour stocks have a lower long-run performance than that of other types of spinoff. To 
test this prediction, I compare long-run abnormal stock returns to offspring firms 
following glamour spinoffs and those to offspring firms following other types of spinoff. 
The univariate analysis results are reported in Table 6.6. 
 
[Insert Table 6.6 about here, see page 136] 
 
As shown in Table 6.6, offspring firms following glamour spinoffs underperform those 
following other types of spinoffs in the long term. The relative underperformance of 
offspring from glamour spinoffs is statistically significant for different definitions of 
glamour spinoffs and for different return measurement periods. For instance, offspring 
firms with relatively high industry MTBV of assets ratios prior to spinoff announcement 
dates have a mean (median) three-year BHARs of -0.37 (-0.25), which is significant at 
the 5% level. In contrast, other offspring firms have a mean (median) three-year BHARs 
of 0.47 (0.28), which is also significant at the 5% level. Both the mean and the median 
difference of three-year BHARs between these two groups are significant at the 1% level 
(t-statistic = -3.79 and z –statistic = -3.20). This evidence supports hypothesis H6 that an 
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offspring from a spinoff which caters to investor demand for glamour stocks 
underperforms other offspring in the long run.  
 
I also run regression analysis to examine whether offspring from glamour spinoffs have 
lower long-run performance than other offspring. The dependent variable, long-run 
returns to offspring firms, is first measured against returns to the size and book-to-market 
control portfolios. The independent variables include FOCUS, INFASYM, RELSIZ, 
ANTIDIR and HOTTIME. Two control variables, GROWTH and ROA, are not 
employed in the regression because they are not directly related to the long-run 
performance of offspring firms. 
 
Table 6.7 presents the regression results. According to Table 6.7, glamour spinoff proxies 
have significant and negative coefficients in all regression models. The coefficient for 
GLAMMTB is -0.79, which is significant at the 1% level (t-statistic = -3.25). The 
coefficient for GLAMRET is -0.90, which is significant at the 1% level (t-statistic = -
4.14). Finally, the coefficient for GLAMHT is -0.76, which is also significant at the 1% 
level (t-statistic = -3.43). Since glamour spinoff proxies are dummy variables, the 
coefficients from regression models 1-3 indicate that offspring firms following catering-
motivated spinoffs underperform those following other types of spinoffs by 76% or more 
over the three-year post-spinoff period. 
 
[Insert Table 6.7 about here, see page 138] 
 
Control proxies such as corporate focus, information asymmetry, and relative size are 
insignificant for all regression models. This finding suggests that stock markets may 
efficiently react to these value factors upon spinoff announcements. The control variable 
for country-level shareholder protection is insignificant for all regression models. Finally, 
the dummy variable to indicate the hot or cold periods of spinoff announcements has an 
insignificant coefficient in each regression model. Thus, the long-run returns to offspring 
firms cannot be explained by the country-specific or time-specific effects.  
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Taken together, the glamour spinoff proxies are the only independent variables having a 
significant coefficient in the regression models. The negative coefficients for glamour 
spinoff proxies suggest that offspring firms from spinoffs which cater to investor demand 
for glamour stocks significantly underperform other types of offspring firms.  
 
6.6 Robustness Checks 
This section mainly discusses whether my results for the catering theory are sensitive to 
variable construction, return measurement procedures, and sample country.  
 
First, I consider whether my investor sentiment proxies are actually measuring the 
fundamental value drivers of a spinoff. In particular, independent variables SUBMTB and 
SUBRET may be alternative measures of the growth opportunity of an offspring firm. 
Thus the positive impact of these two variables on the spinoff announcement returns can 
be attributed to the rational expectation of stock markets that the offspring firm with high 
growth opportunity can create more values in the post-spinoff period.  
 
I check this issue by regressing the CARs to spinoff announcements on three different 
offspring industry-based variables. The first industry-based variable is an alternative 
investor sentiment proxy, SUBPE, which is the value-weighted average of price-to-
earnings ratios for all firms in the offspring’s two-digit SIC industry. To make the price-
to-earnings ratio meaningful, I remove all firms with negative earnings in calculating 
SUBPE. Since the price-to-earnings ratio is a popular valuation ratio, the variable SUBPE 
may also capture the investor demand for glamour stocks. Thus, the variable SUBPE is 
predicted to be positively associated with the spinoff announcement returns. The second 
and third variables are measures of investment opportunity of the offspring industry. The 
second variable, SUBCAPEX, is the value-weighted capital expenditure to total assets 
ratio for all firms in the offspring’s two-digit SIC industry. The third variable, 
SUBREVINC, is the value-weighted past-year revenue increase rates for all firms in the 
offspring’s two-digit SIC industry. If markets assess the desirability of a spinoff 
transaction based on the fundamental value driver of an offspring industry, the variables 
SUBCAPEX and SUBREVINC should have a significant and positive coefficient in the 
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regression to explain spinoff announcement returns.  
 
Then the three-day (-1, +1) CARs to parents are regressed on one of these industry-based 
variables with other control variables as reported in Table 6.1. Results (not shown) 
indicate that the variable SUBPE has a positive and significant coefficient of 0.07 in the 
regression (t-statistic = 2.24). However, neither SUBCAPEX nor SUBREVINC has a 
significant coefficient in the regression models. Therefore, my investor sentiment proxies 
do not seem to be alternative measures of fundamental value drivers of a spinoff.  
 
Another concern is that return measurement errors may affect my empirical results. I use 
the world market model suggested in Park (2004) to re-estimate the spinoff 
announcement returns and find that the relationship between investor sentiment proxies 
and the spinoff announcement returns still holds when the return methodology is changed. 
Similarly, the glamour spinoff proxies still have significant and positive coefficients in 
regressions with the re-estimated spinoff announcement returns. 
 
The measurement of long-run returns is very controversial since the current literature has 
no consensus on the return measurement (e.g. see Ang and Zhang, 2004; Fama, 1998; 
Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Mitchell and Stafford, 2000). To ensure the robustness of my 
results, I also use the industry- and size-adjusted BHARs to examine the long run 
performance of post-spinoff firms. Then, based on Equation (6.3) in section 6.3.4, I 
regress the alternative long-run abnormal returns to offspring firms on glamour spinoff 
proxies to examine whether regression results are sensitive to the return methodology 
used. Control variables are FOCUS, INFASYM, RELSIZ, ANTIDIR and HOTTIME. 
The regression results are reported in Panel A of Table 6.8. 
 
[Insert Table 6.8 about here, see page 139] 
 
In general, offspring firms following spinoffs that cater to investor demands for glamour 
stocks have lower long-run industry- and size-adjusted BHARs than those following 
other types of spinoff. The coefficients for two out of three glamour spinoff proxies are 
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significant in the regression models. The variable GLAMMTB has a negative coefficient 
of -0.68, which is significant at the 1% level (t-statistic = -2.69). The variable GLAMRET 
also has a coefficient of -0.98, which is significant at the 1% level (t-statistic = -4.69). 
Thus, this evidence lends support to the catering theory of spinoff that offspring firms 
following spinoffs which cater to investor demand for glamour stocks underperform those 
following other types of spinoff. 
 
On the other hand, the variable GLAMHT has an insignificant coefficient of -0.21 in the 
regression model 3. The insignificance of GLAMHT in the regression may be due to the 
fact that the whole high-tech industry experienced return reversal as the high-tech bubble 
burst in the early 2000. Therefore, the relative underperformance of offspring firms in the 
high-tech industry may not be significant.    
 
I also consider abnormal accounting returns of post-spinoff firms as an alternative 
measure of the long-run performance of post-spinoff firms. Following Barber and Lyon 
(1996), I use two benchmark-adjusted accounting returns, industry median-adjusted 
return on assets ratio and industry- and size-adjusted return on assets ratio. These two 
approaches are described in Section 5.5. 
 
Based on Equation (6.3) in section 6.3.4, the three-year abnormal accounting returns to 
offspring are regressed on glamour spinoff proxies. Control variables are FOCUS, 
INFASYM, RELSIZ, ANTIDIR and HOTTIME. The regression results for the three-year 
industry median-adjusted ROAs and those for the three-year industry- and size-adjusted 
ROAs are reported in Panel B and Panel C of Table 6.8, respectively.  
 
Our results in Panels B - C indicate that Equation (6.3) has a good explanatory power in 
explaining the variation of long-run accounting performance of offspring since the 
adjusted R-squared for regression model varies between 15% and 28%. Further, the 
coefficients of GLAMMTB and GLAMHT are significantly negative for models 4 – 9. In 
contrast, the coefficient of GLAMRET is insignificant for models 4 – 9. However, the 
variable GLAMRET has a predicted negative sign in the regression models 4 – 9. Thus, 
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my results with different measures of long-run performance of post-spinoff offspring also 
suggest that offspring firms following spinoffs which cater to investor demand for 
glamour stocks underperform those following other types of spinoff in the long run. 
 
Although I document evidence that offspring firms following catering-motivated spinoffs 
underperform others in the long run, a possible explanation is that some European stock 
markets may be inexperienced with spinoff transactions and thus make mistakes in the 
initial assessment of those transactions.31 Therefore, the evidence on catering theory of 
spinoffs may not obtain for samples of spinoffs in a country with well-developed stock 
markets, such as the UK. I address this concern by analysing the determinants of long-run 
returns to post-spinoff offspring firms in the UK. Specifically the model based on 
Equation (6.3) in section 6.3.4 is run for the UK sub-sample of offspring firms. Control 
variables are FOCUS, INFASYM, RELSIZ and HOTTIME. The variable ANTIDIR is 
not used because this variable has the same value for all UK offspring firms. The 
regression results are reported in Panels D - G of Table 6.8. Dependent variables are 
three-year size and book-to-market-adjusted BHARs to UK offspring, three-year 
industry- and size-adjusted BHARs to UK offspring, three-year industry median-adjusted 
ROAs to UK offspring, and three-year industry- and size-adjusted ROAs to UK offspring. 
These are for regression models in Panel D, Panel E, Panel F and Panel G, respectively. 
 
As indicated in Panel D of Table 6.8, the glamour spinoff proxies GLAMMTB and 
GLAMRET have significant and negative coefficients in regression models 10 -12, which 
are consistent with the results in Table 6.7. The coefficient of glamour spinoff proxy 
GLAMHT is insignificant in the regression but it has a predicted negative sign. Similar 
conclusions can be reached based on the results in Panel E of Table 6.8. Again, the results 
in Panel F and Panel G are generally similar to those in Panel B and Panel C. Hence, in 
general, my robustness check results for the UK sub-sample show that investor sentiment 
still plays a role in the market reaction to spinoff announcements even for a well-
developed stock market such as the UK stock market. 
                                                 
31 Based on the spinoff transaction data in SDC, many continental European countries do not have spinoff 
transactions prior to the 1990s.  
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Finally, I consider whether my results are purely driven by the high-tech bubble in the 
late 1990s. To this end, I remove the high-tech spinoffs announced in the late 1990s, i.e. 
within the period 1996 and 2000. Then I design a new glamour spinoff variable, GLAM, 
which equals one when either GLAMMTB or GLAMRET equals one and equals zero 
otherwise. Following Hypotheses 5 and 6, this new glamour spinoff variable GLAM 
should have a significant and positive impact on the spinoff announcement returns while 
having a significant and negative impact on the long-run performance of post-spinoff 
firms.  
 
In Panel A of Table 6.9, I regress the three-day CARs to parents on the variable GLAM 
and control variables as defined in Table 6.1. Consistent with Hypothesis 5, the variable 
GLAM has a coefficient of 2.74, which is significant at the 10% level. The regression 
model has an adjusted R-squared of 5%, which is significant at the 7% level. Panel A of 
Table 6.9 also reports the regression coefficients of long-run abnormal stock returns to 
offspring on the variable GLAM. The coefficient of GLAM is significantly negative 
when the dependent variable is either three-year size- and book-to-market-adjusted 
BHARs or three-year industry- and size-adjusted BHARs.  
 
[Insert Table 6.9 about here, see page 141] 
 
In Panel B of Table 6.9, I regress the three-year abnormal accounting returns to offspring 
on the variable GLAM and control variables. Consistent with Hypothesis 6, the variable 
GLAM has a negative coefficient in the regression models. When the dependent variable 
is three-year industry median-adjusted ROAs to offspring, the coefficient of GLAM is -
0.06, which is significant at the 5% level. When the dependent variable is thee-year 
industry- and size-adjusted ROAs to offspring, the coefficient of GLAM is -0.02 but is 
insignificant at conventional levels. This significant result may be attributable to the 
smaller sample size.   
  
It is interesting to know how parents following catering spinoffs perform worse (or better) 
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than parents following other types of spinoff in the long run. In Table 6.10, I regress the 
long-run size- and book-to-market-adjusted BHARs to parents on the glamour spinoff 
proxies. None of the glamour spinoff proxies can explain the long-run BHARs to parents. 
Control variables have no explanatory power either. The whole regression models have 
very low R-squared. Thus, this finding suggests that European stock markets are efficient 
in valuing post-spinoff parents.  
 
[Insert Table 6.10 about here, see page 143] 
 
6.7 Summary 
Existing literature argues that corporate spinoffs are value-enhancing restructuring 
transactions. However, past empirical analysis only focuses on one side of the spinoff 
transaction: the divestiture of a subsidiary. Corporate spinoffs are joint events combining 
the divestiture and the equity listing of a subsidiary. Less attention has been paid to how 
stock markets react to the equity listing of a subsidiary. In addition, extant studies have 
not explored whether the investor sentiments can affect the market reaction to spinoff 
announcements and whether some spinoffs are undertaken for non-efficiency-related 
reasons.  
 
This study contributes to the existing literature on corporate divestiture in two ways. First, 
it provides empirical evidence that investor sentiments affect the market reaction to 
spinoff announcements. In particular, investor demand for corporate focus and glamour 
stocks is positively affecting the announcement returns to spinoffs. My study presents 
new evidence supporting this behavioural argument that markets are not always efficient. 
Investors have an unrealistic demand for non-fundamental factors and such demand 
affects the market valuation of corporate events.  
 
Second, I propose and test a catering theory of the managerial decision of spinoff. The 
catering theory argues that rational managers may respond to the prevailing strong 
investor demand for glamour stocks, and then spin off a subsidiary with glamour status to 
boost short-run share prices. Further, the long-term performance of offspring following 
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the catering-motivated spinoffs will be lower than that of other types of spinoff.  
 
My empirical analysis results support the catering theory. I find that spinoffs which are 
undertaken to cater to investor demand for glamour stocks have better announcement 
returns than other spinoffs. However, offspring from spinoffs that cater to investor 
demand for glamour stocks have lower long-run stock returns than offspring from other 
spinoffs. This evidence indicates that investors’ overoptimistic beliefs of offspring from 
catering-motivated spinoffs eventually turn out be unfounded.   
 
On a cautionary note, the catering theory of corporate spinoffs only applies to certain 
types of spinoff and is not a complete story of corporate spinoffs. Corporate spinoffs may 
be motivated to reduce agency conflicts associated with conglomerates, divest 
underperforming divisions, improve the efficiency of stock-based compensation, and for 
other reasons (for detailed discussions on other spinoff rationales, see Sudarsanam, 2003, 
Chapter 11 and Weston, Mitchell and Mulherin 2005, Chapter 11). However, the catering 
theory complements other existing theories of corporate divestitures to depict a more 
complete picture of spinoff value effects.  
 
It is also worth mentioning that the glamour spinoff proxies used in this study are not 
perfect measures of managerial motives to exploit misevaluations. Future research should 
design better proxies to measure the managerial response to market inefficiency. 
 
My results for the long-run performance of post-spinoff firms are different from those 
reported in earlier US studies. This difference may be attributed to the institutional 
difference between the US and Europe. First, the US has a more active hostile takeover 
market than Europe as documented in Sudarsanam (2003, chapter 2). Thus, according to 
the corporate control rationale of spinoffs as proposed in Chemmanur and Yan (2004), 
post-spinoff firms following European spinoffs will generally experience less effective 
market discipline and deliver lower long-run returns than those following US spinoffs. 
Second, managers in the US firms generally have more intensive stock-based 
compensation than those in European firms (e.g. see Conyon and Murphy, 2000). 
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Therefore, following the arguments of Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Coles, Daniel and 
Naveen (2006), managers in the US are more likely to conduct spinoffs to maximise 
shareholder wealth than those in Europe. Ahn and Walker (2006) have presented evidence 
that the spinoff decision is positively related to the CEO compensation. For those reasons, 
it is possible that my catering theory of spinoffs may not be applicable to the US spinoffs. 
Future research testing the predictions of catering theory with the US spinoff sample will 
be useful. 
 
Finally, the behavioural explanation of the managerial catering incentive to spin off can 
be equally applied to other cases of managerial decisions, such as mergers and 
acquisitions. The test of the association between investor appetite for corporate focus 
(and glamour stocks) and the market reaction to other managerial decisions may produce 
more fruitful results that could deepen my understanding of managerial decisions from a 
behavioural perspective.  
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Table 6.1 Definitions for explanatory variables 
Variables Definition 
Panel A: Investor sentiment proxies 
FPMTB The difference in the natural logarithm of value-weighted average market-to-book value (MTBV) of 
assets between focused firms and diversified firms in the country where parents are listed. The 
variable is measured at the month end prior the spinoff announcement date. The weight is the book 
value of assets. Market value of total assets is the sum of the market value of equity and the book
value of total debts. Diversified (Focused) firms are defined as listed firms that have (no) segments 
operating in different two-digit SIC industries. The product segment data are from Worldscope. 
FPRET The difference in the value-weighted average past-year stock returns between focused firms and
diversified firms in the country where parents are listed. The variable is measured at the month end 
prior to the spinoff announcement date. The weight is the market capitalisation. For definitions of 
diversified and focused firms, see the definition of FPMTB.  
SUBMTB The value-weighted average MTBV of assets ratios for all firms in an offspring’s two-digit SIC 
industry. The weight is the market capitalisation.  
SUBRET The value-weighted past-year returns to all firms in an offspring’s two-digit SIC industry. The weight 
is the market capitalisation. 
Panel B: Glamour spinoff proxies 
GLAMMTB A dummy variable that equals one when the MTBV of assets ratio of a parent’s industry is lower than 
the median of MTBV of assets ratios for all industries while the MTBV of assets ratio of an 
offspring’s industry is higher than the median of MTBV of assets ratios for all industries, and equals 
zero otherwise.  
GLAMRET A dummy variable that equals one when past-year stock return to a parent’s industry is lower than the
median of past-year stock returns to all industries while past-year stock returns to an offspring’s 
industry is higher than the median of past-year returns for all industries, and equals zero otherwise. 
GLAMHT A dummy variable that equals one when a non-high-tech parent spins off a high-tech offspring, and 
equals zero otherwise. For details of high-tech spinoff classification, see Appendix. 
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Table 6.1 (continued) 
Variables Definition 
Panel C: Control variables 
FOCUS 
 
A dummy variable that equals one when parent and offspring operate in different two-digit SIC 
industries, and equals zero otherwise. 
INFASYM 
 
The dispersion in the market-adjusted daily stock returns to a parent in the 250-day trading 
period prior to the spinoff announcement. 
GROWTH 
 
ROA 
 
RELSIZ 
The parent’s growth options in its investment opportunity set, measured as its MTBV of assets 
ratio at the end of month prior to spinoff announcement date. 
The parent’s return on assets in the year prior to the spinoff announcement date, measured as its 
earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA) divided by its total assets.  
Market value of an offspring divided by the sum of the market capitalisations of parent and 
offspring on the spinoff completion date. When a parent spins off multiple offspring firms on the 
same date, the relative size is total market values of all offspring firms divided by the sum of 
market capitalisations of parent and all offspring firms on the spinoff completion date. 
ANTIDIR An index to measure the strength of a country’s legal system to protect minority shareholders 
developed by La Porta et al. (1998), which ranges from zero to six, where the lower score refers 
to a weak protection of shareholder rights. 
HOTTIME A dummy variable that equals one when a spinoff is announced between 1996 and 2001, and 
equals zero otherwise. 
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Table 6.2 Summary descriptive statistics for explanatory variables 
This table reports summary descriptive statistics for explanatory variables. FPMTB = difference in the natural 
logarithms of value-weighted average MTBV of assets between focused firms and diversified firms in the parent 
listing country. FPRET = difference in the value-weighted average past-year stock returns between focused firms 
and diversified firms in the parent listing country. SUBMTB = value-weighted average MTBV of assets ratios for 
all firms in an offspring’s two-digit SIC industry. SUBRET = value-weighted past-year returns to all firms in an 
offspring’s two-digit SIC industry. GLAMMTB = 1 when the MTBV of assets ratio of a parent’s industry is lower 
than the median of all industries while the MTBV of assets ratio of an offspring’s industry is higher than the 
median of industries, = 0 otherwise. GLAMRET =1 when past-year stock return to a parent’s industry is lower 
than the median of all industries while past-year stock returns to an offspring’s industry is higher than the median 
of all industries, = 0 otherwise. GLAMHT = 1 when a non-high-tech parent spins off a high-tech offspring, = 0 
otherwise. FOCUS = 1 when parent and offspring operate in different industries at the two-digit SIC level, = 0 
otherwise. INFASYM = dispersion in market-adjusted daily stock returns to a parent in the 250-day trading period 
prior to the spinoff announcement. GROWTH = parent’s MTBV of assets ratio at the end of month prior to spinoff 
announcement date. ROA = parent’s EBITDA divided by its total assets. RELSIZ = market value of an offspring 
(market values of all offspring when multiple subsidiaries are spun off) relative to the sum of the market values of 
the parent and (all) offspring on the spinoff completion date. ANTIDIR = index of the effectiveness of a country’s 
legal system to protect shareholder rights (La Porta et al., 1998). HOTTIME = 1 when a spinoff is announced 
between 1996 and 2001, = 0 otherwise.  
Variable Mean Median No. of obs. 
Panel A: Continuous variables for parent firms 
FPMTB -0.11  -0.13  157 
FPRET 0.00  0.00  157 
SUBMTB 1.97  1.39  157 
SUBRET 0.02  0.02  157 
INFASYM 0.02 0.02 157 
GROWTH 2.63 1.75 157 
ROA 0.10 0.11 157 
RELSIZ 0.30 0.24 157 
ANTIDIR 3.60 4.00 157 
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Table 6.2 (continued) 
Variable Mean Median No. of obs. 
Panel B: Dummy variables for parent firms 
GLAMMTB 0.25   157 
GLAMRET 0.21   157 
GLAMHT 0.17   157 
FOCUS 0.74  157 
HOTTIME 0.58  157 
Panel C: Continuous variables for offspring firms 
INFASYM 0.02 0.02 170 
RELSIZ 0.32 0.24 170 
ANTIDIR 3.65 4.00 170 
Panel D: Dummy variables for offspring firms 
GLAMMTB 0.23   170 
GLAMRET 0.20   170 
GLAMHT 0.16   170 
FOCUS 0.73  170 
HOTTIME 0.66  170 
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Table 6.3 Regression of announcement period CARs on investor sentiment proxies 
Regression coefficients for announcement period (-1, 1) CARs for the 157 completed spinoffs from January 1987 
to December 2005. FPMTB = difference in the natural logarithms of value-weighted average MTBV of assets 
between focused firms and diversified firms in the parent listing country. FPRET = difference in the value-
weighted average past-year stock returns between focused firms and diversified firms in the parent listing country. 
SUBMTB = value-weighted average MTBV of assets ratios for all firms in an offspring’s two-digit SIC industry. 
SUBRET = value-weighted past-year returns to all firms in an offspring’s two-digit SIC industry. FOCUS = 1 
when parent and offspring operate in different industries at the two-digit SIC level, = 0 otherwise. INFASYM = 
dispersion in market-adjusted daily stock returns to a parent in the 250-day trading period prior to the spinoff 
announcement. GROWTH = parent’s MTBV of assets ratio at the end of month prior to spinoff announcement date. 
ROA = parent’s EBITDA divided by its total assets. RELSIZ = market value of an offspring (market values of all 
offspring when multiple subsidiaries are spun off) relative to the sum of the market values of the parent and (all) 
offspring on the spinoff completion date. ANTIDIR = index of the effectiveness of a country’s legal system to 
protect shareholder rights (La Porta et al., 1998). HOTTIME = 1 when a spinoff is announced between 1996 and 
2001, = 0 otherwise. White heteroskedasticity-adjusted t-statistics are in parentheses. a, b, c indicates the 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
Panel A: Regression models with one investor sentiment variable 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept -6.86b (-2.39) -6..74b (-2.27) -7.07b (-2.50) -7.38a (-2.65) 
FPMTB 5.83b  (2.21)       
FPRET   79.76b (2.24)     
SUBMTB     0.67b (2.30)   
SUBRET       44.24b  (2.07) 
FOCUS 4.16a  (3.18) 3.85a (2.93) 3.88a (2.88) 3.63a  (2.72) 
INFASYM 129.27  (1.52) 114.17 (1.26) 110.72 (1.27) 124.20  (1.46) 
GROWTH 0.19  (1.13) 0.20 (1.23) 0.14 (0.81) 0.10  (0.56) 
ROA 6.03  (1.02) 6.59 (1.16) 4.48 (0.75) 3.73  (0.60) 
RELSIZ 14.11a  (2.94) 14.02a (2.97) 13.42a (2.64) 14.35a  (3.11) 
ANTIDIR 0.10  (0.18) -0.10 (-0.20) -0.13 (-0.27) -0.05  (-0.09) 
HOTTIME 1.31  (0.93) 1.50 (1.06) 1.68 (1.24) 1.87  (1.40) 
No. of obs. 157  157  157  157  
Adjusted R2 0.20  0.19  0.19  0.19  
F statistic 5.72  5.63  5.70  5.70  
Sig. level <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  
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Table 6.3 (Continued) 
Panel B: Regression models with both focus premium and glamour stock variables 
Variable Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Intercept -6.78b (-2.35) -6.98b (-2.44) -6.72b (-2.27) -6.89b (-2.33) 
FPMTB 4.45c  (1.84) 4.92c (1.95)     
FPRET     56.63 (1.62) 65.55c  (1.90) 
SUBMTB 0.50c  (1.78)   0.51c (1.69)   
SUBRET   36.96b (1.80)   37.55c  (1.78) 
FOCUS 3.96a  (2.96) 3.73a (2.86) 3.73a (2.80) 3.46a  (2.63) 
INFASYM 113.51  (1.29) 122.48 (1.42) 102.63 (1.12) 110.04  (1.21) 
GROWTH 0.16  (0.96) 0.13 (0.73) 0.17 (1.04) 0.14  (0.81) 
ROA 4.97  (0.83) 4.23 (0.68) 5.34 (0.92) 4.66  (0.77) 
RELSIZ 13.17b  (2.57) 13.75a (2.88) 13.13b (2.59) 13.68a  (2.90) 
ANTIDIR 0.05  (0.10) 0.14 (0.27) -0.10 (-0.20) -0.02  (-0.04) 
HOTTIME 1.14  (0.81) 1.19 (0.85) 1.32 (0.93) 1.37  (0.97) 
No. of obs. 157  157  157  157  
Adjusted R2 0.20  0.20  0.20  0.20  
F statistic 5.30  5.39  5.22  5.31  
Sig. level <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  
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Table 6.4 Announcement period CARs by glamour spinoff status 
This table compares 3-day (-1, +1) CARs for glamour sub-samples of 157 spinoff announcements from January 
1987 to December 2005. GLAMMTB = 1 when the MTBV of assets ratio of a parent’s industry is lower than the 
median of all industries while the MTBV of assets ratio of an offspring’s industry is higher than the median of 
industries, = 0 otherwise. GLAMRET =1 when past-year stock return to the a parent’s industry is lower than the 
median of all industries while past-year stock returns to an offspring’s industry is higher than the median of all 
industries, = 0 otherwise. GLAMHT = 1 when a non-high-tech parent spins off a high-tech offspring, = 0 
otherwise. In parentheses are the t-statistics (mean) or Wilcoxon test z-statistics (median). All tests are based on 
two-tailed tests. a, bindicate the significance level at the 1% and 5% level, respectively.  
 Parent relative to offspring Parent relative to offspring  
less glamorous (1) same or more glamorous (2) Group difference (1-2) Variable 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
GLAMMTB 8.24a 4.74a 3.69a 1.88a 4.54b 2.86a 
 (4.82) (4.93) (4.30) (4.84) (2.38) (3.03) 
No. of obs. 39 118   
GLAMRET 9.34a 4.56a 3.62a 1.80a 5.71b 2.76a 
 (4.05) (4.26) (4.81) (5.24) (2.36) (2.82) 
No. of obs. 33 124   
GLAMHT 13.37a 10.23a 3.13a 1.94a 10.24a 8.29a 
 (4.74) (4.05) (4.66) (5.38) (3.53) (3.92) 
No. of obs. 26 131   
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Table 6.5 Regression of announcement period CARs on the glamour spinoff proxies  
Regression coefficients for announcement period (-1, 1) CARs for the 157 completed spinoffs from January 1987 
to December 2005. GLAMMTB = 1 when the MTBV of assets ratio of a parent’s industry is lower than the median 
of all industries while the MTBV of assets ratio of an offspring’s industry is higher than the median of industries, = 
0 otherwise. GLAMRET =1 when past-year stock return to a parent’s industry is lower than the median of all 
industries while past-year stock returns to an offspring’s industry is higher than the median of all industries, = 0 
otherwise. GLAMHT = 1 when a non-high-tech parent spins off a high-tech offspring, = 0 otherwise. FOCUS = 1 
when parent and offspring operate in different industries at the two-digit SIC level, = 0 otherwise. INFASYM = 
dispersion in market-adjusted daily stock returns to a parent in the 250-day trading period prior to the spinoff 
announcement. GROWTH = parent’s MTBV of assets ratio at the end of month prior to spinoff announcement date. 
ROA = parent’s EBITDA divided by its total assets. RELSIZ = market value of an offspring (market values of all 
offspring when multiple subsidiaries are spun off) relative to the sum of the market values of the parent and (all) 
offspring on the spinoff completion date. ANTIDIR = index of the effectiveness of a country’s legal system to 
protect shareholder rights (La Porta et al., 1998). HOTTIME = 1 when a spinoff is announced between 1996 and 
2001, = 0 otherwise. White heteroskedasticity-adjusted t-statistics are in parentheses. a, b, c indicates the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% significance level, respectively.  
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept -7.37a (-2.65) -7.44a (-2.61) -5.42c (-1.90) 
GLAMMTB 3.16c  (1.80)     
GLAMRET   3.41c (1.70)   
GLAMHT     5.83b  (2.45) 
FOCUS 3.21b  (2.26) 3.27b (2.46) 3.13b  (2.41) 
INFASYM 147.14c  (1.73) 140.60c (1.67) 98.14  (1.19) 
GROWTH 0.17 (1.02) 0.14 (0.80) 0.02 (0.16) 
ROA 6.69 (1.15) 6.76 (1.21) 4.47 (0.86) 
RELSIZ 14.38a  (3.11) 13.86a (3.23) 12.09a  (2.65) 
ANTIDIR -0.17 (-0.35) -0.06 (-0.12) -0.04 (-0.08) 
HOTTIME 1.78  (1.36) 1.91 (1.41) 1.46  (1.14) 
No. of Obs. 157  157  157  
Adjusted R2 0.21  0.19  0.21  
F statistic 5.67  5.69  6.29  
Sig. level <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  
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Table 6.6 Long-run BHARs to offspring by glamour spinoff status 
This table compares size- and book-to-market adjusted BHARs for sub-samples of 142 offspring firms from 
January 1987 to December 2002. GLAMMTB = 1 when the MTBV of assets ratio of a parent’s industry is lower 
than the median of all industries while the MTBV of assets ratio of an offspring’s industry is higher than the 
median of industries, = 0 otherwise. GLAMRET =1 when past-year stock return to a parent’s industry is lower 
than the median of all industries while past-year stock returns to an offspring’s industry is higher than the median 
of all industries, = 0 otherwise. GLAMHT = 1 when a non-high-tech parent spins off a high-tech offspring, = 0 
otherwise. The mean is tested with the t-statistic adjusted for cross-sectional dependence following Mitchell and 
Stafford (2000). In parentheses are the t-statistics (mean) or Wilcoxon test z-statistics (median). All tests are based 
on two-tailed tests. a, b, c indicate the significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
 Parent relative to offspring 
less glamorous (1) 
Parent relative to offspring 
same or more glamorous (2) 
 
Group difference (1-2) 
Interval Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Panel A: Dummy variable is GLAMMTB 
(0, +1 year) -0.09 -0.22 0.15 0.05c -0.24b -0.27a 
 (-0.82) (-1.64) (0.63) (1.66) (-2.13) (-2.59) 
(0, +2 year) -0.26 -0.27b 0.39 0.22a -0.65a -0.49a 
 (-1.37) (-2.34) (1.37) (3.12) (-3.52) (-3.49) 
(0, +3 year) -0.37 -0.25b 0.47 0.28a -0.83a -0.53a 
 (-1.41) (-2.49) (1.34) (2.97) (-3.79) (-3.47) 
No. of obs.  35 107   
Panel B: Dummy variable is GLAMRET 
(0, +1 year) -0.15 -0.22c 0.15 0.04 -0.30a -0.26b 
 (-0.97) (-1.66) (0.95) (1.51) (-2.80) (-2.41) 
(0, +2 year) -0.39a -0.33a 0.39 0.14a -0.78a -0.47a 
 (-3.35) (-3.01) (1.37) (3.29) (-4.74) (-4.10) 
(0, +3 year) -0.53b -0.51a 0.47 0.26a -1.00a -0.77a 
 (-2.21) (-2.87) (1.38) (3.11) (-4.63) (-3.96) 
No. of obs. 30 112  
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Table 6.6 (continued)  
 Parent relative to offspring 
less glamorous (1) 
Parent relative to offspring 
same or more glamorous (2) 
 
Group difference (1-2) 
Interval Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Panel C: Dummy variable is GLAMHT 
(0, +1 year) -0.29b -0.25a 0.17 0.10b -0.46a -0.35a 
 (-2.01) (-3.24) (1.15) (2.13) (-4.70) (-4.00) 
(0, +2 year) -0.27 -0.29b 0.34 0.11a -0.60a -0.40a 
 (-0.96) (-2.32) (1.26) (2.83) (-2.93) (-3.23) 
(0, +3 year) -0.45 -0.38b 0.42 0.26a -0.87a -0.64a 
 (-1.63) (-2.45) (1.31) (2.66) (-3.79) (-3.20) 
No. of obs. 26 116   
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Table 6.7 Regression of 3-year size- and book-to-market-adjusted BHARs to offspring on 
glamour spinoff proxies 
Regression coefficients for 3-year size- and book-to-market adjusted BHARs for 142 offspring firms from January 
1987 to December 2002. GLAMMTB = 1 when the MTBV of assets ratio of a parent’s industry is lower than the 
median of all industries while the MTBV of assets ratio of an offspring’s industry is higher than the median of 
industries, = 0 otherwise. GLAMRET =1 when past-year stock return to the a parent’s industry is lower than the 
median of all industries while past-year stock returns to an offspring’s industry is higher than the median of all 
industries, = 0 otherwise. GLAMHT = 1 when a non-high-tech parent spins off a high-tech offspring, = 0 
otherwise. FOCUS = 1 when parent and offspring operate in different industries at the two-digit SIC level, = 0 
otherwise. INFASYM = dispersion in market-adjusted daily stock returns to a parent in the 250-day trading period 
prior to the spinoff announcement. RELSIZ = market value of an offspring (market values of all offspring when 
multiple subsidiaries are spun off) relative to the sum of the market values of the parent and (all) offspring on the 
spinoff completion date. ANTIDIR = index of the effectiveness of a country’s legal system to protect shareholder 
rights (La Porta et al., 1998). HOTTIME = 1 when a spinoff is announced between 1996 and 2001, = 0 otherwise. 
White heteroskedasticity-adjusted t-statistics are in parentheses. a, b indicates the 1% and 5% significance level, 
respectively.  
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept 1.19 (1.64) 1.15 (1.62) 1.03 (1.45) 
GLAMMTB -0.79a (-3.25)     
GLAMRET   -0.90a (-4.14)   
GLAMHT     -0.76a  (-3.43) 
FOCUS -0.31 (-0.93) -0.32 (-0.98) -0.43  (-1.36) 
INFASYM -8.28 (-1.24) -7.00 (-1.03) -0.21  (-0.03) 
RELSIZ -0.32 (-0.66) -0.10 (-0.21) 0.01  (0.03) 
ANTIDIR 0.004 (0.05) -0.02 (-0.19) -0.01 (-0.14) 
HOTTIME -0.30 (-0.65) -0.26 (-0.59) -0.33  (-0.70) 
No. of Obs. 142  142  142  
Adjusted R2 0.05  0.06  0.03  
F statistic 2.18  2.44  1.81  
Sig. level 0.05  0.03  0.10  
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Table 6.8 Robustness regression of long-run performance of offspring on glamour spinoff proxies 
Regression coefficients for long-run performance of 142 offspring firms from January 1987 to December 2002. 
GLAMMTB = 1 when the MTBV of assets ratio of a parent’s industry is lower than the median of all industries 
while the MTBV of assets ratio of an offspring’s industry is higher than the median of industries, = 0 otherwise. 
GLAMRET =1 when past-year stock return to the a parent’s industry is lower than the median of all industries 
while past-year stock returns to an offspring’s industry is higher than the median of all industries, = 0 otherwise. 
GLAMHT = 1 when a non-high-tech parent spins off a high-tech offspring, = 0 otherwise. FOCUS = 1 when 
parent and offspring operate in different industries at the two-digit SIC level, = 0 otherwise. INFASYM = 
dispersion in market-adjusted daily stock returns to a parent in the 250-day trading period prior to the spinoff 
announcement. RELSIZ = market value of an offspring (market values of all offspring when multiple subsidiaries 
are spun off) relative to the sum of the market values of the parent and (all) offspring on the spinoff completion 
date. ANTIDIR = index of the effectiveness of a country’s legal system to protect shareholder rights (La Porta et 
al., 1998). HOTTIME = 1 when a spinoff is announced between 1996 and 2001, = 0 otherwise. Panel A reports the 
regression results of 3-year industry- and size-adjusted BHARs to all offspring firms on glamour spinoff proxies. 
Panel B (C) reports the regression results of 3-year industry median-adjusted ROAs (industry- and size-adjusted 
ROAs) of all offspring firms on glamour spinoff proxies. Panel D (E) reports the regression results of 3-year size- 
and book-to-market-adjusted BHARs (industry- and size-adjusted BHARs) to UK offspring firms on glamour 
spinoff proxies. Panel F (G) reports the regression results of 3-year industry median-adjusted ROAs (industry- and 
size-adjusted ROAs) of UK offspring firms on glamour spinoff proxies. Control variables for regressions in Panels 
A, B, and C are FOCUS, INFASYM, RELSIZ, ANTIDIR and HOTTIME while those for regressions in Panel D, E, 
F and G are FOCUS, INFASYM, RELSIZ and HOTTIME. Coefficients for control variables are suppressed to 
save space. Coefficients for control variables are generally insignificant at conventional levels except those for 
INFASYM and RELSIZ. Coefficient for INFASYM is significantly negative in models 4, 5, 6, 10, 11, 16, 17, and 
18. Coefficient for RELSIZ is significantly positive in models 4, 5, and 6. White heteroskedasticity-adjusted t-
statistics are in parentheses. a, b, c indicates the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively.  
Panel B: Regression of 3-year industry median-adjusted ROAs to all offspring 
Model 4 -0.09b (-2.57)     0.25 140 
Model 5   -0.05 (-1.09)   0.23 140 
Model 6     -0.16a (-2.74) 0.28 140 
Model GLAMMTB GLAMRET GLAMHT Adj. R2  No. of Obs. 
Panel A: Regression of 3-year industry- and size-adjusted BHARs to all offspring 
Model 1 -0.68a (-2.69)     0.04 142 
Model 2   -0.98a (-4.69)   0.07 142 
Model 3     -0.21 (-0.83) 0.01 142 
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Table 6.8 (continued) 
Panel C: Regression of 3-year industry- and size-adjusted ROAs to all offspring 
Model 7 -0.05c (-1.69)     0.16 137 
Model 8   -0.02 (-0.03)   0.15 137 
Model 9     -0.16a (-2.91) 0.20 137 
Panel E: Regression of 3-year industry- and size-adjusted BHARs to UK offspring 
Model 13 -0.99a (-3.04)     0.12 67 
Model 14   -1.08a (-3.78)   0.12 67 
Model 15     -0.16 (-0.37) 0.02 67 
Panel G: Regression of 3-year industry- and size-adjusted ROAs to UK offspring 
Model 19 -0.10c (-1.76)     0.22 67 
Model 20   0.01 (0.14)   0.21 67 
Model 21     -0.27a (-2.83) 0.29 67 
Panel D: Regression of 3-year size- and book-to-market-adjusted BHARs to UK offspring 
Model 10 -0.88a (-3.64)     0.15 67 
Model 11   -0.65a (-2.43)   0.08 67 
Model 12     -0.43c (-1.66) 0.05 67 
Panel F: Regression of 3-year industry median-adjusted ROAs to UK offspring 
Model 16 -0.16b (-2.55)     0.34 67 
Model 17   -0.03 (-0.42)   0.28 67 
Model 18     -0.28a (-3.17) 0.41 67 
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Table 6.9 Robustness regression of spinoff performance for sub-sample without high-tech spinoffs 
in the late 1990s 
Regression coefficients for wealth effects of completed spinoffs from January 1987 to December 2005, excluding 
high-tech spinoffs in the late 1990s. GLAMMTB = 1 when the MTBV of assets ratio of a parent’s industry is 
lower than the median of all industries while the MTBV of assets ratio of an offspring’s industry is higher than the 
median of industries, = 0 otherwise. GLAMRET =1 when past-year stock return to the parent’s industry is lower 
than the median of all industries while past-year stock returns to an offspring’s industry is higher than the median 
of all industries, = 0 otherwise. GLAM = 1 when either GLAMMTB =1 or GLAMRET = 1, = 0 otherwise. 
FOCUS = 1 when parent and offspring operate in different industries at the two-digit SIC level, = 0 otherwise. 
INFASYM = dispersion in market-adjusted daily stock returns to a parent in the 250-day trading period prior to the 
spinoff announcement. GROWTH = parent’s MTBV of assets ratio at the end of month prior to spinoff 
announcement date. ROA = parent’s EBITDA divided by its total assets. RELSIZ = market value of an offspring 
(market values of all offspring when multiple subsidiaries are spun off) relative to the sum of the market values of 
the parent and (all) offspring on the spinoff completion date. ANTIDIR = index of the effectiveness of a country’s 
legal system to protect shareholder rights (La Porta et al., 1998). HOTTIME = 1 when a spinoff is announced 
between 1996 and 2001, = 0 otherwise. White heteroskedasticity-adjusted t-statistics are in parentheses. a, b, c 
indicates the significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
Panel A: Dependent variable is stock returns 
Variable 
3-day (-1, +1)  
CARs to parents 
3-year size- and book-to-market-
adjusted BHARs to offspring 
3-year industry- and size-
adjusted BHARs to offspring 
Intercept -0.96 (-0.38) 1.11 (1.46) 1.21b (1.72) 
GLAM 2.74c (1.66) -0.94a (-3.51) -1.05a (-3.53) 
FOCUS 1.71 (1.31) -0.04 (-0.13) 0.14  (0.42) 
INFASYM -50.89 (-0.72) 3.46 (0.29) -3.35  (-0.28) 
GROWTH -0.17 (-0.80)     
ROA -1.53 (-0.30)     
RELSIZ 7.84b (1.99) -0.33 (-0.60) -1.11c  (-1.91) 
ANTIDIR 0.44 (1.04) -0.06 (-0.62) -0.001 (-0.01) 
HOTTIME 0.39 (0.30) -0.19 (-0.43) -0.40  (-0.95) 
No. of Obs. 139  123  123  
Adjusted R2 0.05  0.04  0.07  
F statistic 1.85  1.79  2.57  
Sig. level 0.07  0.11  0.03  
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Table 6.9 (continued) 
Panel B: Dependent variable is accounting returns 
Variable 
3-year industry median-adjusted 
ROAs to offspring 
3-year industry- and size-adjusted 
ROAs to offspring 
Intercept -0.03 (-0.54) -0.09 (-1.53) 
GLAM -0.06b (-2.13) -0.02 (-0.81) 
FOCUS 0.02 (0.46) -0.02 (-0.48) 
INFASYM -3.45b (-1.98) 0.22 (0.18) 
RELSIZ 0.15b (2.30) 0.14c (1.95) 
ANTIDIR 0.01 (1.25) 0.02b (1.99) 
HOTTIME 0.05 (1.26) 0.02 (0.77) 
No. of Obs. 123  120  
Adjusted R2 0.08  0.03  
F statistic 2.86  1.65  
Sig. level 0.01  0.14  
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Table 6.10 Regression of 3-year size- and book-to-market-adjusted BHARs to parents on glamour 
spinoff proxies 
Regression coefficients for 3-year size- and book-to-market adjusted BHARs for 129 parent firms from January 
1987 to December 2002. GLAMMTB = 1 when the MTBV of assets ratio of a parent’s industry is lower than the 
median of all industries while the MTBV of assets ratio of an offspring’s industry is higher than the median of 
industries, = 0 otherwise. GLAMRET =1 when past-year stock return to the a parent’s industry is lower than the 
median of all industries while past-year stock returns to an offspring’s industry is higher than the median of all 
industries, = 0 otherwise. GLAMHT = 1 when a non-high-tech parent spins off a high-tech offspring, = 0 
otherwise. FOCUS = 1 when parent and offspring operate in different industries at the two-digit SIC level, = 0 
otherwise. INFASYM = dispersion in market-adjusted daily stock returns to a parent in the 250-day trading period 
prior to the spinoff announcement. GROWTH = parent’s MTBV of assets ratio at the end of month prior to spinoff 
announcement date. ROA = parent’s EBITDA divided by its total assets. RELSIZ = market value of an offspring 
(market values of all offspring when multiple subsidiaries are spun off) relative to the sum of the market values of 
the parent and (all) offspring on the spinoff completion date. ANTIDIR = index of the effectiveness of a country’s 
legal system to protect shareholder rights (La Porta et al., 1998). HOTTIME = 1 when a spinoff is announced 
between 1996 and 2001, = 0 otherwise. White heteroskedasticity-adjusted t-statistics are in parentheses. None of 
the coefficients are significant at conventional levels. 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept -0.03 (-0.08) -0.02 (-0.06) -0.06 (-0.13) 
GLAMMTB -0.36  (-1.16)     
GLAMRET   -0.17 (-0.59)   
GLAMHT     -0.07  (-0.27) 
FOCUS 0.30  (1.16) 0.23 (0.93) 0.19  (0.84) 
INFASYM -12.89  (-1.51) -11.69 (-1.47) -10.99  (-1.61) 
GROWTH -0.01 (-0.40) -0.01 (-0.36) -0.01 (-0.37) 
ROA -1.02 (-1.14) -0.96 (-1.06) -0.88 (-1.00) 
RELSIZ 0.15  (0.28) 0.18 (0.33) 0.18  (0.30) 
ANTIDIR 0.04 (0.45) 0.04 (0.38) 0.04 (0.41) 
HOTTIME 0.18  (0.72) 0.15 (0.61) 0.14  (0.59) 
No. of Obs. 129  129  129  
Adjusted R2 -0.03  -0.04  -0.04  
F statistic 0.54  0.39  0.36  
Sig. level 0.82  0.93  0.94  
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Appendix 6.1 Classification of High-tech Spinoffs 
To classify whether a non-high-tech parent spins off a high-tech offspring, I use three 
different classification approaches to identify the high-tech status of parent and 
subsidiary firm. First, I rely on the spinoff transaction details reported in SDC M&A 
database to classify spinoffs of a high-tech subsidiary. SDC sometimes reports the 
high-tech status of divested subsidiary and divesting parent. Earlier studies have used 
the SDC definition to classify high-tech acquisitions (e.g. Kohers and Kohers, 2001; 
Gao and Sudarsanam, 2005). When the offspring industry is classified as a high-tech 
industry while the parent industry is not according to the SDC definition of high-tech 
industry, I classify such spinoff as a high-tech spinoff. 
 
Second, I use four-digit standard industry classification (SIC) codes to classify the 
high-tech subsidiary and non-high-tech parent. The classification scheme follows the 
high-tech industry classification approach of Kasznik and Lev (1995), with minor 
adjustments, in a study examining disclosure quality. They define communications 
industries as regulated industries rather than high-tech industries to examine the 
disclosure quality difference between regulated industries and non-regulated 
industries. As communications industries are classified as high-tech industries in SDC, 
I include the SIC codes of communications industries in the high-tech SIC code list. I 
collect SIC codes for subsidiary and parent firms from Worldscope and Thomson 
Research. The SIC codes for high-tech industries with a brief description are as 
follows: 
Drugs: 2830-2836  
Computers: 3570-3577 
Electronics: 3600-3699 
Communications: 4811-4899 
Computer-related services: 7370-7379 
Research and development: 8730-8734 
 
When the offspring industry is classified as a high-tech industry while the parent 
industry is not according to the above high-tech SIC code list, I classify such a spinoff 
as a high-tech spinoff. 
  
 145
Third, I identify the high-tech status of parent and subsidiary firm based on the press 
reports of spinoff transaction. For each spinoff in my sample, I search the newspaper 
database, Factiva, to obtain news reports about the operational details of the parent 
and subsidiary firm. When the subsidiary is featured in the Press as one operating in 
the high-tech industry or in the internet-based business while the parent is not, I 
define such a spinoff as a high-tech spinoff where a non-high-tech parent is divesting 
a high-tech subsidiary. This approach has helped us identify some spinoffs of high-
tech businesses which would be defined as spinoffs of non-high-tech businesses 
following the first two classification methods. For example, Culver Holdings PLC, a 
British insurance broker company, announced the spinoff of World Travel Holdings 
in December 1999. The former two classification approaches define World Travel 
Holdings as a non-high-tech travel agency firm. However, World Travel Holdings 
was actually a leading internet-based travel service firm in the UK. This feature was 
highlighted in the press reports about the spinoff. For example, the press quoted the 
comments of Chairman of Culver, Richard Read, on the spinoff as follows:  
"Our plans for the development and subsequent spin-off of 
worldtraveldirect.com are, I believe, another example of Culver seeking to 
generate value for my shareholders … I have assembled a strong Board to 
take the worldtraveldirect.com business forward and with the important 
acquisitions of US based travel portal, powerflyer.com, and IML, adding 
on-line access to one of the UK's largest databases of negotiated airfares, 
worldtraveldirect.com is very well placed in this exciting growth market." 
(‘CULVER: Announcement of finance raising and demerger’, M2 
Presswire, December 29th, 1999) 
 
Another example is the spinoff of CDB Web Tech Investments by an Italian real estate 
firm, AEDES, in 2000. Although CDB Web Tech Investments was classified as an 
investment holding firm using the former two approaches, it was actually focusing on 
the investments on the high-tech industry and such specialisation was also indicated in 
the news reports about the spinoff. The original statement of AEDES on this spinoff 
was quoted in the Press as follows: 
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"The new company will make financial investments directly or through 
venture capital funds, private equity funds and technology hedge funds, in 
mainly American companies operating in the Internet, 
telecommunications and technology sector." (‘Aedes spins off new high-
tech investment unit’, Reuters News, November 5th, 1999)  
When the offspring industry is classified as a high-tech industry while the parent 
industry is not according to the press report, I classify such a spinoff as a high-tech 
spinoff.  
 
High-tech spinoffs of my sample includes all high-tech spinoffs identified by any of 
these three classification approaches and the final list is given below. 
  
Table 6A1 The list of European high-tech spinoffs between January 1987 and December 2005 
AnnDate EffDate Parent Firm Subsidiary Firm Nation 
22-Nov-88 8-Dec-88 SALTIRE  AMSTRAD UK 
30-Jul-92 28-May-93 IMPERIAL CHM.INDS. ASTRAZENECA UK 
16-Oct-95 24-Nov-95 BURFORD HDG.  CHORION UK 
14-Dec-95 14-May-96 HAFSLUND NYCOMED  NW 
29-Dec-95 14-May-96 KINNEVIK IND.  TELE2 SD 
13-Mar-96 30-May-96 J&W  BFE BENIMA FERATOR ENGR. SD 
22-Mar-96 16-Apr-96 HEATH (CE)  REBUS GROUP  UK 
22-Oct-97 18-May-98 GETINGE LIFCO  SD 
04-Jun-98 24-Jul-98 BTG TOROTRAK UK 
01-Feb-99 1-Oct-99 ASPO GROUP  ASPOCOMP GROUP FN 
25-Feb-99 27-Oct-99 COLRUYT DOLMEN COMPUTERS BG 
10-Aug-99 29-Oct-99 ALUSUISSE  LONZA GROUP SW 
01-Nov-99 11-Jan-00 UNIVERSE GROUP RETAIL DECISIONS UK 
05-Nov-99 17-Mar-00 AEDES CDB WEB TECH IT 
23-Dec-99 19-Sep-00 CULVER HOLDINGS WORLD TRAVEL HOLDINGS  UK 
05-Jan-00 30-Mar-00 IMS GROUP  TEAMTBLK MEDIA  UK 
22-Feb-00 6-Apr-00 FISH  QUADRANET  UK 
09-Mar-00 1-Nov-00 FINVEST  EQ HOLDING  FN 
09-Mar-00 1-Nov-00 FINVEST  EVOX RIFA GROUP FN 
18-Apr-00 18-Aug-00 MODERN TIMES GP.MTG  METRO INTL.SDB  SD 
01-Sep-00 13-Nov-00 BARCO NEW BARCONET BG 
05-Oct-00 2-Apr-01 KYRO TECNOMEN CORP. FN 
22-Nov-00 5-Feb-01 L GARDNER GP.  NOBLE INVESTMENTS (UK) UK 
24-Nov-00 11-Dec-00 PARK ROW GROUP  ILX GROUP UK 
04-Jan-01 25-Feb-02 PILAT TECH.INTL. (ISE) PILAT MEDIA GLOBAL UK 
06-Feb-01 3-Sep-01 BERGMAN & BEVING  LAGERCRANTZ  SD 
29-Oct-03 17-Mar-04 TOUCH GROUP MONEYBOX  UK 
 
Note: Countries are coded as follows: BG for Belgium, FN for Finland, IT for Italy, NW for Norway, SD for 
Sweden, SW for Switzerland, and UK for United Kingdom. 
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Chapter 7 Corporate Governance and Spinoff Value Effects 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The literature review in Chapter 2 shows that shareholders benefit from corporate 
spinoffs. These gains are often attributable to a correction of value-destroying 
diversification and an increase in corporate focus (for related discussion see section 2.2). 
Although diversification may be the symptom that spinoffs are conducted to cure, in 
section 4.2.3 I argue that the root problem could be poor internal control mechanisms that 
allow managers to pursuer their own objectives prior to spinoffs. In this chapter, I 
investigate whether the gains from spinoffs reflect the mitigation of agency conflicts that 
lead to costly diversification or other suboptimal decisions. Specifically, I examine the 
ownership structure, board structure, capital structure, analyst coverage, product market 
competition, market for corporate control and the legal system, and relate these measures 
of internal and external controls to the shareholder gains from spinoffs. 
 
Corporate spinoffs are large-scale restructurings with substantial re-organisation costs.32 
Hence the decision to spin off will only be made when firms can create significant value 
by reducing agency costs. Similarly, firms may not conduct spinoffs if the benefits of 
agency costs are less than the spinoff costs. Thus, the first governance-based hypothesis 
is given below: 
H7: Spinoff parents have weaker corporate governance than non-spinoff control firms 
prior to the spinoff announcements. 
 
Under the governance-based view, when the firm announces that it will spin off assets, its 
weak corporate governance signals the potential for large gains from removing negative 
synergies that arise from the prior mistaken strategy. Managers of firms with weak 
                                                 
32 There are several sources of spinoff costs, including duplication of administrative functions in post-
spinoff firms, maintaining separate accounting and finance staffs for post-spinoff parent and offspring, and 
re-establishing product market and shareholder relationship for offspring. The spinoff costs are non-trivial. 
For instance, Parrino (1997) demonstrates that these transaction costs and operating inefficiency of the 
1993 Marriott spinoff result in a decline of the total value of the firm by at least US$40.7 million. 
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corporate governance would allow negative synergies to accumulate, thus creating the 
potential for large gains when changes are finally made. Allen et al. (1995) show a 
positive association between the announcement spinoffs and value losses from prior 
mistaken acquisitions of the subsequently spun-off assets. Therefore, I offer the second 
governance-based hypothesis below: 
H8: Spinoff parents with weak corporate governance earn higher abnormal stock 
returns during the spinoff announcement period than those with strong corporate 
governance. 
 
The corporate governance literature discussed in section 4.2.3 has shown that shareholder 
value enhancing decisions are more likely to be enacted when the firm has a strong 
corporate governance structure. Conversely, a firm with weak corporate governance is 
likely to make a sub-optimal spinoff decision even a spinoff is generally value enhancing. 
Parrino (1997) analyses the 1993 Marriott spinoff and finds that Marriott’s controlling 
family shareholder conducts the spinoff to maintain its control over the firm even though 
the spinoff results in a substantial loss in the total value of the firm.33 Therefore, the 
relationship between spinoff announcement effects and the strength of corporate 
governance structure may be positive. In other words, manages of firms with strong 
corporate governance are more likely to conduct spinoffs to maximise shareholder value 
than managers of firms with weak corporate governance.  
 
Although there is no clear-cut relation between spinoff announcement gains and the 
strength of corporate governance of pre-spinoff parents, the governance-based view 
predicts a positive association between the long-run spinoff performance and an 
improvement in corporate governance of post-spinoff firms. When post-spinoff firms 
improve internal corporate governance structure voluntarily or due to discipline imposed 
by external control mechanism, the agency problems of post-spinoff firms will be 
                                                 
33 Parrino (1997) argues that the Marriott family benefits from the value-destroying spinoff because it 
reduced the likelihood that the Marriott family would lose control of the entire firm. Marriott substantially 
increases the leverage of the parent, which has limited growth options compared with offspring. Thus, 
Marriott keep control of the high-growth offspring and can aggressively pursue growth opportunities in 
offspring’ businesses without risking dilution of its ownership position. 
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mitigated more significantly and hence the performance of post-spinoff firms will be 
enhanced. Thus, the third prediction of the governance-based view is offered below: 
H9: Post-spinoff firms with an improvement in corporate governance have better long-
run performance than those without an enhancement in corporate governance. 
 
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. The variable construction and empirical 
models are discussed in Section 7.2. The association between the magnitude of agency 
problems of spinoff parents and the spinoff decision is investigated in Section 7.3. 
Section 7.4 analyses the relationship between the short-run market reaction to spinoff 
announcements and the strength of governance structure of spinoff parents. Section 7.5 
explores whether the changes of corporate governance structure following spinoffs 
determine the long-run spinoff performance. Section 7.6 compares the spinoff 
performance between family firms and non-family firms. Section 7.7 offers conclusions.  
 
7.2 Variable Construction and Test Methodology 
This section sets out the variable construction and the empirical models to test the above-
mentioned governance-based hypotheses.  
 
7.2.1 Sample Characteristics 
This chapter analyses a sample of European spinoffs. The sample selection procedure is 
the same as that introduced in section 5.2. Table 7.1 reports the descriptive statistics of 
operating characteristics of sample firms involved in spinoffs. The sample firms’ 
characteristics considered include market capitalisation (MV), market-to-book value of 
assets (MTBV), return on assets (ROA), leverage ratio (LEV), segment number 
(SEGNO), and the proportion of assets divested (DIVSIZ).  
 
[Insert Table 7.1 about here, see page 170] 
 
The definitions of these characteristics are given as follows. MV is the market value of 
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equity at the month end prior to the spinoff announcement for the pre-spinoff parent or at 
the spinoff completion date for both post-spinoff parent and offspring. MV is denoted in 
millions of 2005 US dollars. MTBV is measured as the market value of equity plus book 
value of preferred stocks and book value of debt divided by the sum of book values of 
equity, preferred stocks and debt following Faccio et al. (2006). ROA is the earnings 
before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortisation divided by the book value of total 
assets in the beginning of the year. LEV is total debt divided by total assets. SEGNO is 
the number of business segments. DIVSIZ is the total assets of offspring divided by the 
sum of total assets of post-spinoff parent and offspring. The accounting data are taken 
from the latest available annual reports prior to the spinoff announcement for the pre-
spinoff parent and from the first available annual reports following the spinoff completion 
for both the post-spinoff parent and offspring. 
 
The descriptive statistics of characteristics are reported in Table 7.1 as follows. Panel A 
gives the data of all pre-spinoff parents. Panel B reports the data for all post-spinoff 
parents. The data for all offspring are presented in Panel C. I also split sample firms into 
two groups, firms involved with UK spinoffs and firms involved with non-UK spinoffs. 
The sample split is used because nearly half of spinoff transactions in my sample are 
taking place in the UK. There are 72 parents (76 subsidiaries) involved with UK spinoffs 
and 85 parents (94 subsidiaries) involved with non-UK spinoff. The descriptive statistics 
for UK pre-spinoff parents, UK post-spinoff parents and UK offspring are reported in 
Panels D, E, and F, respectively.  The descriptive statistics for non-UK pre-spinoffs, non-
UK post-spinoff parents and non-UK offspring are reported in Panels G, H, and I, 
respectively.   
 
Table 7.2 reports the difference in characteristics between sub-samples of firms involved 
in spinoffs. First, I test the difference in characteristics between pre-spinoff parents and 
post-spinoff parents and the difference in characteristics between post-spinoff parents and 
offspring. The test results are reported in Panel A and Panel B. Then I do such tests for 
the UK sub-sample and the results are presented in Panel C and Panel D. Similarly, I 
conduct tests for the non-UK sub-sample and give the results in Panel E and Panel F. 
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Lastly I examine the difference in characteristics between UK pre-spinoff parents and 
non-UK pre-spinoff parents, the difference in characteristics between UK post-spinoff 
parents and non-UK post-spinoff parents, and the difference in characteristics between 
UK offspring and non-UK offspring. The tests results are shown in Panel G, Panel H, and 
Panel I. Since the sample firms’ market capitalisations are not symmetrically distributed, 
I use the natural logarithm of market capitalisation to test the difference in market 
capitalisations between sub-samples.  
 
[Insert Table 7.2 about here, see page 172] 
 
Since my sample is not large, I mainly discuss the test results for the median difference 
between sub-samples in order to avoid biased statistical inferences. Panels A - C in Table 
7.1 indicate that European spinoff firms are large firms in terms of market capitalisation. 
The average market value for European spinoff parents is US$ 5,326 million while the 
median market value is only US$ 1,117 million. The substantial difference between the 
mean market capitalisation and the median market capitalisation suggests that my sample 
includes a few very large spinoff parents. Similarly, there is a significant difference in 
MTBV between pre-spinoff parents and post-spinoff parents. The standard deviation of 
MTBV for the pre-spinoff parent sample is also quite big. A further examination shows 
that this is due to some technology firms with very MTBV in the sample. 34  The 
proportion of assets divested by parents through spinoffs is nontrivial.  On average, about 
32% of the total assets of pre-spinoff parents are spun off. This evidence suggests that 
European spinoffs are very large-scale corporate restructurings. 
 
There is some evidence that post-spinoff parents are valued more highly than pre-spinoff 
parents, as indicated in Panel A of Table 7.2. The median MTBV for the post-spinoff 
parents is 1.75 while the median MTBV for the pre-spinoff parents is 1.40, where the 
median difference of 0.11 is significant at the 5% level (z-statistic = 2.03). The MTBV for 
post-spinoff parents is generally higher than that for offspring. The median MTBV for 
                                                 
34 For instance, IMS Group Plc, an integrated telephony service provider, announced the spinoff Teamtalk 
in January 2000. The MTBV ratio of IMS Group PLC was 8.09 prior to the spinoff announcement. 
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post-spinoff parents is 1.75 while the median MTBV for offspring is 1.36. Panel B of 
Table 7.2 shows that the median difference of MTBV between post-spinoff parents and 
offspring is statistically significant at the 10% level (z statistic = 1.86). However, the 
accounting performance measured by ROA for post-spinoff parents is similar to that for 
offspring. The mean (median) ROA for the post-spinoff parents is 0.11 (0.12) while the 
mean (median) ROA for the offspring is 0.11 (0.10). The difference in ROA between 
post-spinoff parents and offspring is statistically insignificant.  
 
As shown in Panels B and C of Table 7.1, the mean (median) leverage ratio of post-
spinoff parents is 0.27 (0.24) and the mean leverage ratio of offspring is 0.30 (0.24). Both 
the mean and median differences in leverage ratios between post-spinoff parents and 
offspring are insignificant, as indicated in Panel B of Table 7.2. Panel B of Table 7.2 
further demonstrates that usually one business segment is divested through a spinoff. The 
median difference in segment number between pre-spinoff parents and post-spinoff 
parents is 1, which is significant at the 1% level (z-statistic = 3.22). Post-spinoff parents 
generally have a more complex organisational structure than offspring since the median 
difference in segment number between post-spinoff parents and offspring is 1 and 
statistically significant at the 1% level (z-statistic = 2.63). 
 
Based on the above analysis, parents in my sample seem to divest subsidiaries with poor 
growth prospectus rather than divest underperforming subsidiaries. There is an 
insignificant change in the leverage ratio between pre-spinoff parents and post-spinoff 
parents. In addition, the leverage ratios for post-spinoff parents and offspring are 
comparable. Therefore, parents in my sample do not appear to transfer wealth from 
debtholders to shareholders since there is no asymmetric re-allocation of debts across 
post-spinoff firms. A final impression is that European spinoffs are refocusing 
transactions since the mean (median) number of business segments for spinoff parents 
drops from 3.77 (4.00) to 3.13 (3.00) following spinoffs.   
 
Panels D- F of Table 7.1 and Panels C-D of Table 7.2 indicate that the data pattern of UK 
sub-sample is consistent with that of the whole sample. Again, results in Panels G-I of 
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Table 7.1 and Panels E-F of Table 7.2 show that the conclusions in the preceding 
paragraph based on the whole sample are generally applicable to the non-UK sub-sample.  
 
In Panels G-I of Table 7.2, I examine the difference in characteristics between firms in the 
UK sub-sample and those in the non-UK sub-sample. Several conclusions can be drawn 
based on the results in Table 7.2. First, non-UK parents are generally larger and have a 
more complex organisational structure than UK parents. The median difference in market 
capitalisation between UK and non-UK pre-spinoff parents is statistically significant (z-
statistic = -1.78). The median difference in segment number between UK and non-UK 
pre-spinoff parents is significant at the 10% level (z-statistic = -2.97). Second, UK pre-
spinoff parents have slightly better operating performance than non-UK pre-spinoff 
parents as the difference in ROA is 0.02 and significant at the 10% level (z-statistic = 
1.77). The proportion of divested assets of UK spinoffs is significant larger than that of 
non-UK spinoffs since the median difference in DIVSIZ is highly significant (z-statistic = 
2.97).  
 
The results also show that UK post-spinoff parents have higher market valuation and are 
more focused than non-UK post-spinoff parents. The median difference in MTBV 
between UK post-spinoff parents and non-UK post-spinoff parents is 1.01, which is 
significant at the 1% level (z-statistic = 4.62). The median difference in SEGNO between 
UK post-spinoff parents and non-UK post-spinoff parents is -1, which is also significant 
at the 1% level (z-statistic = -3.70). Similar conclusions can be drawn for UK offspring 
and non-UK offspring.   
 
7.2.2 Empirical Design  
Hypothesis H7 states that the agency problems of spinoff parents are more severe than 
non-spinoff control firms. In order to test this hypothesis, I need a sample of non-spinoff 
control firms. To select a control firm for a spinoff parent, I first identify a sample of 
firms that operate in the same 2-digit SIC industry as the spinoff parent and are not 
involved in a spinoff in the three-year period prior to the parent’s spinoff announcement. 
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From these non-spinoff industry peers, I identify the control firm as the firm whose 
market capitalisation is closest to that of the spinoff parent prior to the spinoff 
announcement.   
 
I measure the magnitude of agency conflicts based on the strength of a firm’s corporate 
governance system. Extant literature has argued that corporate governance can mitigate 
the agency costs and improve firm values (Denis and McConnell, 2003; Fama and Jensen, 
1983; Jensen, 1993; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Following 
this argument, there should be a negative association between the extent of agency 
conflicts for a firm and the strength of the firm’s corporate governance system. Hence I 
define firms with high agency costs as those with a weak corporate governance structure. 
 
There are different types of corporate governance mechanisms available for owners to 
monitor controllers, including corporate board, executive share ownership, executive 
compensation, large shareholders, lenders, financial analysts, takeover markets, product 
market competition, and the legal system (for general review articles, see Becht, Bolton 
and Roell, 2002; Denis and McConnell, 2003; Gillan, 2006; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
For testing H7, the corporate governance mechanisms considered include corporate board, 
director ownership, institutional blockholders, lenders, and financial analysts. I do not 
consider executive compensation because I do not have quality data for sample firms’ 
executive compensation35 and the inference based on the poor data might be biased. I do 
not consider takeover markets, product markets and the legal system because these 
mechanisms are identical for both pre-spinoff parents and non-spinoff control firms.  
Table 7.3 gives the definitions of corporate governance variables used in this Chapter. 
 
                                                 
35 I collected the executive compensation data from sample firms’ annual reports which are downloaded 
from Thomson research. Because many continental European sample firms do not have English version 
annual reports for the sample period, I compiled the executive compensation data based on the word 
matching between these firms’ non-English-version reports and their subsequent English-version reports. 
Further, many sample firms’ annual reports only report the average exercise price of stock options or the 
average expiry period of stock option. Thus, it is difficult for me to compute the exact amount of stock-
based compensation for sample firms. I then use the average value for the compensation calculation. 
Results based on my executive compensation data indicate that the level of executive compensation is not 
related to the spinoff value effects.  
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[Insert Table 7.3 about here, see page 174] 
 
The strength of board monitoring is measured with the board independence. Fama and 
Jensen (1983) argue that independent directors can monitor the management more 
effectively. I measure the board independence, BODIND, as the ratio of independent 
directors on the board. The assumption is that the monitoring strength increases with the 
ratio of independent directors on the board. There are two different board systems for our 
sample firms, a single-tier or unitary board system and a two-tier or binary board system. 
I focus on the board when a sample firm is of a unitary board system and the supervisory 
board when a sample firm is of a binary board system. I examine the independence of the 
supervisory board only because by definition the management board in a two-tier board 
system consists of exclusively executives and the supervisory board exercises the 
monitoring function.  
 
The board member data are from annual reports, supplemented by the data from press 
news searched through Factiva. For both spinoff parent and non-spinoff control firms, 
their board member data are taken from the last annual report prior to the spinoff 
announcement date. Following Anderson and Reeb (2003), I use a three-tier 
categorization of board members: independent directors, affiliate directors and insider 
directors. Directors employed by the firm, retired from the firm, or who are immediate 
family members of the controlling family shareholders are insider directors. Immediate 
family board members are identified when a board director has the same last name as the 
controlling family shareholder. Affiliate directors are directors with potential or existing 
business relationships with the firm but are not full-time employees. Consultants, lawyers, 
financiers, and investment bankers are examples of affiliate directors. Independent 
directors are individuals whose only business relationship to the firm is their directorship. 
A cautionary note should be made. Because this board classification is based on my own 
assessment and the limited information sources which I have access to, the classification 
results inevitably contain personal biases.  
 
Board ownership, BODOWN, is an important mechanism to align the incentives of 
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directors and shareholders (Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990). I collect 
the board ownership data from annual reports and Worldscope. Similarly, I focus on the 
board when a sample firm is of a unitary board system and the supervisory board when a 
sample firm is of a binary board system. The rationale of this variable is the incentive of a 
firm’s board members to monitor the manager increases with their equity ownership in 
the firm. 
 
Large shareholders have interests and expertise in monitoring self-interested managers 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). McConnell and Servaes (1990) find a positive association 
between firm performance and the level of institutional ownership. Therefore, I use the 
equity ownership of a firm’s institutional blockholders, INSTOWN, to measure the 
monitoring strength of institutional blockholders. An institutional blockholder is defined 
as one holding more than 3% of the total number of outstanding shares of the sample firm 
and having no affiliation with the controlling family shareholders.36 The rationale for this 
variable is that the incentive of institutional blockholders to monitor managers is higher 
when their equity ownership is larger. The institutional equity ownership data are taken 
from annual reports. When the annual report does not disclose substantial ownership data 
above the 3% level, I search press news in Factiva about ownership data of the sample 
firm during the spinoff period to obtain the desired data.  
 
Debt has an agency monitoring role (Jensen, 1986). Lasfer, Sudarsanam and Taffler (1996) 
document evidence on the positive impact of lender monitoring on the market reaction to 
asset sales. I measure the monitoring strength of lenders, LEV, as the total debt divided 
by the total assets. The rationale for this variable is the incentive of debtholders to 
monitor a firm increases with the stake of debtholders on the firm. 
 
Security analysts are an important information intermediary between investors and firms. 
                                                 
36 The UK sample firms report the substantial equity interests at the 3% level. Continental European firms 
report the equity ownership at different levels. In general, the equity holding disclosure for most continental 
European sample firms is somewhat better than that for UK sample firms. For example, Swedish sample 
firms disclose the equity holding for the largest ten shareholders and the disclosure level is often at a level 
of lower than 1%. 
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Chung and Jo (1996) and Doukas, Kim and Pantzalis (2004) find that analyst following 
exerts a significant and positive impact on a firms' market value. I measure the strength of 
analyst monitoring for a firm, ACOV, as the number of following analysts. The 
assumption is that the monitoring strength of analysts increases with the number of 
analysts. The analyst data is supplied by the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (IBES). 
 
Hypothesis H8 proposes a cross-sectional negative relationship between the strength of 
corporate governance of pre-spinoff parents and spinoff announcement returns. The 
spinoff announcement effects are measured as the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) 
during the three-day announcement period. The computation of CARs is based on the 
market model and the computation procedure is introduced in section 5.3.  
 
To test H8, I examine the following corporate governance mechanisms of pre-spinoff 
parents: director ownership, institutional blockholders, lenders, financial analysts, 
takeover markets, product markets, and the legal system. BODIND is not considered here 
because there are two different types of board systems in the sample and a cross-sectional 
test based on BODIND will give meaningless results.  
 
The monitoring strength of takeover markets, INDACQ, is measured as the number of 
industry peers acquired in the spinoff parent’s two-digit SIC industry over the three-year 
period prior to the spinoff announcement. I use this proxy to capture the intensity of 
mergers and acquisitions in the parent’s industry in the recent period. The rationale for 
this variable is that a firm’s managers face higher takeover pressure and will work harder 
to avoid potential takeovers when the industry takeover activity is more intensive. 
Industry acquisition activities more than three years before the spinoff announcement 
may be irrelevant to the spinoff decision. Another reason for me to use the three-year 
window is due to the data limitation. The SDC M&A database have the detailed 
continental European acquisition data from 1984. Since my sample period starts from 
1987, a selection of a longer window will result in a removal of some sample 
observations. As my sample is not large, the loss of sample observations will result in a 
lower explanatory power of my empirical tests. 
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Managers have to work hard to enhance firm performance when the industry competition 
is intensive (Hermalin, 1992). A recent theoretical paper by De Bettignies and Baggs 
(2006) demonstrates that product market competition directly lowers the shareholders’ 
marginal cost of inducing managerial efforts. I use the industry Herfindahl index, 
INDCOMP, to measure the monitoring strength of product markets. The Herfindahl Index 
is obtained by squaring the market-share of all firms in the two-digit SIC industry of the 
pre-spinoff parent, and then summing those squares. The rationale of this variable is that 
the managerial efforts to maximise shareholder wealth will increase with the intensity of 
product market competition. Since INDCOMP measures the extent of industry ownership 
concentration, there should be a negative association between the product market 
monitoring and INDCOMP. 
 
I use the anti-director index introduced in Chapter 6, ANTIDIR, to measure the 
effectiveness of a country’s legal system to protect shareholder rights and control 
potential managerial opportunism, which is proposed in La Porta et al. (1998). This anti-
director index ranges from zero to six, where the lower score refers to a weak protection 
of shareholder rights. There is a growing literature arguing that the country-level 
corporate governance system is an important corporate governance mechanism to 
mitigate agency costs (e.g. see Denis and McConnell 2003; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer and Vishny 2000). The assumption is that managers in a country with strong 
shareholder protection are more likely to make decisions to benefit shareholders than 
those in a country with weak shareholder protection. 
 
So far I consider seven corporate governance variables for testing H8, i.e. BODOWN, 
INSTOWN, LEV, ACOV, INDACQ, INDCOMP, and ANTIDIR. Because the analyst 
coverage varies substantially across sample firms, I use the natural logarithm of analyst 
coverage to normalise this variable. Specifically, the analyst coverage is measured as 
Log(1+ACOV).37 These variables are positively associated with the strength of a firm’s 
corresponding governance mechanism. According to H8, the spinoff announcement 
                                                 
37 I use Log (1+ACOV) rather than Log (ACOV) because some sample firms have no analyst following. 
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returns should be negatively associated with the corporate governance strength variables 
except for INDCOMP. For INDCOMP, the relationship should be positive since 
INDCOMP measures the degree of industry concentration.   
 
In addition, I consider the family ownership variable, FAMILY, to indicate the monitoring 
impact of controlling family shareholders on the spinoff value effects. I define a firm as a 
family firm when the firm’s largest shareholder is a family shareholder and the family 
equity holding is more than 10% of the firm’s equity. The variable, FAMILY, is a dummy 
variable that equals one when a firm is a family firm, and equals zero otherwise. Owning 
10% of a firm’s equity is usually sufficient for a large shareholder to effectively control 
the firm’s operation. The same definition has been used in Faccio and Lang (2002). The 
family shareholder and its equity stake are identified with a firm’s latest annual report 
prior to the spinoff announcement date. When the annual report does not disclose the 
exact ownership of a controlling family shareholder, I search press news in Factiva for 
ownership data about the sample firm to obtain the desired data.  
 
There are conflicting views on the value impact of family shareholders (Burkart et al., 
2003). On the one hand, family control implies the costs of a concentrated ownership. I 
call this argument as the family expropriation hypothesis. First, family shareholders may 
use their control to extract private benefits at the expense of other shareholders. Second, 
families may be excessively interested in maintaining control over the company event in 
the presence of potentially value-enhancing acquirers. Third, family shareholders may 
appoint their children or relatives as key employees (e.g. CEO) even though they may not 
qualify. On the other hand, families have incentives to monitor the management and the 
presence of family shareholders is argued to positively affect the firm performance 
(Anderson and Reed, 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2006). I refer this argument to the 
family monitoring hypothesis. The family expropriation hypothesis predicts a positive 
impact of controlling family shareholders on the spinoff performance while the family 
monitoring hypothesis conjectures a negative relationship between the presence of 
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controlling family shareholders and the spinoff value creation.38 Thus, there is no clear 
cut prediction with regard to the impact of family shareholders on the spinoff value 
effects. 
 
Therefore, I present the following empirical model to test H8.  
),,,,),1(
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         (7.1) 
where the control variables are FOCUS, INFASYM, GROWTH, ROA, RELSIZ and 
HOTTIME. The variable construction for control variables is given in section 6.3.3. The 
definitions of control variables are also given in Table 7.3. 
 
Hypothesis H9 predicts a positive relationship between the improvement in corporate 
governance in post-spinoff firms and the long-run spinoff performance. The long-run 
spinoff performance is measured as the long-run stock returns and the long-run 
accounting returns for post-spinoff firms. Specifically, I use the three-year size- and 
book-to-market-adjusted buy-and-hold returns (size/BEME BHARs) and the three-year 
industry- and size-adjusted buy-and-hold returns (ind/size BHARs). I do not consider the 
calendar time regression and calendar time portfolio approaches because of the limited 
sample size. These calendar-time based approaches require a construction of event-firm 
portfolios on a monthly basis and the number of event firms for each calendar month 
should be more than 10 in order to draw unbiased conclusions (Mitchell and Stafford, 
2000). Since my sample is quite small and the sample period is quite long, it is unfeasible 
for me to use these calendar-time based approaches to compare the performance between 
sub-groups of sample firms. I do not consider the long-run accounting performance of 
post-spinoff firms because I will examine the impact of takeover bids on the long-run 
spinoff performance for testing H9 and the accounting performance of post-spinoff firms 
acquired within the three-year post-spinoff period will not be publicly available. Thus, by 
focusing on the accounting performance, I either lose the observation if the firm is 
                                                 
38  The signalling effect makes the prediction event more difficult. Under the family expropriation 
hypothesis, there may be a positive association between the presence of a controlling family shareholder 
and the spinoff announcement returns because family controlled spinoff firms have allowed large negative 
synergies to accumulate and the stock markets expect large gains from spinoffs. 
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acquired in the first year following the spinoff or under-estimate the accounting 
performance if the firm acquired in the first year following the spinoff has not reported 
the full-year accounting performance.      
 
To test H9, I need to measure the changes of corporate governance around spinoffs. I 
measure the change in board independence, ∆BODIND, as the difference in BODIND 
between post-spinoff parent (offspring) and pre-spinoff parent. I measure the change in 
board ownership, ∆BODOWN, as the difference in BODIND between post-spinoff 
parent(offspring) and pre-spinoff parent. The change in institutional blockholder 
ownership, ∆INSTOWN, is defined as the difference in INSTOWN between post-spinoff 
parent(offspring) and pre-spinoff parent. The change in the analyst coverage, 
∆Log(1+ACOV), is calculated as the difference in Log(1+ACOV) between post-spinoff 
parent(offspring) and pre-spinoff parent. I do not consider changes in the leverage ratio 
because the debt distribution across post-spinoff firms is often influenced by debtholders 
and the reallocation decision is more related to the asset structure of post-spinoff firms 
than to the governance-based consideration (Dittmar, 2004; Mehrotra, Mikkelson and 
Partch, 2003).  
 
I do not consider changes in INDACQ, INDCOMP, and ANTIDIR because there is no 
reason to expect these external corporate governance mechanisms to change following 
spinoffs. Therefore, I use the INDCOMP measured at the spinoff completion date and 
ANTIDIR for post-spinoff firms to indicate the strength of external governance 
mechanisms for post-spinoff firms. These two variables should be positively related to 
the long-run performance of post-spinoff firms.  
  
I consider two additional variables for testing H9. The first variable is the takeover bid 
for post-spinoff firms, ACQBID, which equals one when the post-spinoff firm receives a 
takeover bid in the three-year post-spinoff period, and equals zero otherwise. The 
presence of takeover bid indicates the presence of an effective market control and is 
positively related to the long-run spinoff performance (Chemmanur and Yan, 2004). The 
second variable is the family ownership variable, FAMILY. Since the short-run market 
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reaction to spinoffs of family firms can be explained by both the family monitoring 
hypothesis and the family expropriation hypothesis, the long-run spinoff performance of 
family firms thus provides more unambiguous evidence for the value impact of 
controlling family shareholders. If the long-run spinoff performance of family firms is 
significantly lower than that of non-family firms, it will suggest that family firms make 
suboptimal spinoff decisions, which will be consistent with the prediction of the family 
expropriation hypothesis. Conversely, if the long-run spinoff performance of family firms 
is significantly higher than that of non-family firms, it will suggest that family firms 
make better spinoff decisions, which will be consistent with the prediction of the family 
monitoring hypothesis. 
 
To test H9, I use the following empirical model:  
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where the control variables are FOCUS, INFASYM, GROWTH, ROA, RELSIZ and 
HOTTIME for post-spinoff parents and the control variables are FOCUS, INFASYM, 
RELSIZ and HOTTIME for offspring. The variable construction for control variables is 
given in section 6.3.3. I do not use GROWTH and ROA for offspring because these two 
variables are operating characteristics of pre-spinoff parents and are irrelevant to the 
performance of offspring. The definitions of control variables are given in Table 6.1. 
 
Table 7.4 reports the summary statistics of explanatory variables used in subsequent 
empirical tests. Panel A of Table 7 reports the corporate governance data for pre-spinoff 
parents. The mean and median of BODIND for pre-spinoff parents are 0.40. However, 
since half sample firms are of binary board system, the board independence ratio for 
firms with a unitary board system will certainly be less than 0.40. Therefore, it suggests 
that pre-spinoff parents do not have a majority independent board. There is a substantial 
difference in BODOWN across pre-spinoff firms since the mean of BODOWN is 10.81 
while the median of BODOWN is just 1.26. This implies that many pre-spinoff parents 
do not have significant board ownership. The mean INSTOWN for my pre-spinoff parent 
sample is 16.40 and the median is 10.01. It seems that INSTOWN does not differ 
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substantially across sample firms. Since the spinoff parents are often large firms, the 
values of INSTOWN indicate that many institutional blockholders have equity holdings 
in spinoff parents. The leverage ratios of pre-spinoff parents have a mean of 0.26 and a 
median of 0.24. Further, pre-spinoff parents have quite a few following analysts. The 
mean ACOV is 12.38 and the median is 9.00. Industry acquisition activity and product 
market competition seems to be reasonable. The median INDACQ is 0.10, indicating that 
about 10% of industry firms are acquired in the three-year period prior to the spinoff 
announcement. The median of INDCOMP is 0.24, implying that the pre-spinoff parent’s 
industry is not highly concentrated and the industry product market competition is quite 
high. The anti-director ration has a mean value of 4.00 and a median value of 3.66. A 
final note about the corporate governance of pre-spinoff parents is that 34% of pre-
spinoff parents are family firms. The significant proportion of family firms in the sample 
indicates that I should consider the impact of the existence of family firms in subsequent 
analysis.   
 
Panels B - D of Table 7.4 suggest that the corporate governance structure of post-spinoff 
firms is generally similar as that of pre-spinoff firms. The differences in most corporate 
governance variables are insignificant at the 10% level. However, the difference in 
institutional ownership between post-spinoff firms and pre-spinoff firms is highly 
significant at the 1% level. This indicates that post-spinoff firms attract more institutional 
investors than pre-spinoff firms. Finally, the difference in the analyst coverage between 
offspring and pre-spinoff parents is negative and significant at the 1% level. This is not 
surprising since offspring are generally much smaller than pre-spinoff parents and will 
have less analyst following than pre-spinoff parents (Hong et al., 2000).  
 
[Insert Table 7.4 about here, see page 175] 
 
Table 7.5 reports the correlations across explanatory variables. Panel A reports the 
correlation across explanatory variables for pre-spinoff parents. Panel B reports the data 
for post-spinoff parents and panel C reports the data for offspring. Results show that there 
are significant correlations between several variables. For pre-spinoff parents, FAMILY is 
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positively significantly related to BODOWN. This suggests that some controlling family 
members are likely to be board directors and thus the board ownership for family firms is 
high. The relationship between FAMILY and INSTOWN is -0.33, which is also 
significant at the 1% level. This indicates that institutional blockholders are less likely to 
invest in family firms than in non-family firms. Similarly, family firms attract fewer 
analysts than non-family firms since the correlation between FAMILY and Log(1+ACOV) 
is -0.28, which is significant at the 1% level. ANTIDIR is negatively associated with 
Log(1+ACOV) and with INDCOMP, where the correlation is significant at the 1% level.  
Explanatory variables for post-spinoff parents and those for offspring generally are not 
highly correlated.  
 
[Insert Table 7.5 about here, see page 177] 
 
7.3 Corporate Governance and the Spinoff Decision 
The corporate governance structure of spinoff parents and non-spinoff control firms are 
reported in Table 7.6. The ratio of independent directors on board is significantly lower 
for spinoff parents than for non-spinoff control firms. The mean (median) board 
independence ratio for spinoff firms is 0.40 (0.40) while the mean (median) board 
independence ratio for control firms is 0.51 (0.50). Both the mean difference and the 
median difference are significant at 1% level (t-statistic = -7.37 and z-statistic = -6.59). 
Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that corporate board should consist of a majority of 
independent directors. Therefore, the independent director on board ratio of 0.40 for pre-
spinoff parents suggests that the board monitoring in pre-spinoff parents may be weak.  
 
[Insert Table 7.6 about here, see page 179] 
 
The board ownership of pre-spinoff parents is comparable with that of control firms. Both 
the mean difference and the median difference are insignificant at the 10% level. 
However, the mean (median) difference in institutional ownership between parents and 
control firms is -10.26 (-12.09), which is statistically significant at the 1% level (t-
statistic = -4.80 and z-statistic = -4.50). The substantial difference in institutional 
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ownership between parents and control firms indicates that the institutional monitoring in 
parents is generally weak.  
 
The leverage ratio of parents is generally similar to that of control firms. The difference is 
statistically insignificant at the 10% level. Similarly, the number of analysts following 
parents is comparable with that for control firms. The data indicate that the analyst 
coverage for parents is slightly higher than that for control firms since the median 
difference in analyst coverage is positive and significant at the 10% level.  
 
Collectively, the results in Table 7.6 show that pre-spinoff parents generally have weaker 
corporate governance than non-spinoff control firms. The mean board independence ratio 
for pre-spinoff parents is less than that for non-spinoff control firms by 11%. Similarly, 
the mean institutional ownership for pre-spinoff parents is less than that for non-spinoff 
control firms by 10%. Thus, my evidence supports H7 that the corporate governance 
structure of pre-spinoff parents is generally weaker than that of non-spinoff control firms. 
This evidence further implies that agency conflicts in pre-spinoff parents will be more 
severe than those in non-spinoff control firms. 
 
I also run a logit regression to analyse the impact of corporate governance structure on 
the spinoff decision. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals one when a 
firm is spinoff parent and equals zero when a firm is non-spinoff control firm. The 
corporate governance variables used include BODOWN, INSTOWN, LEV, 
Log(1+ACOV), and FAMILY. I do not consider BODIND because my sample includes 
firms with a unitary board system and those with a binary board system. Thus BODIND 
is not directly comparable when firms are of different board systems. Further, I do not 
consider INDACQ, INDCOMP, and ANTIDIR because these variables are of the same 
value for spinoff parents and non-spinoff control firms. There are four control variables in 
the logit regression. The first control variable is the number of business segments 
(SEGNO), which captures a firm’s organisational complexity. The second control 
variable is residual stock return (INFASYM), which measures a firm’s information 
asymmetry level. The third control variable is MTBV of assets ration, which measures a 
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firm’s growth potential. The fourth control variable is cash-flow return on assets, which 
estimates a firm’s liquidity constraints. These control variables have been used in Berger 
and Ofek (1999) and Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) to explain the refocusing 
and spinoff decision, respectively. Regression results are reported in Table 7.7.  
 
[Insert Table 7.7 about here, see page 181] 
 
As results in Table 7.7 indicate, the strength of corporate governance is negatively related 
to the spinoff likelihood. The coefficients for INSTOWN, and Log(1+ACOV) are 
negative and significant at the 1% level. The coefficient for BODOWN is also negative 
although insignificant. The coefficients for LEV and FAMILY are positive and significant 
at the 5% level. The positive coefficient for LEV may indicate that firms have to conduct 
spinoffs to seek external finance given that they cannot access additional bank debts due 
to the high leverage ratio. The positive coefficient for FAMILY is consistent with the 
family expropriation hypothesis that agency problems for family firms are more severe 
than those for non-family firms. Control variables SEGNO and ROA have predicted 
positive sign and are significant.   
 
7.4 Corporate Governance and Spinoff Announcement Effects 
To test hypotheses H8, I regress the three-day (-1, +1) CARs to spinoff parents on the 
corporate governance variables of pre-spinoff parents. The empirical model used is 
equation (7.1). The regression results are given in Table 7.8.   
 
[Insert Table 7.8 about here, see page 182] 
 
Although the empirical model has a reasonable explanatory power to explain spinoff 
announcement effects, none of corporate governance variables is significant at the 10% 
level. The only variables that are significant are FOCUS and RELSIZ. Therefore, I have 
no evidence to support H8. However, almost all corporate governance variables have a 
predicted negative sign in the regression, which is consistent with the argument of H8 
that markets expect more value creation from spinoffs of firms with weak corporate 
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governance and severe agency problems.  
 
7.5 Corporate Governance and Long-run Spinoff Performance 
To examine the relationship between the improvement in corporate governance following 
spinoffs and the long-run spinoff performance, I regress post-spinoff abnormal stock 
returns on these proxies for changes in corporate governance following spinoffs. The 
long-run returns to post-spinoff firms are measured at the three-year interval. The 
empirical model used is equation (7.2). The test results are provided in Table 7.9.  
 
[Insert Table 7.9 about here, see page 183] 
 
The first message conveyed from the regressions is that the increase of board 
independence in post-spinoff firms is significantly related to the long-run spinoff 
performance. The coefficient of ∆BODIND in model 1 is 3.18 in model 1, which is 
significant at the 5% level (t-statistic = 2.06). ∆BODIND is insignificant in model 2 but 
has a predicted positive sign in the regression. For both model 3 and model 4, ∆BODIND 
have a positive coefficient and is statistically significant at the 1% level.  
 
The second impression from reading the regression results is that the market for corporate 
control is positively affecting the long-run spinoff performance. The coefficient for 
ACQBID is positive and significant across these four regression models. In addition, the 
magnitude of the impact of ACQBID is significant. Generally speaking, if a post-spinoff 
firm receives a takeover bid in the post-spinoff period, its long-run stock returns will 
increase by at least 56% (the lower bound of coefficients for ACQBID in these four 
models). Finally, the presence of a controlling family shareholder is negatively related to 
the long-run performance of post-spinoff parents. The coefficient for FAMILY is -0.44 in 
model 1, which is significant at the 5% level (t-statistic = -2.48). The coefficient for 
FAMILY is -0.67 in model 2, which is significant at the 1% level (t-statistic = -3.42). 
However, the presence of a controlling family shareholder is unrelated to the long-run 
performance of offspring.  
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Changes in other corporate governance mechanisms are generally positively related to the 
long-run spinoff performance although they are not significant at the conventional level. 
An interesting finding is that the long-run spinoff performance is negatively associated 
with the strength of legal system, which is contrary to the argument that managers in a 
country with strong shareholder protection are more likely to make shareholder-friendly 
decisions than those in a country with weak shareholder protection. However, a similar 
finding is documented in Veld and Veld-Merkoulova (2004), who also examine the long-
run stock performance of European spinoffs. Thus, whether a legal system is effective in 
monitoring managerial behaviour is unclear from my evidence.  
 
The explanatory powers of these four regression models are generally good except for 
model 4. The adjusted R-squared for models 1-3 range from 8% to 12% and these three 
models are significant at the 3% level. Taken together, I provide supporting evidence for 
H9 that an improvement in corporate governance is positively related to the long-run 
spinoff performance. In particular, the increased in board independence and the takeover 
threats have a positive and significant impact on the long-run performance of post-spinoff 
firms. However, I find that post-spinoff parent firms with a controlling family shareholder 
significantly underperform those without a controlling family shareholder in the long run. 
This evidence indicates that the family shareholders may conduct spinoffs for non-value-
maximising reasons, which is consistent with the argument of the family expropriation 
hypothesis. I examine the spinoff rationale of family firms in the next section. 
 
7.6 The Spinoff of Family Firms  
In this section, I compare the spinoff performance between family firms and non-family 
firms. I also examine the changes of equity holding for the family shareholder around the 
spinoff. To facilitate the comparison, I select non-family firms with at least one 
blockholder and examine the changes in equity holding of these firms’ largest shareholder 
around spinoffs. The comparison results are reported in Table 7.10. 
 
[Insert Table 7.10 about here, see page 184] 
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Panel A in Table 7.10 examines the difference in spinoff announcement returns between 
family firms and non-family firms. The mean difference in the three-day CARs between 
family firms and non-family firms is 3.65%, which is significant at the 10% level (t-
statistic = 1.93). The median difference in the three-day CARs between family firms and 
non-family firms is 1.27%, which is significant at the 5% level (z-statistic = 2.49). Thus, 
results indicate that family firms generally have better announcement effects than non-
family firms. However, the overall outperformance of family firms during the 
announcement period may be temporary.  
 
 Panels B – C in Table 7.10 examine the long-run performance of family firms and non-
family firms. In general, family firms underperform non-family firms. Post-spinoff parent 
firms controlled by family shareholders have significantly lower long-run abnormal 
returns than post-spinoff parent firms without a controlling family shareholder. The 
offspring controlled by family shareholders also underperform the offspring without a 
controlling family shareholder in the long run. Thus, the comparison results suggest that 
the initial positive market reaction to spinoffs of family firms may be unfounded. A 
tempting explanation is that family shareholders make suboptimal spinoff decisions to 
maximise their personal interests.  
 
I further explore this issue by inspecting the equity holding changes around spinoffs. 
Results in Panel D show that family shareholders generally reduce their share holdings in 
post-spinoff firms although the reduction is statistically insignificant. However, the 
largest shareholders in non-family firms generally increase their equity holdings in post-
spinoff firms. In particular, those non-family blockholders significantly increase their 
shareholding in post-spinoff parents (t-statistic = 2.37 and z-statistic = 2.69).  
 
Allen (2001) argues that managers have private information of the prospect of post-
spinoff firms and their stock trading behaviour predicts the long-run spinoff performance. 
My evidence is consistent with his finding. It seems that family shareholders have private 
information of the long-run spinoff performance and they reduce the equity holdings in 
post-spinoff firms. It is worthwhile noting that those family shareholders still retain 
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substantial control over the post-spinoff firms although they reduce the equity holdings. 
Thus, I conclude that family shareholders may use the spinoff to reshuffle their wealth 
portfolios by selling shares of post-spinoff parents, where the sales proceeds may be used 
in other firms (projects) under their control. Such portfolio-rebalance consideration for a 
spinoff does not aim to maximise shareholder value of post-spinoff firms and hence the 
long-run spinoff performance will be relatively poor.  
 
7.7 Summary 
This chapter proposes and tests the governance-based model for spinoff value effects, 
which argues that spinoffs create shareholder value by enhancing corporate governance 
and mitigating agency costs in post-spinoff firms. From a sample of 170 European 
spinoffs completed during the period from 1987 to 2005, I present some evidence 
supporting the governance-based hypotheses. First, I find that spinoff parents are likely to 
have weaker corporate governance than non-spinoff control firms. Therefore, agency 
problems in spinoff parents seem to be more severe than those in non-spinoff control 
firms. Second, I find the strength of corporate governance for spinoff parents is generally 
negatively associated with the spinoff announcement period abnormal returns although 
the relationship is insignificant. Third, I find that post-spinoff firms with increased board 
independence or facing takeover threats earn significantly higher long-run abnormal 
returns than those without such activities. Finally, I document evidence that family-
controlled parent firms have significantly lower performance than non-family-controlled 
parent firms. Therefore, my evidence indicates that the gains from spinoffs reflect the 
lessening of agency conflicts. 
 
However, my conclusions may be limited to the sample of European firms involved in 
spinoffs. The conclusion that corporate refocusing gains stem from reduction of agency 
costs may not hold for a large sample of cross-sectional firms. Further, the board 
independence variable used in this study may be biased because it is based on my 
subjective assessment of director profiles. Future research examining this issue with 
better data source to measure the strength of corporate governance will be valuable. 
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Table 7.1 Descriptive statistics for characteristics of sample firms involved in spinoffs 
This table reports descriptive statistics of characteristics of sample firms. Panel A reports the data for all pre-
spinoff parents. Panel B reports the data for all post-spinoff parents. Panel C reports the data for all offspring. 
Panel D reports the data for UK pre-spinoff parents. Panel E reports the data for UK post-spinoff parents. Panel F 
reports the data for UK offspring. Panel G reports the data for non-UK pre-spinoff parents. Panel G reports the data 
for non-UK post-spinoff parents. Panel H reports the data for non-UK offspring. MV is the market value of equity 
at the month end prior to the spinoff announcement for the pre-spinoff parent or at the spinoff completion date for 
both post-spinoff parent and offspring. MV is denoted in millions of 2005 US dollars. MTBV is measured as the 
market value of equity plus book value of preferred stocks and book value of debt divided by the sum of book 
values of equity, preferred stocks and debt following Faccio et al. (2006). ROA is the earnings before interest, tax, 
depreciation, and amortisation divided by the book value of total assets in the beginning of the year. LEV is total 
debt divided by total assets. SEGNO is the number of business segments. DIVSIZ is the total assets of offspring 
divided by the sum of total assets of post-spinoff parent and offspring. The accounting data are taken from the 
latest available annual reports prior to the spinoff announcement for the pre-spinoff parent and from the first 
available annual reports following the spinoff completion for both the post-spinoff parent and offspring.  
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. No. of Obs. 
Panel A: All pre-spinoff parents 
MV 5326.00 1116.96 12006.76  157 
MTBV 2.84 1.40 6.28  157 
ROA 0.10 0.11 0.13  157 
LEV 0.26 0.24 0.18  157 
SEGNO 3.77 4.00 1.82  157 
DIVSIZ 0.32 0.28 0.21 157 
Panel B: All post-spinoff parents 
MV 5267.21 873.82 12283.25  157 
MTBV 2.63 1.75 3.42  157 
ROA 0.11 0.12 0.15  157 
LEV 0.27 0.24 0.19  157 
SEGNO 3.13 3.00 1.67  157 
Panel C: All offspring 
MV 1220.82 291.95 2588.64  170 
MTBV 2.26 1.36 2.25  170 
ROA 0.11 0.10 0.22  157 
LEV 0.30 0.24 0.28  170 
SEGNO 2.35 2.00 1.43  170 
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Table 7.1 (continued) 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. No. of Obs. 
Panel D: UK pre-spinoff parents 
MV 4708.21 759.28 9840.63  72 
MTBV 4.11 1.67 9.00  72 
ROA 0.11 0.13 0.14  72 
LEV 0.24 0.22 0.18  72 
SEGNO 3.31 3.00 1.69  72 
DIVSIZ 0.36 0.33 0.19 72 
Panel E: UK post-spinoff parents 
MV 4104.34 790.87 7873.75  72 
MTBV 3.61 2.29 4.66  72 
ROA 0.11 0.12 0.19  72 
LEV 0.25 0.23 0.17  72 
SEGNO 2.61 2.00 1.52  72 
Panel F: UK offspring 
MV 1330.03 227.80 2948.34  76 
MTBV 2.69 1.82 2.48  76 
ROA 0.13 0.11 0.28  73 
LEV 0.29 0.22 0.34  76 
SEGNO 1.99 1.00 1.31  76 
Panel G: Non-UK pre-spinoff parents 
MV 5849.30 1294.56 13611.57  85 
MTBV 1.75 1.23 1.52  85 
ROA 0.09 0.10 0.12  85 
LEV 0.28 0.27 0.18  85 
SEGNO 4.16 4.00 1.84  85 
DIVSIZ 0.28 0.21 0.22 85 
Panel H: Non-UK post-spinoff parents 
MV 6252.22 884.25 15021.98  85 
MTBV 1.80 1.28 1.34  85 
ROA 0.12 0.13 0.11  85 
LEV 0.28 0.25 0.21  85 
SEGNO 3.56 3.00 1.68  85 
Panel I: Non-UK offspring 
MV 1132.52 298.27 2269.20  94 
MTBV 1.92 1.23 1.99  94 
ROA 0.09 0.09 0.14  84 
LEV 0.31 0.25 0.22  94 
SEGNO 2.64 3.00 1.47  94 
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Table 7.2 Difference in characteristics between sub-samples of firms involved in spinoffs 
This table reports the difference in characteristics between sub-samples of firms involved in spinoffs. Panel A 
reports the difference in characteristics between all pre-spinoff parents and all post-spinoff parents. Panel B reports 
the difference in characteristics between all post-spinoff parents and all offspring. Panel C (E) reports the 
difference in characteristics between (non-) UK pre-spinoff parents and (non-) UK post-spinoff parents. Panel D (F) 
reports the difference in characteristics between (non-) UK post-spinoff parents and (non-) UK offspring. Panel G 
reports the difference in characteristics between UK pre-spinoff parents and non-UK pre-spinoff parents. Panel H 
(I) reports the difference in characteristics between UK post-spinoff parents (UK offspring) and non-UK post-
spinoff parents (non-UK offspring). LogMV = the natural logarithm of market value of equity at the month end 
prior to the spinoff announcement for the pre-spinoff parent or at the spinoff completion date for both post-spinoff 
parent and offspring. MV is denoted in millions of 2005 US dollars. MTBV = the market value of equity plus book 
value of preferred stocks and book value of debt divided by the sum of book values of equity, preferred stocks and 
debt following Faccio et al. (2006). ROA = the earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortisation divided 
by the book value of total assets in the beginning of the year. LEV= total debt divided by total assets. SEGNO =the 
number of business segments. DIVSIZ = the total assets of offspring divided by the sum of total assets of post-
spinoff parent and offspring. The accounting data are taken from the latest available annual reports prior to the 
spinoff announcement for the pre-spinoff parent and from the first available annual reports following the spinoff 
completion for post-spinoff firm. The mean difference is tested with t-statistic and the median difference is tested 
with Wilcoxon z statistic. a, b,, c indicates the significance at  the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Variable Mean Diff. t-statistic Median Diff. z-statistic 
Panel A: All pre-spinoff parents vs. all post-spinoff parents 
LogMV 0.05 0.42 -0.00 -0.45 
MTBV 0.20 0.36 -0.11b -2.03 
ROA -0.01 -0.84 -0.01 -1.24 
LEV -0.00 -0.10 0.00 0.01 
SEGNO 0.64a 3.26 1.00a 3.22 
Panel B: All post-spinoff parents vs. all offspring 
LogMV 0.51a 4.87 0.48a  4.57 
MTBV 0.37 1.14 0.38c  1.86 
ROA 0.01 0.27 0.02  1.30 
LEV -0.03 -1.21 0.00  0.31 
SEGNO 0.78a 4.52 1.00a  4.38 
Panel C: UK pre-spinoff parents vs. UK post-spinoff parents 
MV 0.00 0.03 -0.02  0.00 
MTBV 0.50 0.42 -0.61b  -2.58 
ROA 0.00 -0.04 0.01  0.14 
LEV -0.01 -0.24 -0.01  -0.46 
SEGNO 0.69b 2.59 1.00a  2.63 
Panel D: UK post-spinoff parents vs. UK offspring 
LogMV 0.46a 2.67 0.54a  2.65 
MTBV 0.92 1.49 0.47c  1.74 
ROA -0.02 -0.55 0.01  0.19 
LEV -0.04 -0.80 0.01  0.50 
SEGNO 0.62a 2.67 1.00a  2.85 
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Table 7.2 (Continued) 
Variable Mean Diff. t-statistic Median Diff. z-statistic 
Panel E: Non-UK pre-spinoff parents vs. non-UK post-spinoff parents 
LogMV 0.08 0.62 0.17  0.63 
MTBV -0.05 -0.22 -0.05  -0.42 
ROA -0.02 -1.33 -0.02  -1.64 
LEV 0.00 0.07 0.02  0.36 
SEGNO 0.60b 2.22 1.00b 2.08 
Panel F: Non-UK post-spinoff parents vs. non-UK offspring 
LogMV 0.56 4.36 0.47a  3.84 
MTBV -0.12 -0.47 0.05  0.64 
ROA 0.03 1.53 0.03c  1.68 
LEV -0.03 -0.90 0.00  0.77 
SEGNO 0.93a 3.91 0.00a  3.61 
Panel G: UK pre-spinoff parents vs. non-UK pre-spinoff parents 
LogMV -0.33b -2.08 -0.23c  -1.78 
MTBV 2.36b 2.20 0.44a  2.75 
ROA 0.01 0.59 0.02c  1.77 
LEV -0.04 -1.33 -0.05  -1.46 
SEGNO -0.86a -3.05 -1.00a  -2.97 
DIVSIZ 0.08b 2.30 0.13a  2.97 
Panel H: UK post-spinoff parents vs. non-UK post-spinoff parents 
LogMV -0.26 -1.57 -0.05  -1.19 
MTBV 1.81a 3.19 1.01a  4.62 
ROA -0.01 -0.40 -0.01  -0.22 
LEV -0.03 -0.97 -0.02  -0.67 
SEGNO -0.95a -3.74 -1.00a  -3.70 
Panel I: UK offspring vs. non-UK offspring 
LogMV -0.15 -1.05 -0.12  -0.97 
MTBV 0.77a 2.20 0.58a  2.44 
ROA 0.04 1.13 0.01  1.17 
LEV -0.02 -0.52 -0.03c  -1.89 
SEGNO -0.65a -3.05 -2.00a  -3.10 
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Table 7.3 Definitions for explanatory variables 
Variables Definition 
BODIND The number of independent directors divided by the total number of directors, where independent 
directors are directors whose only business relationship with a firm is the directorship.  
BODOWN The percentage of equity ownership of board members in a firm.  
INSTOWN The percentage of equity ownership of institutional blockholders in a firm, where the blockholder is 
defined as a large shareholder holding more than 3% of equity in a firm. 
LEV The total debt divided by the total assets. 
ACOV The number of following analysts over the one-year period prior to the spinoff announcement for 
pre-spinoff parents and over the one-year period subsequent to the spinoff completion for post-
spinoff firms.  
INDACQ The number of industry firms acquired in the two-digit SIC industry of a firm over the three-year 
period prior to the spinoff announcement. 
INDCOMP A firm’s industry Herfindahl index, which is measured as the sum of squared market shares of all 
firms in the sample firm’s two-digit SIC industry. 
ANTIDIR An index to measure the strength of a country’s legal system to protect minority shareholders 
developed by La Porta et al. (1998), which ranges from zero to six, where the lower score refers to 
a weak protection of shareholder rights. 
FAMILY A dummy variable that equals one when a firm’s large shareholder is a family shareholder and the 
family shareholder’s equity holding is more than 10%. 
∆BODIND The difference in BODIND between a post-spinoff firm and its pre-spinoff parent. 
∆BODOWN The difference in BODOWN between a post-spinoff firm and its pre-spinoff parent. 
∆INSTOWN The difference in INSTOWN between a post-spinoff firm and its pre-spinoff parent. 
∆Log(1+ACOV) The difference in Log(1+ACOV) between a post-spinoff firm and its pre-spinoff parent. 
ACQBID A dummy variable that equals one when a post-spinoff firm receives a takeover bid over the three-
year post-spinoff period, and equals zero otherwise. 
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Table 7.4 Summary descriptive statistics for explanatory variables  
This table reports the summary descriptive statistics for explanatory variables. BODIND = the number of 
independent directors divided by the total number of directors, where independent directors are directors whose 
only business relationship with a firm is the directorship.  BODOWN = the percentage of equity ownership of 
board members in a firm.  INSTOWN = the percentage of equity ownership of institutional blockholders in a firm, 
where the blockholder is defined as a large shareholder holding more than 3% of equity in a firm. LEV = the total 
debt divided by the total assets. ACOV = the number of following analysts over the one-year period prior to the 
spinoff announcement for pre-spinoff parents and over the one-year period subsequent to the spinoff completion 
for post-spinoff firms. INDACQ = the number of industry firms acquired in the two-digit SIC industry of a firm 
over the three-year period prior to the spinoff announcement. INDCOMP = the sum of squared market shares of all 
firms in a firm’s two-digit SIC industry.  ANTIDIR = an index to measure the strength of a country’s legal system 
to protect minority shareholders developed by La Porta et al. (1998). FAMILY = 1 when a firm’s largest 
shareholder is a family shareholder and the family shareholder’s equity holding is more than 10%, = 0 otherwise. 
∆BODIND = the difference in BODIND between a post-spinoff firm and its pre-spinoff parent. ∆BODOWN = the 
difference in BODOWN between a post-spinoff firm and its pre-spinoff parent. ∆INSTOWN = the difference in 
INSTOWN between a post-spinoff firm and its pre-spinoff parent. ∆Log(1+ACOV) = the difference in 
Log(1+ACOV) between a post-spinoff firm and its pre-spinoff parent. ACQBID =1 when a post-spinoff firm 
receives a takeover bid over the three-year post-spinoff period, = 0 otherwise. In parentheses are the t-statistic 
(mean) or Wilcoxon test z-statistic (median). a indicates the 1% significance level. 
Panel A: Pre-spinoff parents 
Variable Mean Median Std.dev. No. of obs. 
BODIND 0.40 0.40 0.18 157 
BODOWN 10.81 1.26 16.65 157 
INSTOWN 16.40 10.01 17.68 157 
LEV 0.26 0.24 0.18 157 
ACOV 12.38 9.00 12.32 157 
INDACQ 0.12 0.10 0.11 157 
INDCOMP 0.33 0.24 0.28 157 
ANTIDIR 3.66 4.00 1.51 157 
FAMILY 0.34 0.00 0.48 157 
Panel B: Post-spinoff parents 
Variable Mean Median Std.dev. No. of obs. 
BODIND 0.40 0.40 0.19 157 
BODOWN 11.10 1.24 17.11 157 
INSTOWN 19.40 15.60 18.60 157 
LEV 0.27 0.24 0.19 157 
ACOV 11.83 7.00 12.22 157 
INDACQ 0.12 0.12 0.11 157 
INDCOMP 0.33 0.24 0.27 157 
ANTIDIR 3.66 4.00 1.51 157 
FAMILY 0.34 0.00 0.48 157 
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Table 7.4 (continued)  
Panel C: Offspring 
Variable Mean Median Std.dev. No. of obs. 
BODIND 0.42 0.40 0.20 170 
BODOWN 10.66 0.74 17.41 170 
INSTOWN 20.12 16.96 18.37 170 
LEV 0.30 0.24 0.28 170 
ACOV 5.54 2.00 7.17 170 
INDACQ 0.13 0.11 0.13 170 
INDCOMP 0.36 0.24 0.30 170 
ANTIDIR 3.65 4.00 1.49 170 
FAMILY 0.34 0.00 0.48 170 
Panel D: Post-spinoff parents vs. pre-spinoff parents 
Variable Mean Diff. Median Diff. t-statistic z-statistic 
BODIND 0.00 0.00 0.35 0.00 
BODOWN 0.29 -0.02 0.30 -0.54 
INSTOWN 3.00a 5.59a 3.50 3.61 
LEV 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.14 
ACOV -0.55 -2.00 -1.15 -1.12 
INDACQ 0.01 0.02 1.64 1.31 
INDCOMP 0.00 0.00 -0.02 1.36 
Panel E: Offspring vs. pre-spinoff parents 
Variable Mean Diff. Median Diff. t-statistic z-statistic 
BODIND 0.01 0.00 0.80 -1.02 
BODOWN -0.06 -0.52 -0.05 -0.79 
INSTOWN 3.43a 6.95a 2.80 3.40 
LEV 0.04 0.00 1.80 -1.22 
ACOV -6.79a -7.00a -9.50 -8.86 
INDACQ 0.02 0.01 1.41 1.45 
INDCOMP 0.02 0.00 0.96 1.09 
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Table 7.5 Correlations across explanatory variables 
This table presents the Pearson correlations across explanatory variables for firms involved in spinoffs. Panel A 
reports the correlations across explanatory variables for pre-spinoff parents. Panel B reports the correlations across 
explanatory variables for post-spinoff parents. Panel C reports the correlations across explanatory variables for 
offspring. BODIND = the number of independent directors divided by the total number of directors, where 
independent directors are directors whose only business relationship with a firm is the directorship.  BODOWN = 
the percentage of equity ownership of board members in a firm.  INSTOWN = the percentage of equity ownership 
of institutional blockholders in a firm, where the blockholder is defined as a large shareholder holding more than 
3% of equity in a firm. LEV = the total debt divided by the total assets. ACOV is the number of following analysts 
over the one-year period prior to the spinoff announcement for pre-spinoff parents and over the one-year period 
subsequent to the spinoff completion for post-spinoff firms. INDACQ = the number of industry firms acquired in 
the two-digit SIC industry of a firm over the three-year period prior to the spinoff announcement. INDCOMP = the 
sum of squared market shares of all firms in a firm’s two-digit SIC industry.  ANTIDIR = an index to measure the 
strength of a country’s legal system to protect minority shareholders developed by La Porta et al. (1998). FAMILY 
= 1 when a firm’s largest shareholder is a family shareholder and the family shareholder’s equity holding is more 
than 10%, = 0 otherwise. ∆BODIND = the difference in BODIND between a post-spinoff firm and its pre-spinoff 
parent. ∆BODOWN = the difference in BODOWN between a post-spinoff firm and its pre-spinoff parent. 
∆INSTOWN = the difference in INSTOWN between a post-spinoff firm and its pre-spinoff parent. 
∆Log(1+ACOV) = the difference in Log(1+ACOV) between a post-spinoff firm and its pre-spinoff parent. 
ACQBID =1 when a post-spinoff firm receives a takeover bid over the three-year post-spinoff period, = 0 
otherwise. a, b, c indicates the significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Pre-spinoff parents 
 BODOWN INSTOWN LEV Log(1+ACOV) INDACQ INDCOMP ANTIDIR 
INSTOWN -0.29a       
LEV -0.01 0.01      
Log(1+ACOV) -0.41a -0.01 0.04     
INDACQ -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.03    
INDCOMP 0.01 -0.07 -0.04 0.22a -0.15c   
ANTIDIR -0.18b 0.06 -0.03 -0.28a 0.11 -0.34a  
FAMILY 0.59a -0.33a 0.08 -0.28a 0.03 -0.09 -0.14c 
Panel B: Post-spinoff parents 
 ∆BODIND ∆BODOWN ∆INSTOWN ∆Log(1+ACOV) ACQBID INDCOMP ANTIDIR 
∆BODOWN -0.07       
∆INSTOWN 0.06 -0.11      
∆Log(1+ACOV) 0.03 0.00 0.08     
ACQBID 0.08 0.13 0.01 -0.24a    
INDCOMP 0.02 0.12 -0.08 0.01 -0.12   
ANTIDIR 0.05 0.06 0.17b 0.09 0.05 -0.33a  
FAMILY -0.05 -0.17b 0.04 0.00 -0.18b -0.11 -0.14 
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Table 7.5 (continued) 
Panel C: Offspring 
 ∆BODIND ∆BODOWN ∆INSTOWN ∆Log(1+ACOV) ACQBID INDCOMP ANTIDIR 
∆BODOWN -0.03       
∆INSTOWN 0.00 -0.15b      
∆Log(1+ACOV) -0.00 -0.06 0.03     
ACQBID -0.07 -0.00 0.19b -0.22a    
INDCOMP 0.04 0.08 -0.18b -0.11 -0.06   
ANTIDIR 0.11 0.08 0.06 0.18b 0.12 -0.30a  
FAMILY -0.08 -0.12 0.04 0.03 -0.08 0.01 -0.11 
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Table 7.6 Corporate governance structure of spinoff parents and non-spinoff control firms 
This table reports summary descriptive statistics of corporate governance structure for spinoff parents and non-
spinoff control firms. BODIND = the number of independent directors divided by the total number of directors, 
where independent directors are directors whose only business relationship with a firm is the directorship.  
BODOWN = the percentage of equity ownership of board members in a firm.  INSTOWN = the percentage of 
equity ownership of institutional blockholders in a firm, where the blockholder is defined as a large shareholder 
holding more than 3% of equity in a firm. LEV = the total debt divided by the total assets. ACOV = the number of 
following analysts over the one-year period prior to the spinoff announcement for pre-spinoff parents and over the 
one-year period subsequent to the spinoff completion for post-spinoff firms. For the difference in corporate 
governance variables between spinoff firms and control firms, t-statistic (mean) or Wilcoxon test z-statistic 
(median) is reported in parentheses in the columns of Group Difference (1-2). a indicates the 1% significance level. 
 Spinoff firms (1) Control firms (2) Group difference (1 -2) 
Variable Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
BODIND 0.40 0.40 0.51 0.50 -0.11a -0.10a 
     (-7.37) (-6.59) 
BODOWN 10.81 1.26 9.95 0.47 0.86 0.79 
     (0.58) (-1.26) 
INSTOWN 16.40 10.01 26.65 22.10 -10.26a -12.09a 
     (-4.80) (-4.50) 
LEV 0.26 0.24 0.24 0.22 0.02 0.02 
     (1.13) (-1.00) 
ACOV 12.38 9.00 11.31 7.00 1.07 2.00a 
     (1.37) (1.79) 
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Table 7.7 Logit regression of spinoff likelihood on corporate governance proxies 
Logit regression coefficients for spinoff likelihood for spinoff parents and non-spinoff control firms. Dependent 
variable is 1 when the firm is spinoff parent and is 0 when the firm is non-spinoff control firm. BODOWN = the 
percentage of equity ownership of board members in a firm.  INSTOWN = the percentage of equity ownership of 
institutional blockholders in a firm, where the blockholder is defined as a large shareholder holding more than 3% of 
equity in a firm. LEV = the total debt divided by the total assets. ACOV = the number of following analysts over the 
one-year period prior to the spinoff announcement for pre-spinoff parents and over the one-year period subsequent to 
the spinoff completion for post-spinoff firms. FAMILY =1 when a firm’s largest shareholder is a family shareholder and 
the family shareholder’s equity holding is more than 10%, = 0 otherwise. SEGNO = number of business segments in 
the year preceding spinoff announcement date. INFASYM = dispersion in market-adjusted daily stock returns to a 
parent in the 250-day trading period prior to the spinoff announcement. GROWTH = MTBV of assets ratio at the end 
of month prior to spinoff announcement date. ROA = EBITDA divided by its total assets. a, b indicates the significance 
at the 1% and 5%, respectively.  
Variable Coeff. Sig. 
Intercept 0.49 0.64 
BODOWN -0.01 0.54 
INSTOWN -0.06a 0.00 
LEV 2.94b 0.04 
Log(1+ACOV) -11.39a 0.00 
FAMILY 1.40b 0.05 
SEGNO 0.72a 0.00 
INFASYM -4.16 0.79 
GROWTH 0.10 0.38 
ROA 2.99b 0.04 
No. of obs. 157  
-2 Log Likelihood 114.95  
R2 Cox Snell 0.64  
R2 Nagelkerke 0.85  
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Table 7.8 Regression of announcement period (-1, 1) CARs on the corporate governance structure of spinoff 
parents 
Regression coefficients for announcement period (-1, 1) cumulative abnormal returns for the 157 completed spinoffs by 
144 European companies from January 1987 to December 2005. BODOWN = the percentage of equity ownership of 
board members in a firm.  INSTOWN = the percentage of equity ownership of institutional blockholders in a firm, 
where the blockholder is defined as a large shareholder holding more than 3% of equity in a firm. LEV = the total debt 
divided by the total assets. ACOV = the number of following analysts over the one-year period prior to the spinoff 
announcement for pre-spinoff parents and over the one-year period subsequent to the spinoff completion for post-
spinoff firms. INDACQ = the number of industry firms acquired in the two-digit SIC industry of a firm over the three-
year period prior to the spinoff announcement. INDCOMP= the sum of squared market shares of all firms in a firm’s 
two-digit SIC industry.  ANTIDIR = an index to measure the strength of a country’s legal system to protect minority 
shareholders developed by La Porta et al. (1998). FAMILY =1 when a firm’s largest shareholder is a family shareholder 
and the family shareholder’s equity holding is more than 10%, = 0 otherwise. FOCUS = 1 when parent and offspring 
operate in different industries at the two-digit SIC level, = 0 otherwise. INFASYM = dispersion in market-adjusted 
daily stock returns to a parent in the 250-day trading period prior to the spinoff announcement. GROWTH = parent’s 
MTBV of assets ratio at the end of month prior to spinoff announcement date. ROA = parent’s EBITDA divided by its 
total assets. RELSIZ = market value of an offspring (market values of all offspring when multiple subsidiaries are spun 
off) relative to the sum of the market values of the parent and (all) offspring on the spinoff completion date. HOTTIME 
= 1 when a spinoff is announced between 1996 and 2001, = 0 otherwise. White heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistic 
is reported in parentheses. a, b, c indicates the significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
Variable Coeff. t-stat. 
Intercept -6.23 (-1.16) 
BODOWN -0.03 (-0.46) 
INSTOWN -0.05 (-1.41) 
LEV 0.43 (0.09) 
Log(1+ACOV) -0.77 (-0.46) 
INDACQ 4.88 (0.64) 
INDCOMP 0.22 (0.07) 
ANTIDIR -0.18 (-0.30) 
FAMILY 1.35 (0.67) 
FOCUS 4.23a (3.15) 
INFASYM 124.18 (1.43) 
GROWTH 0.17 (1.03) 
ROA 6.92 (1.10) 
RELSIZ 13.80a (3.19) 
HOTTIME 2.00 (1.58) 
No. of obs. 157  
Adjusted R2 0.16  
F statistic 3.11  
Sig. level <0.001  
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Table 7.9 Regression of the long-run spinoff performance on the changes of corporate governance 
Regression coefficients for the long-run spinoff performance on the changes of corporate governance around spinoffs. 
BODIND = the number of independent directors divided by the total number of directors, where independent directors 
are directors whose only business relationship with a firm is the directorship. ∆BODIND = the difference in BODIND 
between a post-spinoff firm and its pre-spinoff parent.  BODOWN = the percentage of equity ownership of board 
members in a firm.  ∆BODOWN = the difference in BODOWN between a post-spinoff firm and its pre-spinoff parent. 
INSTOWN = the percentage of equity ownership of institutional blockholders in a firm, where the blockholder is 
defined as a large shareholder holding more than 3% of equity in a firm. ∆INSTOWN = the difference in INSTOWN 
between a post-spinoff firm and its pre-spinoff parent. ACOV is the number of following analysts over the one-year 
period prior to the spinoff announcement for pre-spinoff parents and over the one-year period subsequent to the spinoff 
completion for post-spinoff firms. ∆Log(1+ACOV) = the difference in Log(1+ACOV) between a post-spinoff firm and 
its pre-spinoff parent. ACQBID =1 when a post-spinoff firm receives a takeover bid over the three-year post-spinoff 
period, = 0 otherwise. INDCOMP = the sum of squared market shares of all firms in a firm’s two-digit SIC industry.  
ANTIDIR = an index to measure the strength of a country’s legal system to protect minority shareholders developed by 
La Porta et al. (1998). FAMILY = 1 when a firm’s largest shareholder is a family shareholder and the family 
shareholder’s equity holding is more than 10%, = 0 otherwise. White heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistic is reported 
in parentheses. a, b, c indicates the significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
Variable 
Dep. Var. =  3-year 
size/BEME BHARs 
to parents (1) 
Dep. Var. =  3-year 
ind/siz BHARs  
to parents (2) 
Dep. Var. =  3-year 
size/BEME BHARs 
to offspring (3) 
Dep. Var. =  3-year 
ind/siz BHARs  
to offspring (4) 
Intercept 0.33 (0.87) 0.33 (0.71) 1.08 (1.45) 1.09c (1.97) 
∆BODIND 3.18b (2.06) 2.26 (1.34) 2.09a (3.84) 1.45a (2.65) 
∆BODOWN 0.01 (0.83) 0.02 (1.28) 0.01 (1.27) 0.01 (1.35) 
∆INSTOWN 0.00 (0.56) 0.01 (0.83) 0.01 (1.44) 0.00 (0.52) 
∆Log(1+ACOV) 0.40 (1.08) 0.59 (1.43) -0.26 (-0.72) 0.08 (0.26) 
ACQBID 0.77b (2.52) 0.67b (2.01) 0.56c (1.81) 0.65b (1.99) 
INDCOMP -0.32 (-0.97) -0.95b (-1.99) -0.19 (-0.48) -0.09 (-0.21) 
ANTIDIR -0.08 (-1.12) -0.09 (-1.10) -0.10 (-0.98) -0.07 (-0.84) 
FAMILY -0.44b (-2.48) -0.67a (-3.42) -0.20 (-0.67) 0.05 (0.16) 
FOCUS 0.04 (0.24) 0.38c (1.83) -0.69b (-2.22) -0.44 (-1.45) 
INFASYM -4.63 (-0.75) 0.13 (0.02) 4.78 (0.59) 4.13 (0.47) 
GROWTH 0.04c (1.75) 0.04b (2.56)     
ROA -0.56 (-0.71) -1.79a (-2.63)     
RELSIZ 0.48 (0.91) 1.12c (1.96) 0.07 (0.15) -0.50 (-1.07) 
HOTTIME -0.11 (0.55) -0.20 (-0.86) -0.31 (-0.65) -0.48 (-1.08) 
No. of obs. 127  127  138  138  
Adjusted R2 0.12  0.12  0.08  0.03  
F statistic 2.27  2.22  2.00  1.37  
Sig. level 0.01  0.01  0.03  0.19  
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Table 7.10 Comparisons of performance and ownership structure between family and non-family firms 
This table compares the long-run spinoff performance and equity ownership between family and non-family firms. 
Panel A reports the comparison for spinoff announcement effects. Panel B reports the comparison for long-run stock 
performance of post-spinoff parents. Panel C reports the comparison for long-run stock performance of offspring. Panel 
D reports the comparison for changes of equity ownership of a firm’s largest shareholders around the spinoff. For the 
difference in variables between sub-groups, t-statistic (mean) or Wilcoxon test z-statistic (median) is reported in 
parentheses in the columns of Group Difference (1-2). a, b, c indicates the significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Panel A: Spinoff announcement returns to pre-spinoff parents 
 Family firms (1) Non-family firms (2) Group difference (1 -2) 
3-day CARs 7.22 3.24 3.58 1.97 3.65c 1.27b 
No. of obs.  54  103 (1.93) (2.49) 
Panel B: Long-run performance of post-spinoff parents 
 Family firms (1) Non-family firms (2) Group difference (1 -2) 
3-year size/BEME BHARs -0.36 -0.27 0.20 0.02 -0.56a -0.20a 
No. of obs.  42  87 (-2.78) (-2.61) 
3-year ind/size BHARs -0.33 -0.36 0.26 0.14 -0.59a -0.50a 
No. of obs.  42  87 (-2.62) (-2.83) 
Panel C: Long-run performance of offspring 
 Family firms (1) Non-family firms (2) Group difference (1 -2) 
3-year size/BEME BHARs 0.01 -0.12 0.38 0.32 -0.37 -0.44b 
No. of obs.  46  96 (-1.26) (-2.49) 
3-year ind/size BHARs 0.05 0.00 0.27 0.24 -0.15 -0.23 
No. of obs.  46  96 (-0.50) (-1.25) 
Panel D: Equity ownership of a firm’s largest blockholder 
 Pre-spinoff (1) Post-spinoff (2) Group difference (1 -2) 
Family-controlled parents 28.46 25.05 27.53 21.82 0.93 3.23 
No. of obs.  54  54 (0.78) (0.23) 
Non-family-controlled parents 19.63 13.30 22.31 18.30 -2.68b -6.00a 
No. of obs.  97  97 (-2.37) (-2.69) 
Family-controlled offspring 28.46 25.05 24.96 20.50 2.07 4.50 
No. of obs.  54  54 (1.14) (0.17) 
Non-family controlled offspring 19.63 13.30 21.63 16.30 -1.53 -3.30 
No. of obs.  109  109 (-1.27) (-0.77) 
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Chapter 8 Information Asymmetry and Spinoff Value Effects  
 
8.1 Introduction 
Section 2.3.2 shows that there are mixed views about the informational benefits of a 
spinoff. Further, prior empirical studies have reported mixed evidence on the information 
asymmetry hypothesis. For example, Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) find that 
the information asymmetry proxies such as analyst forecast errors are improved following 
a spinoff, while Huson and MacKinnon (2003) observe that the information asymmetry 
level significantly increases subsequent to a spinoff based on the market microstructure 
data such as the bid-ask spread.  
 
The objective of this chapter is to re-examine the information asymmetry hypothesis with 
a sample of European spinoffs. The empirical investigation focuses on three main 
predictions of the information asymmetry hypothesis.  
 
The first prediction is that a spinoff is conducted to mitigate information asymmetry. This 
argument has two implications. Since a spinoff is involved with high transaction costs 
(Parrino, 1997), the spinoff decision will only be made when the spinoff benefits exceed 
the costs. Under the information asymmetry hypothesis, the spinoff decision will only be 
made when the information transparency benefits of a spinoff will be sufficiently large. 
Consequently, firms that choose to spin off a subsidiary should have more severe 
information asymmetry problems than firms that have similar operating characteristics 
but do not spin off a subsidiary. Thus, I provide the following hypothesis: 
H10: The level of information asymmetry of pre-spinoff parents is significantly higher 
than that of non-spinoff control firms. 
 
To test this hypothesis, I use four different proxies to measure the level of information 
asymmetry based on the analyst forecast data as well as the market microstructure data. 
The use of different information asymmetry proxies ensures the robustness of test results. 
The control firm for a spinoff parent is an industry- and size-matching firm that is not 
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involved in a spinoff. 
 
If the information asymmetry hypothesis holds, a spinoff should increase the information 
transparency level for post-spinoff parent. In other words, post-spinoff parents should 
have less severe information asymmetry problems than pre-spinoff parents. Thus the 
following hypothesis is proposed: 
H11: The level of information asymmetry of post-spinoff parents is significantly lower 
than that of pre-spinoff parents.  
 
The second prediction of the information asymmetry hypothesis is that spinoff value 
gains stem from the reduction of information asymmetry problem for spinoff parents 
following spinoffs. Hence, the third information-based hypothesis is given as follows: 
H12: The spinoff value effects are positively associated with the level of information 
asymmetry of pre-spinoff parents.  
 
To test H12, I first regress the short run market reaction to spinoff announcements on the 
information asymmetry proxies. As the extant literature suggests that market may initially 
underreact to corporate news (e.g. Daniel et al., 2002), I then examine whether the 
mitigation of information asymmetry can explain the long-run performance of post-
spinoff firms. Specifically, I test whether the level of information asymmetry for pre-
spinoff parents is related to the long-run spinoff performance and whether the change of 
information asymmetry around a spinoff is related to the long-run spinoff performance.  
 
The third prediction of the information asymmetry hypothesis is that the source of 
information problems stem from the organisational complexity of the spinoff firm. Nanda 
and Narayanan (1999) contend that diversified firms tend to have market undervaluation 
problems because investors only observe their aggregated cash flows rather than 
divisional cash flows. Gilson et al. (2001) propose that diversified firms have severe 
information asymmetry problems because analysts have difficulty in understanding 
different businesses and spinoffs have informational benefits because focused post-
spinoff firms attract financial analysts. The fourth information-based hypothesis is hence 
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offered below: 
H13: The level of information asymmetry of post-spinoff parent firms is significantly 
lower than that of pre-spinoff parent firms when a spinoff reduces the organisational 
complexity of pre-spinoff parents.  
 
To test H13, I identify two sub-samples of spinoff parents that are likely to have 
significant informational benefits from spinoffs. The first sub-sample of firms is spinoff 
parents that reduce the number of business segments following spinoffs. The second sub-
sample of firms includes firms that spin off lowly related subsidiaries. The rationale for 
this examination is that a firm is more complex and more difficult for outsiders to value is 
the divisions are unrelated. After obtaining these two sub-samples, I examine the changes 
in information asymmetry proxies around a spinoff for these two sub-sample parents. 
 
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 8.2 describes the test methods for the 
information asymmetry hypothesis, including the variable construction and empirical 
models. Section 8.3 examines whether spinoff parents suffer from information asymmetry 
problems. Section 8.4 investigates the relationship between the information problems of 
spinoff parents and the spinoff value gains. Section 8.5 explores the informational 
benefits of spinoffs by analysing sub-samples of spinoff parents that are likely to suffer 
severe information asymmetry problems. Section 8.6 provides results of robustness 
checks. Section 8.7 concludes this chapter. 
  
8.2 Test Methodology 
This section sets out the variable construction and empirical methodology to test the three 
main predictions of the information asymmetry hypothesis.  
 
8.2.1 Information Asymmetry Proxies 
There are alternative measures of information asymmetry proxies. Similar to 
Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) and Veld and Veld-Merkoulova (2004), I 
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calculate two measures of information asymmetry based on the analyst forecast data, i.e. 
the mean earnings forecast error39 and the standard deviation of all analysts’ forecast 
errors. Following Huson and MacKinnon (2003), I use two further different measures of 
information asymmetry based on the market microstructure data, the stock’s residual 
standard deviation and its bid-ask spread. The definitions for these four different 
information asymmetry proxies are given in Table 8.1. 
 
[Insert Table 8.1 about here, see page 207] 
 
The first measure of information asymmetry, forecast error, is based on the analyst’s 
earnings forecasts data provided by the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (IBES). 
The IBES reports a monthly mean, median, and standard deviation of the forecasts for 
each firm based on analysts’ estimates that are submitted in that month. For each spinoff 
parent, I collect the mean earnings forecast for the current fiscal year made in the last 
month of the fiscal year prior to spinoff announcement. Then the information asymmetry 
level is defined as the ratio of the absolute difference between the mean forecast earnings 
and actual earnings per share to the price per share at the beginning of the last month of 
the fiscal year prior to spinoff announcement. Formally, forecast error, ERROR, is 
calculated as follows: 
PEPSAnEPSFERROR
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                                                       (8.1) 
where _ iF EPS  is the mean forecasted earnings per share by analyst i  in the last month 
of the fiscal year, n  is the total number of analysts following the spinoff parent, _ iA EPS  
is the actual earnings per share for the forecasted fiscal year, and P  is the share price at 
the beginning of the last month of the fiscal year. Firms with higher levels of information 
asymmetry between the managers and outsiders about their cash flows and value are 
expected to have larger earnings forecast errors. 
 
I focus on earnings forecast data for the last month of the fiscal year because Elton, 
                                                 
39 Results with the median earnings forecast error remain qualitatively similar.  
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Gruber and Gultekin (1984) find that the forecast error of the last month is appropriate for 
measuring information asymmetry around a firm. Their evidence shows that nearly 84% 
of the forecast error in the final month can be attributed to misestimating firm-specific 
factors rather than to misestimation of economy-wide or industry-specific factors. Best, 
Hodges and Lin (2004) and Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) use the same proxy 
to measure a firm’s information asymmetry level. 
 
The second measure of information asymmetry, forecast dispersion (DISP), is computed 
as the standard deviation of all analysts’ earnings forecasts for the current year made in 
the last month of the fiscal year preceding the spin-off announcement. This represents the 
dispersion among analysts about a consensus of the earnings forecast. Similar to Veld and 
Veld-Merkoulova (2004), I normalise this standard deviation by dividing it by the stock 
price of the firm at the beginning of the month in which the standard deviation of 
forecasts is measured.  Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) contend that this measure 
indicates a lack of information about the firm for the analysts. Specifically, the standard 
deviation of all analysts’ forecasts, DISP, is computed as follows: 
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where _ iF EPS  is the forecasted earnings per share by analyst i  in the last month of the 
fiscal year, n  is the total number of analysts following the spinoff parent, EPSF _  is the 
average of all analysts’ forecasted earnings per share in the last month of the fiscal year, 
and P  is the share price at the beginning of the last month of the fiscal year.  
 
The third measure of information asymmetry, residual standard deviation, is measured as 
the residual standard deviation of the market-adjusted daily stock returns on an annual 
basis. Specifically, the residual standard deviation, RESD, is computed as follows: 
∑
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Where tε  is the difference actual stock return tr  and expected stock return on day t , the 
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expected return is measured with a market model,  t mt tr rα β ε= + + , for a 250-day 
trading period, mtr  is the return on the local market index (this chapter uses the total 
market return index for local country given in Datastream), and α  and β  are parameters 
of the estimated market model. As discussed in Chapter 3, if the stock market is efficient, 
the stock price should reflect all publicly available information and the market model 
should perfectly explain the stock returns.40  
 
Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) argue that the residual standard deviation 
captures the extent of information asymmetry of a stock. Information asymmetry about a 
firm is high when managers have a relatively large amount of value-relevant, firm-
specific information that is not publicly known to the market. Investors have to bear some 
firm-specific uncertainty until this information is disclosed to the market. Assuming the 
investors and the managers are equally well-informed about the economy-wide factors 
influencing the firm’s values, the residual volatility in the firm’s stock returns can capture 
the information asymmetry between the investors and the managers about the firm-
specific information.  
  
The fourth measure of information asymmetry is the bid-ask spread, BIDASK, which is 
measured as the average of daily bid-ask spread during a 60-day trading period. The 
selection of 60-day window follows Huson and MacKinnon (2003). The daily bid-ask 
spread is defined as the difference between ask price and bid price divided by the 
midpoint price of that day, where the midpoint price is calculated as the average of the 
bid and ask price. Specifically, the bid-ask spread is calculated as follows: 
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where tPA  is the ask price on day t  and tPB  is the bid price on day t . The bid-ask 
spread reflects the information asymmetry between market makers and informed traders 
and is used to protect the market maker (e.g. see Kim and Verrecchia, 1994; Gregoriou, 
Ioannidis, and Skerratt, 2005).  
                                                 
40 This argument implicitly assumes that the market model used is a well-specified asset pricing model. 
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For pre-spinoff parents and non-spinoff control firms, I measure ERROR and DISP based 
on the earnings forecast data for a firm in the last month of the fiscal year prior to the 
spinoff announcement date. RESD is gauged based on the stock data of the 250-day 
trading period before the spinoff announcement date while BIDASK is calculated based 
on the trading data of the 60-day trading period preceding the spinoff announcement date.  
 
For post-spinoff parents, I measure ERROR and DISP based on the earnings forecast date 
for a firm in the last month the first fiscal year subsequent to the spinoff completion date. 
RESD is computed based on the stock data of the 250-day trading period following the 
spinoff completion date. When a post-spinoff firm has less than 250 trading days 
following the spinoff, I use the stock data of available trading days to estimate the market 
model.41 BIDASK is calculated based on the trading data of the 60-day trading period 
following the spinoff completion date.  
 
As argued in Habib et al. (1997), the improved information transparency following a 
spinoff should be positively associated with the spinoff value creation. To investigate this 
possibility, I also compute the changes in information asymmetry proxies around a 
spinoff, which are actually the value difference in information asymmetry proxy between 
post-spinoff parent and pre-spinoff parent. Specifically, ∆ERROR measures the 
difference in ERROR between post-spinoff parents and pre-spinoff parents; ∆DISP 
measures the difference in DISP between post-spinoff parents and pre-spinoff parents; 
∆RESD measures the difference in RESD between post-spinoff parents and pre-spinoff 
parents; and ∆BIDASK measures the difference in BIDASK between post-spinoff parents 
and pre-spinoff parents. The definitions for these variables are provided in Table 8.1. 
 
                                                 
41 In order to avoid an inaccurate estimation of residual standard deviation, I require that a post-spinoff firm 
must have at least 100 trading days of stock data in order to estimate the market model. This data 
requirement results in the loss of one sample firm that was acquired within the two-month period 
subsequent to the spinoff completion.  
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8.2.2 Tests for Information Asymmetry Problems of Spinoff Firms 
Hypothesis H10 states that a spinoff is conducted to mitigate the information asymmetry 
problems. If this argument holds, the information asymmetry problem for a spinoff parent 
firm should be more serious than that for a non-spinoff control firm prior to the spinoff 
announcement date. I select an industry- and size-matching firm as a control firm for a 
spinoff parent. The selection procedure is the same as that used in section 7.2.2. After 
control firms are selected, I measure the information asymmetry proxies for both pre-
spinoff parents and non-spinoff control firms. I then compare the information asymmetry 
proxies between pre-spinoff parents and non-spinoff control firms. Again, the information 
asymmetry proxies for pre-spinoff parents should be significantly higher than those for 
non-spinoff control firms according to the information asymmetry hypothesis. 
 
In addition, H11 proposes that the information asymmetry problem for a spinoff parent 
firm should be less severe following a spinoff. I compute the information asymmetry 
proxies for post-spinoff parents and then compare the difference in information 
asymmetry proxies between pre-spinoff and post-spinoff parents. The information 
asymmetry proxies for pre-spinoff parents should be significantly higher than those for 
post-spinoff parents under H11. 
 
8.2.3 Tests for Spinoff Gains from Transparency Improvements 
Hypothesis H12 argues that (partial) spinoff value gains result from the reduction of 
information asymmetry through a spinoff (see section 2.3.2). I examine H12 by analysing 
three regression models to explain the spinoff value gains based on the information-based 
hypothesis.  
 
The first empirical model predicts that the level of information asymmetry for pre-spinoff 
parents is positively related to the short run market reaction to spinoff announcements. 
The dependent variable is the CARs to parents over the three-day (-1, +1) announcement 
window as described in section 5.3. Control proxies are FOCUS, GROWTH, ROA, 
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RELSIZ, ANTIDIR and HOTTIME, as defined in section 6.5. Formally, the testing 
model is given below: 
CARs= f(Information Asymmetry Proxy,Control Proxies)                                             (8.5) 
 
The second empirical model is similar to the first model except for the dependent variable. 
Extant literature has shown that initial market reaction to corporate news may be 
incomplete or biased (e.g. see Shleifer, 2000). I use the three-year buy-and-hold abnormal 
stock returns (BHARs) to post-spinoff parent/subsidiary combined firms as long-run 
market reaction to spinoff announcement. The three-year window period should be 
sufficient to allow for the complete market reaction to spinoff news. The three-year 
abnormal stock returns are measured against the returns to size- and book-to-market-
adjusted control portfolios. The computation procedure is introduced in section 5.4. 
Control proxies are FOCUS, GROWTH, ROA, RELSIZ, ANTIDIR and HOTTIME, as 
defined in section 6.5. Formally, the second model is given below: 
BHARs= f(Information Asymmetry Proxy,Control Proxies)                                          (8.6) 
 
The third model is test whether the changes in information asymmetry proxies around 
spinoffs are related to spinoff value gains. This prediction is proposed in Habib et al. 
(1997). Similar to the second model, the spinoff value gains are measured as the three-
year size- and book-to-market-adjusted BHARs to post-spinoff parent/subsidiary 
combined firms. The long-run return measurement procedure is introduced in section 
5.4.1. I do not consider calendar-time based portfolio approaches to measure the value 
impact of information asymmetry variables because of the small sample size. The 
measurement of changes in information asymmetry proxies is described in section 6.2.1. 
Control proxies are FOCUS, GROWTH, ROA, RELSIZ, ANTIDIR and HOTTIME, as 
defined in Section 6.5. Formally, the third model is offered below: 
BHARs= f(Changein Information Asymmetry Proxy,Control Proxies)                         (8.7) 
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8.2.4 Further Tests for Information Asymmetry Problems 
Because not all spinoffs are undertaken to mitigate the information asymmetry problem, a 
cross-sectional analysis of information problems for all spinoff firms may yield biased 
results against the information asymmetry hypothesis. Therefore, I conduct further 
analyses for sub-sample spinoff parents that are likely to have informational benefits 
from spinoffs. 
  
A spinoff can create informational benefits through two different but non-exclusive 
approaches. On the one hand, a spinoff creates informational benefits by attracting new 
analysts to more focused post-spinoff firms (Gilson et al., 2001; Krishnaswami and 
Subramaniam, 1999). Gilson et al. find that the increase of analyst following after 
spinoffs is because post-spinoff firms become more focused and attract more analysts 
with industry-specific expertise. On the other hand, a spinoff creates informational 
benefits by separating different business segments and allowing investors to value those 
segments more accurately (Habib et al.,1997; Nanda and Narayanan, 1999). Therefore, 
the information asymmetry hypothesis predicts that the informational benefits for a 
spinoff will be higher when the pre-spinoff firm has a more complex organisational 
structure than when the pre-spinoff firm has a less complex organisational structure.  
 
I test this prediction by examining the information problems for a sub-sample of parents 
with a complex organisational structure prior to spinoff announcements. I use two 
approaches to identify pre-spinoff parents with a complex organisational structure. The 
first approach identifies firms with a complex organisational structure as those reducing 
the number of business segments following spinoffs. The assumption for this approach is 
that a firm will reduce the operational scale when it is beyond the optimal level. Thus, a 
firm only makes the decision to reduce segment number by a spinoff when the firm feels 
that it has a complex and suboptimal organisational structure. The second approach 
identifies firms with a complex organisational structure as those separating divisions with 
a low stock return correlation. The rationale of this approach is that firms with a complex 
organisational structure are often those with unrelated businesses. I measure the 
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relatedness between parent and offspring as the correlation between daily stock returns of 
parent and offspring in the first year subsequent to the spinoff completion. I then define 
those firms with a correlation in stock returns between parent and offspring lower than 
the median correlations in stock returns between parents and offspring for the whole 
sample.  
 
I do not use the focusing status of a spinoff to identify a sub-sample of pre-spinoff parents 
with a complex organisational structure for two reasons. First, although parent and 
offspring may do not share the same two-digit SIC industry code, their business may be 
highly correlated or complementary. Gertner, Powers and Scharfstein (2002) find that the 
SIC classification is sometimes inaccurate in identifying focus-increasing spinoffs. For 
instance, the spinoff of Diamond Shamrock by Maxus Energy can be defined as a focus-
increasing spinoff since these two companies are in different two-digit SIC industries. 
However, these companies are actually in related businesses: Maxus Energy is in 
petroleum exploration (SIC 1311), while Diamond Shamrock is in petroleum refining and 
marketing (SIC 2911). Second, the majority (74%) of my sample firms are conducting 
focus-increasing spinoffs. Therefore, the small size of non-focusing spinoffs renders 
statistical inferences from testing less meaningful. 
 
For these two groups of spinoff parents, I examine whether pre-spinoff parents have 
higher level of information asymmetry proxies than non-spinoff control firms. I further 
investigate whether post-spinoff parents have lower level of information asymmetry 
proxies than non-spinoff control firms.  
 
8.3 Information Asymmetry Problems for All Sample Spinoff Firms  
Table 8.2 reports the comparative statistics of information asymmetry proxies for pre-
spinoff parents and non-spinoff control firms for testing H10. This table shows the 
business segment number (SEGNO) and analyst coverage (ACOV) for pre-spinoff 
parents and non-spinoff control firms since these two variables are also related to the 
information asymmetry problems of a firm (Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 1999). The 
definitions for these two variables are given in section 7.2.  
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[Insert Table 8.2 about here, see page 208] 
 
There is weak evidence that spinoff parents have severe information asymmetry problems 
prior to spinoff announcements.  ERROR for pre-spinoff parents has a mean of 0.06 
while that for non-spinoff control firms has an average of 0.03. The mean difference in 
0.03 is significant at the 10% level (t-statistic = 1.84). However, the median difference in 
ERROR between pre-spinoff parents and non-spinoff control firms is 0.002, which is not 
significant at conventional levels (z-statistic = 1.12). The mean (median) difference in 
DISP between pre-spinoff parents and non-spinoff control firms is 0.007 (0.002). The 
mean difference is insignificant (t-statistic = 1.16) while the median difference is 
significant at the 5% level (z-statistic = 2.12). 
 
In contrast, there is no evidence that pre-spinoff parents suffer information problems 
relative to control firms when RESD and BIDASK are used. The mean (median) 
difference in RESD between pre-spinoff parents and non-spinoff control firms is 
insignificant at the 10% level. Similarly, there is an insignificant difference in BIDASK 
between pre-spinoff parents and non-spinoff control firms.  
 
I then turn to the firm characteristics that may be related to information problems. Pre-
spinoff parents have a more complex organisational structure than non-spinoff control 
firms. The mean (median) SEGNO for pre-spinoff parents is 3.77 (4.00) while the mean 
(median) number of segments for non-spinoff control firms is only 3.37 (3.00). Both the 
mean difference and median difference are significant at the 5% level (t-statistic = 2.13 
and z-statistic = 2.34). The difference in operational complexity between pre-spinoff 
parents and non-spinoff control firms may explain the difference in the first two 
information asymmetry proxies between these two groups of firms. However, the ACOV 
between these two groups of firms is comparable. Moreover, the median difference in 
ACOV between pre-spinoff parents and non-spinoff control firms is 2.00, which is 
significant at the 10% level (z-statistic = 1.79). Therefore, the argument of Gilson et al. 
(2001) that diversified firms attract fewer analysts than focused firms because of 
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organisational complexity does not apply to my spinoff sample.  
 
Taken together, there is no strong evidence that pre-spinoff parents have more severe 
information asymmetry problems than non-spinoff control firms. This finding is 
contradictory to the evidence documented in Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) that 
their spinoff sample firms suffer significant information problems. They show that both 
the mean and median difference in information asymmetry proxies between their spinoff 
sample firms and non-spinoff control firms are significant at the 5% or even at the 1% 
level.  
 
I then examine whether spinoff parents have an improvement in the information 
asymmetry proxies following spinoffs as predicted by H11. Table 8.3 report the 
comparative statistics of information asymmetry proxies between pre-spinoff parents and 
post-spinoff parents. The statistics for SEGNO and ACOV are also reported in Table 8.3. 
 
[Insert Table 8.3 about here, see page 209] 
 
Results in Table 8.3 indicate that information asymmetry problems of spinoff parents 
become even worse following spinoffs. The mean difference in ERROR between pre-
spinoff parents and post-spinoff parents is 0.02, which is insignificant at the 10% level (t-
statistic = 0.84). However, the median difference in ERROR between pre-spinoff parents 
and post-spinoff parents is -0.004, which is significant at the 5% level (z-statistic = -2.09). 
Both the mean and median difference in DISP between pre-spinoff parents and post-
spinoff parents are negative. In addition, the median difference (-0.003) is also significant 
at the 5% level (z-statistic = -2.32).  
 
The information asymmetry proxies based on stock trading data report consistent results. 
Both the mean difference (-0.003) and median difference (-0.002) of RESD between pre-
spinoff parents and post-spinoff parents are significant at the 5% level (t-statistic = -3.24 
and z-statistic = -3.39). BIDASK for post-spinoff parents are generally larger than those 
for pre-spinoff parents. The mean difference of -0.007 is significant at the 5% level (t-
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statistic = -2.09) although the median difference of -0.001 is insignificant at conventional 
significance levels (z-statistic = -1.07) 
 
The examination of operating characteristics between post-spinoff parents and pre-spinoff 
parents reveals that a spinoff reduces the organisational complexity as SEGNO 
significantly reduces following spinoffs (both the mean difference and median difference 
are significant at the 1% level). However, ACOV for spinoff parents does not increase 
subsequent to spinoffs. Actually, the mean and median number of analysts following 
spinoff parents slightly decrease subsequent to spinoffs (the mean difference is 0.55 while 
the median difference is 2.00).  
 
I further run a logit regression to analyse whether the information asymmetry problems 
affect the spinoff decision. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals one 
when a firm is spinoff parent and equals zero when a firm is non-spinoff control firm. The 
information asymmetry variables used include ERROR, DISP, RESD and BIDASK. 
There are three control variables in the logit regression. The first control variable is the 
number of business segments (SEGNO), which captures a firm’s organisational 
complexity. The second control variable is MTBV of assets ration, which measures a 
firm’s growth potential. The third control variable is cash-flow return on assets, which 
estimates a firm’s liquidity constraints. These control variables have been used in the 
logit regression for the spinoff decision in section 7.3. Regression results are reported in 
Table 8.4. As shown in Table 8.4, none of information asymmetry proxies is significant at 
the conventional levels. Further, the explanatory powers of logit regression models are 
very low, ranging from 0.01 to 0.05.  
 
[Insert Table 8.4 about here, see page 210] 
 
Thus, my results show that a spinoff does not resolve the information asymmetry problem. 
Moreover, there is evidence that information asymmetry problems for post-spinoff 
parents are even worse than those for pre-spinoff parents. My results are contradictory to 
the findings of Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999), who observe that the 
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information asymmetry proxies for post-spinoff parents are generally lower than those for 
pre-spinoff parents.  
 
There may be two different explanations for the different results on the information 
asymmetry hypothesis. On the one hand, the information asymmetry hypothesis does not 
explain the spinoff rationale. The previous findings supporting the information 
asymmetry hypothesis are then a product of chance. On the other hand, the information 
asymmetry hypothesis is only applicable for a sub-sample of firms suffering severe 
information asymmetry problems. Cross-sectional analysis for all types of spinoffs may 
fail to find evidence supporting the information asymmetry hypothesis. The significant 
results for the information asymmetry hypothesis documented in Krishnaswami and 
Subramaniam (1999) may indicate that their sample firms generally suffer information 
problems. In contrast, most of my spinoff samples are not motivated to mitigate 
information problems. I address this issue in section 8.5 by analysing sub-samples of 
spinoff parents that are likely to suffer very serious information asymmetry problems and 
have significant informational benefits from spinoffs. 
 
8.4 Spinoff Value Gains and Information Asymmetry Problems 
Table 8.5 reports the regression results for the model to explain the short-run market 
reaction to spinoff announcements. The short-run market reaction to spinoff 
announcements is measured as the three-day CARs to spinoff parents based on the market 
model, which are introduced in section 5.3. The regression model tested is the equation 
(8.5). 
 
[Insert Table 8.5 about here, see page 211] 
 
As shown in Table 8.5, coefficients for different information asymmetry proxies have 
expected positive signs but are insignificant in all regressions. Control proxies such as 
FOCUS and RELSIZ are highly significant in all regressions. Therefore, information 
asymmetry proxies do not have a significant power in explaining the spinoff 
announcement gains relative to corporate focus and relative size variables.  
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As indicated in section 3.3, stock markets may underreact to corporate news. Therefore, 
the informational benefits of spinoffs may not be fully reflected in the short-run market 
reaction to spinoffs but should be incorporated in the long-run market reaction to spinoffs.  
 
To examine this possibility, I conduct further regressions including information 
asymmetry proxies to explain the long-run stock performance of post-spinoff firms. At 
first, I analyse the relationship between the level of information asymmetry for pre-
spinoff parent firm and the long-run spinoff performance with the following regression 
model. The regression model tested is Equation (8.6). 
 
Table 8.6 gives the regression results for the above model. In general, the regression 
models are not significant at conventional levels, suggesting that initial market reaction to 
the explanatory factors is generally efficient. However, the information asymmetry 
proxies have a negative sign in the regressions and are significant at the 5% level for 
three out of four regressions. This finding suggests that the higher the information 
asymmetry problem for a pre-spinoff parent firm, the lower the long-run abnormal stock 
returns to post-spinoff parent/subsidiary combined firms. This evidence is contradictory 
to the prediction of the information asymmetry hypothesis. However, it is consistent with 
the results in Table 8.5 that the information asymmetry problems for pre-spinoff parents 
generally become worse following spinoffs.  
 
[Insert Table 8.6 about here, see page 212] 
 
Then I analyse the relationship between the change of information asymmetry level for 
spinoff parents around spinoffs and the long-run spinoff performance with the following 
regression model. The regression model tested is Equation (8.7). 
 
Regression results for the above model are presented in Table 8.7. Similar to regressions 
in Table 8.6, regressions in Table 8.7 are not significant at conventional levels. Changes 
in information asymmetry proxies sometimes have a positive sign in the regressions, 
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which is also contradictory to the prediction of information asymmetry hypothesis. 
However, none of the changes in information asymmetry proxies is significant in the 
regressions. I conclude that spinoff value gains do not stem from the resolution of 
information asymmetry problems following spinoffs.  
 
[Insert Table 8.7 about here, see page 213] 
 
8.5 Information Asymmetry Problems for Sub-sample Spinoff Firms 
Since not all spinoffs are conducted to mitigate the information asymmetry problems, the 
information asymmetry hypothesis may only be applicable to firms that suffer serious 
information asymmetry problems before spinoffs and will have significant informational 
benefits from spinoffs. I examine this possibility by analysing sub-samples of spinoff 
parents that are likely to suffer severe information asymmetry problems.  
 
As discussed in section 8.2.4, I identify two groups of spinoff parents that are likely to 
have significant informational benefits from spinoffs. The first group is spinoff parents 
that reduce the business segment number following spinoffs. The second group is spinoff 
parents that divest a lowly related subsidiary through a spinoff. A spinoff of the lowly 
related subsidiary is defined as the spinoff transaction where the correlation between 
parent’s one-year stock returns and offspring’s one-year stock returns is lower than the 
median correlation value for the whole sample. Table 8.8 presents the comparative 
statistics of information asymmetry proxies for these two groups of pre-spinoff parents 
and their control firms. Panel A reports the comparative statistics for the spinoff parents 
that reduce the business segment subsequent to the spinoff completion dates. There is 
some evidence that those pre-spinoff parents have severe information asymmetry 
problems relative to their control firms. The mean (median) difference in ERROR 
between pre-spinoff parents and non-spinoff control firms is 0.09 (0.003), which is 
significant at the 5% (1%) level. The median difference in DISP between pre-spinoff 
parents and non-spinoff control firms is 0.004, which is also significant at the 5% level 
(z-statistic = 2.48). However, the mean difference in DISP between pre-spinoff parents 
and non-spinoff control firms is insignificant at the 10% level (t-statistic = 1.02). Either 
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the mean or the median difference in RESD between pre-spinoff parents and non-spinoff 
control firms is insignificant at the 10% level. The same finding exists for BIDASK. The 
analyst coverage of control firms is significantly less than that of pre-spinoff parents, 
where the mean difference of 2.76 is significant at the 10% level and the median 
difference of 4.00 is significant at the 5% level.  
 
[Insert Table 8.8 about here, see page 214] 
 
In Panel B of Table 8.8, the comparative statistics of information asymmetry proxies are 
reported for the sub-sample of spinoff parents that divest a lowly related division through 
a spinoff. In general, the values of information asymmetry proxies for pre-spinoff parents 
are insignificantly different from those for non-spinoff control firms. The only exception 
is that the pre-spinoff parents have slightly higher ERROR than control firms since the 
mean difference in ERROR between parents and control firms is significant at the 10% 
level. Thus, there is no evidence that such spinoff parents have more severe information 
asymmetry problems than control firms. For a sample of spinoff parents that are likely to 
have significant informational benefits from spinoffs, I cannot find evidence that such 
firms have severe information problems prior to spinoffs.  
   
I then examine whether these spinoff parents with significant expected informational 
benefits can improve their information transparency through spinoffs. Test results are 
reported in Table 8.9. Based on Panel A of Table 8.9, I find no evidence that spinoff 
parents reducing business segment numbers following spinoffs have an improvement in 
their information asymmetry proxies. There is no significant change for ERROR or DISP 
around the spinoff. However, RESD significantly increases for this sub-sample of spinoff 
parents following spinoffs. The mean (median) difference in RESD is -0.003 (-0.002), 
which is significant at the 1% level (the 1% level). The BIDASK for post-spinoff parents 
are generally larger than those for pre-spinoff parents although the difference is not 
significant at conventional levels. The number of analysts following post-spinoff parents 
is much fewer than that of analysts following pre-spinoff parents since the mean and 
median differences are highly significant at the 1% level.  
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[Insert Table 8.9 about here, see page 215] 
 
Panel B of Table 8.9 presents the comparative statistics of information asymmetry proxies 
for the sub-sample of spinoff parents that divest a lowly related subsidiary through a 
spinoff. There is consistent evidence that post-spinoff firms have more severe information 
asymmetry problems than pre-spinoff parents since the median differences in ERROR, 
DISP and RESD are all negative and significant at the 10% level. In addition, the number 
of analysts following post-spinoff parents is significantly fewer than that of analysts 
following pre-spinoff parents.  
 
To sum up, for sub-samples of spinoff parents that are likely to have significant 
informational benefits from spinoffs, I do not find evidence that those firms suffer severe 
information problems prior to spinoffs and that information transparency for those firms 
will improve following spinoffs. Therefore, my results suggest that the information 
asymmetry hypothesis does not explain the value effects of European spinoffs. 
 
8.6 Robustness Checks 
This section examines whether my results are sensitive to the stock return measurement 
methodology used. I first check whether the information asymmetry proxies for pre-
spinoff parents can explain the spinoff announcement period abnormal returns based on 
alternative computation methods. I use the world market model introduced in section 5.3 
to calculate the announcement abnormal returns. Then I regress the three-day 
announcement period abnormal returns on the information asymmetry proxies. The 
regression results are reported in Table 8.10. The computation procedure for abnormal 
announcement returns with the world market model is given in section 5.3. As shown in 
Table 8.10, there is some evidence that spinoff parents with a higher level of information 
asymmetry earn higher announcement period abnormal returns. The coefficient for DISP 
in model 2 is 16.49 and significant at the 10% level (t-statistic = 1.82). Similarly, the 
coefficient for RESD in model 3 is positive and statistically significant at the 10% level 
(t-statistic = 1.66). However, the other two information asymmetry proxies do not have 
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significant explanatory power for spinoff announcement abnormal returns. Neither of the 
coefficients of these two proxies is significant at conventional levels. 
 
[Insert Table 8.10 about here, see page 216] 
 
Then I examine whether the level of information asymmetry for pre-spinoff parents can 
explain the variation of long-run spinoff performance with different benchmarks. I use 
the industry- and size-adjusted BHARs to post-spinoff parent/offspring combined firms 
as the long-run spinoff performance. The computation procedure for the abnormal returns 
to pro-forma combined firms is introduced in section 5.4.1. I then regress the long-run 
spinoff performance on the information asymmetry proxies for pre-spinoff parents. The 
regression results are reported in Table 8.11. The results in Table 8.11 do not support the 
information asymmetry hypothesis. Information asymmetry proxies have a negative 
coefficient in the regression models, which is contradictory to the prediction of H12. 
Furthermore, none of these models is significant at conventional levels and the adjusted 
R-squared are generally very small, ranging from -0.02 to 0.02. 
 
[Insert Table 8.11 about here, see page 217] 
 
Table 8.12 reports the regression of industry- and size-adjusted BHARs to 
parent/offspring portfolio on the changes in information asymmetry proxies. Again, there 
is no evidence that a decrease in information asymmetry proxies is positively related to 
the gains to spinoffs. Among four information asymmetry proxies, only ∆ERROR has a 
positive and significant coefficient in the regression. However, model 1 testing the value 
impact of ∆ERROR has very low R-squared. For other three information asymmetry 
proxies, the coefficients are insignificant at conventional levels. Therefore, the results 
suggest that the changes in information asymmetry proxies are not related to the long-run 
spinoff performance.  
 
[Insert Table 8.12 about here, see page 218] 
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8.7 Summary 
This chapter examines the information asymmetry hypothesis for spinoff value gains. 
There are contradictory views on the informational benefits of a spinoff. On the one hand, 
a spinoff is argued to have significant informational benefits by providing expanded 
financial disclosure for separately listed post-spinoff firms and by attracting financial 
analysts to more focused post-spinoff firms.  
 
On the other hand, a spinoff is argued to have insignificant informational benefits for two 
reasons. First, forecasts for a diversified firm can be more accurate than those for a 
focused firm since forecast errors investors making for different divisions of a diversified 
firm can be offsetting. Second, post-spinoff firms may have worse information 
asymmetry problems because the liquidity of post-spinoff firms is reduced.  Third, 
informed traders tend to trade stocks of post-spinoff firms by utilising their segment-
specific information advantage and this will exacerbate the information asymmetry 
problems between informed traders and uninformed liquidity traders.  
 
Therefore, my empirical analysis of a sample of European spinoffs provides no evidence 
on the information asymmetry hypothesis. First, spinoff parents do not seem to suffer 
information problems before spinoff announcements. Second, spinoff parents do not 
appear to have informational benefits from spinoffs. A further analysis of sub-sample 
firms that are likely to have significant informational benefits from spinoffs presents no 
evidence supporting the information asymmetry hypothesis.  
 
However, my evidence may lend support to the argument of Goldman (2005) that a 
spinoff may exacerbate the information asymmetry problems by reducing the liquidity of 
post-spinoff firms. Under the view of Goldman, the market’s incentives to collect 
information are positively associated with the liquidity of a stock. Since a firm with 
different businesses poses less information asymmetry problems for liquidity traders, the 
liquidity of a multi-segment firm is generally higher than that of a single-segment firm 
(Hadlock, Ryngaert, and Thomas, 2001). Thus, my results show that post-spinoff parent’s 
analyst following reduces when a parent spins off an unrelated division and reduces its 
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liquidity. 
 
Therefore, my findings in this chapter suggest that shareholders and managers should 
carefully consider the value benefits of a spinoff if the spinoff decision is made to 
increase the information transparency. The informational benefits of a spinoff may not 
necessarily be realised since the stock liquidity benefits may be foregone following a 
spinoff. 
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Table 8.1 Definitions for explanatory variables 
Variables Definition 
ERROR The ratio of the absolute difference between the mean forecast earnings for the current year and 
actual earnings per share to the stock price at the beginning of the last month of the fiscal year. 
For pre-spinoff parents and non-spinoff control firms, it is measured in the last month of the fiscal 
year preceding the spinoff announcement date. For post-spinoff parents, it is measured in the last 
month of the fiscal year immediately following the spinoff completion date. 
DISP 
 
The standard deviation of all analysts’ earnings forecasts for the current year made in the last 
month of the fiscal year divided by the stock price at the beginning of that month. For pre-spinoff 
parents and non-spinoff control firms, it is measured in the last month of the fiscal year preceding
the spinoff announcement date. For post-spinoff parents, it is measured in the last month of the 
fiscal year immediately following the spinoff completion date. 
RESD The dispersion in the market-adjusted daily stock returns to a firm in a year. For pre-spinoff
parents and non-spinoff control firms, it is measured over the 250-day trading period prior to the 
spinoff announcement date. For post-spinoff parents, it is measured over the 250-day trading 
period following the spinoff completion date. 
BIDASK The difference between ask price and bid price divided by the mid point. For pre-spinoff parents 
and non-spinoff control firms, BIDASK is measured as the average daily bid-ask spreads over the 
60-day trading period prior to the spinoff announcement date. For post-spinoff parents, BIDASK is 
measured as the average daily bid-ask spreads over the 60-day trading period following the spinoff 
announcement date. 
Δ ERROR The difference in ERROR between post-spinoff parents and pre-spinoff parents. 
ΔDISP The difference in DISP between post-spinoff parents and pre-spinoff parents. 
Δ RESD  The difference in RESD between post-spinoff parents and pre-spinoff parents. 
Δ BIDASK The difference in BIDASK between post-spinoff parents and pre-spinoff parents. 
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Table 8.2 Information asymmetry proxies of pre-spinoff parents and non-spinoff control firms 
This table reports summary descriptive statistics of information asymmetry proxies and characteristics for pre-
spinoff parent and non-spinoff control firms. ERROR is the ratio of the absolute difference between the mean 
forecast earnings for the current year and actual earnings per share to the stock price at the beginning of the last 
month of the fiscal year. DISP is the standard deviation of all analysts’ earnings forecasts for the current year made 
in the last month of the fiscal year divided by the stock price at the beginning of that month. RESD is the 
dispersion in the market-adjusted daily stock returns to a firm in a year. BIDASK is the difference between ask 
price and bid price divided by the mid point. SEGNO is the number of business segments. ACOV is the number of 
following analysts over the one-year period prior to the spinoff announcement for pre-spinoff parents and over the 
one-year period subsequent to the spinoff completion for post-spinoff firms. In parentheses is the t-statistic (mean) 
or Wilcoxon test z-statistic (median) for the difference in variables between pre-spinoff parents and non-spinoff 
control firms. b, c indicates the significance at the 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
 Spinoff firm (1) Control firm (2) Group difference (1 -2) 
Variable Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
ERROR 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.03c 0.00 
No. of obs. 136 139 (1.84) (1.12) 
DISP 0.02 0.005 0.01 0.003 0.01 0.002b 
No. of obs. 123 125 (1.16) (2.12) 
RESD 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 
No. of obs. 157 157 (0.20) (0.33) 
BIDASK 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.000 
No. of obs. 119 122 (0.13) (0.17) 
SEGNO 3.77 4.00 3.37 3.00 0.40b 1.00b 
No. of obs. 157 157 (2.13) (2.34) 
ACOV 12.38 9.00 11.31 7.00 1.07 2.00c 
No. of obs. 157 157 (1.37) (1.79) 
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Table 8.3 Information asymmetry proxies of pre-spinoff parents and post-spinoff parents 
This table reports summary descriptive statistics of information asymmetry proxies and characteristics for pre-
spinoff parent and post-spinoff parents. ERROR is the ratio of the absolute difference between the mean forecast 
earnings for the current year and actual earnings per share to the stock price at the beginning of the last month of 
the fiscal year. DISP is the standard deviation of all analysts’ earnings forecasts for the current year made in the 
last month of the fiscal year divided by the stock price at the beginning of that month. RESD is the dispersion in 
the market-adjusted daily stock returns to a firm in a year. BIDASK is the difference between ask price and bid 
price divided by the mid point. SEGNO is the number of business segments. ACOV is the number of following 
analysts over the one-year period prior to the spinoff announcement for pre-spinoff parents and over the one-year 
period subsequent to the spinoff completion for post-spinoff firms. In parentheses is the t-statistic (mean) or 
Wilcoxon test z-statistic (median) for the difference in variables between pre-spinoff parents and post-spinoff 
parents. a, b indicates the significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively.  
 Pre-spinoff (1) Post-spinoff (2) Group difference (1 -2) 
Variable Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
ERROR 0.06 0.006 0.04 0.010 0.02  -0.004b 
No. of obs. 136 132 (0.84) (-2.09) 
DISP 0.02 0.005 0.02 0.008 -0.00  -0.003b 
No. of obs. 123 121 (-1.11) (-2.32) 
RESD 0.022 0.019 0.024 0.021 -0.003a  -0.002a 
No. of obs. 157 156 (-3.24) (-3.39) 
BIDASK 0.030 0.01 0.037 0.01 -0.007b  -0.00 
No. of obs. 119 126 (-2.09) (-1.07) 
SEGNO 3.77 4.00 3.13 3.00 0.64a  1.00a 
No. of obs. 157 157 (5.70) (5.40) 
ACOV 12.38 9.00 11.83 7.00 0.55 2.00 
No. of obs. 157 157 (1.15) (1.16) 
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Table 8.4 Logit regression of spinoff likelihood on information asymmetry proxies 
Logit regression coefficients for spinoff likelihood for spinoff parents and non-spinoff control firms. Dependent 
variable is 1 when the firm is spinoff parent and is 0 when the firm is non-spinoff control firm. ERROR is the ratio 
of the absolute difference between the mean forecast earnings for the current year and actual earnings per share to 
the stock price at the beginning of the last month of the fiscal year. DISP is the standard deviation of all analysts’ 
earnings forecasts for the current year made in the last month of the fiscal year divided by the stock price at the 
beginning of that month. RESD is the dispersion in the market-adjusted daily stock returns to a firm in a year. 
BIDASK is the difference between ask price and bid price divided by the mid point. SEGNO is the number of 
business segments preceding the spinoff announcement date. GROWTH is the MTBV of assets ratio at the end of 
month prior to spinoff announcement date. ROA is the EBITDA divided by its total assets. The p-value is reported 
in parentheses. a, c indicates the significance at the 1% and 10% level, respectively.  
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept -0.49 (0.12) -0.12 (0.73) -0.52 (0.14) -1.01a (0.006) 
ERROR 1.83 (0.12)       
DISP   4.40 (0.34)     
RESD     1.13 (0.90)   
BIDASK       3.04 (0.29) 
SEGNO 0.08 (0.21) 0.06 (0.39) 0.11c (0.06) 0.19a (0.009) 
GROWTH 0.03 (0.36) 0.03 (0.48) 0.03 (0.39) 0.06 (0.15) 
ROA 0.13 (0.86) -2.02 (0.12) 0.16 (0.80) 0.68 (0.36) 
No. of obs. 275  248  314  241  
-2 Log Likelihood 375.54  338.58  431.07  324.86  
R2 Cox Snell 0.02  0.02  0.01  0.04  
R2 Nagelkerke 0.03  0.03  0.02  0.05  
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Table 8.5 Regression of announcement period (-1, 1) CARs on the information asymmetry proxies of pre-
spinoff parents 
Regression coefficients for announcement period (-1, 1) cumulative abnormal returns for the 157 completed 
spinoffs by 144 European companies from January 1987 to December 2005. ERROR is the ratio of the absolute 
difference between the mean forecast earnings for the current year and actual earnings per share to the stock price 
at the beginning of the last month of the fiscal year. DISP is the standard deviation of all analysts’ earnings 
forecasts for the current year made in the last month of the fiscal year divided by the stock price at the beginning 
of that month. RESD is the dispersion in the market-adjusted daily stock returns to a firm in a year. BIDASK is the 
difference between ask price and bid price divided by the mid point. The t-statistic based on White 
heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors is reported in parentheses. a, b, and c indicates the significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept -6.67b (-2.47) -3.96 (-1.55) -7.33a (-2.62) -6.62b (-2.58) 
ERROR 7.39 (1.17)       
DISP   15.81c (1.72)     
RESD     133.03 (1.59)   
BIDASK       -9.22 (-0.53) 
FOCUS 4.05a (2.97) 3.24b (2.20) 4.14a (3.13) 3.80b (2.57) 
GROWTH 0.15 (0.81) 0.07 (0.45) 0.17 (1.00) 0.13 (0.66) 
ROA 11.07 (1.61) 12.94 (1.53) 5.85 (1.01) 3.77 (0.64) 
RELSIZ 16.28a (3.25) 12.38b (2.44) 14.94a (3.21) 20.28a (3.19) 
ANTIDIR 0.21 (0.39) -0.27 (-0.53) -0.15 (-0.30) 0.31 (0.64) 
HOTTIME 1.97 (1.47) 2.11c (1.68) 2.17 (1.61) 2.15 (1.31) 
No. of obs. 136  123  157  119  
Adj. R2 0.18  0.14  0.18  0.16  
F statistic 5.34  3.93  5.93  4.29  
Sig. level <0.001  0.001  <0.001  <0.001  
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Table 8.6 Regression of 3-year size- and book-to-market-adjusted BHARs to post-spinoff combined firms on 
the information asymmetry proxies of pre-spinoff parents 
Regression coefficients for 3-year size- and book-to-market adjusted BHARs for post-spinoff parent/subsidiary 
combined firms from the 129 spinoffs completed from January 1987 to December 2002. ERROR is the ratio of the 
absolute difference between the mean forecast earnings for the current year and actual earnings per share to the 
stock price at the beginning of the last month of the fiscal year. DISP is the standard deviation of all analysts’ 
earnings forecasts for the current year made in the last month of the fiscal year divided by the stock price at the 
beginning of that month. RESD is the dispersion in the market-adjusted daily stock returns to a firm in a year. 
BIDASK is the difference between ask price and bid price divided by the mid point. The t-statistic based on White 
heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors is reported in parentheses. a, b, c indicates the significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively.  
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept 0.42 (1.02) 0.51 (1.46) 0.42 (1.19) 0.49 (1.13) 
ERROR -0.77b (-2.26)       
DISP   -1.04 (-2.91)     
RESD     -10.45c (-1.92)   
BIDASK       -2.83a (-3.37) 
FOCUS -0.02 (-0.09) -0.06 (-0.35) -0.01 (-0.07) 0.03 (0.14) 
GROWTH -0.02 (-1.27) -0.01 (-0.62) -0.01 (-0.83) -0.03 (-1.51) 
ROA -1.78a (-2.62) -1.24 (-1.99) -0.88 (-1.33) -1.61b (-2.52) 
RELSIZ 0.19 (0.51) -0.02 (-0.06) 0.18 (0.47) -0.22 (-0.47) 
ANTIDIR 0.01 (0.11) -0.02 (-0.43) -0.01 (-0.10) 0.01 (0.13) 
HOTTIME -0.07 (-0.35) -0.14 (-0.80) -0.02 (-0.08) 0.06 (0.28) 
No. of obs. 114  103  129  91  
Adj. R2 -0.02  -0.03  -0.03  -0.03  
F statistic 0.68  0.64  0.54  0.63  
Sig. level 0.69  0.73  0.80  0.73  
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Table 8.7 Regression of 3-year size- and book-to-market-adjusted BHARs to post-spinoff combined firms on 
the change of information asymmetry proxies following spinoffs 
Regression coefficients for 3-year size- and book-to-market adjusted BHARs for post-spinoff parent/subsidiary 
combined firms from the 129 spinoffs completed from January 1987 to December 2002. ERROR is the ratio of the 
absolute difference between the mean forecast earnings for the current year and actual earnings per share to the 
stock price at the beginning of the last month of the fiscal year. DISP is the standard deviation of all analysts’ 
earnings forecasts for the current year made in the last month of the fiscal year divided by the stock price at the 
beginning of that month. RESD is the dispersion in the market-adjusted daily stock returns to a firm in a year. 
BIDASK is the difference between ask price and bid price divided by the mid point. Δ ERROR is the difference in 
ERROR between post-spinoff parents and pre-spinoff parents. ΔDISP is the difference in DISP between post-
spinoff parents and pre-spinoff parents. ΔRESD is the difference in RESD between post-spinoff parents and pre-
spinoff parents. Δ BIDASK is the difference in BIDASK between post-spinoff parents and pre-spinoff parents.  
The t-statistic based on White heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors is reported in parentheses. a, b, c indicates 
the significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept 0.75b (2.44) 0.71b (2.16) 0.37 (1.08) 0.51 (1.20) 
Δ ERROR -0.55 (-0.45)       
ΔDISP   -3.43 (-1.11)     
Δ RESD     -5.44 (-0.94)   
Δ BIDASK       0.34 (0.10) 
FOCUS -0.17 (-0.99) -0.19 (-0.99) -0.02 (-0.13) 0.04 (0.17) 
GROWTH -0.02 (-0.80) -0.01 (-0.30) -0.02 (-0.91) -0.03 (-1.43) 
ROA -0.95 (-1.47) -1.08 (-0.98) -0.76 (-1.14) -1.34b (-2.36) 
RELSIZ 0.00 (-0.01) -0.01 (-0.04) 0.13 (0.35) -0.37 (-0.94) 
ANTIDIR -0.07 (-1.17) -0.04 (-0.68) -0.02 (-0.27) -0.02 (-0.41) 
HOTTIME -0.24 (-1.40) -0.27 (-1.50) -0.02 (-0.11) 0.08 (0.34) 
No. of obs. 106  97  128  91  
Adj. R2 -0.01  -0.02  -0.04  -0.05  
F statistic 0.89  0.78  0.29  0.39  
Sig. level 0.52  0.61  0.96  0.91  
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Table 8.8 Information asymmetry proxies of pre-spinoff parents and non-spinoff control firms by sub-
samples 
This table reports comparative statistics of information asymmetry proxies for pre-spinoff parent and non-spinoff 
control firms by sub-samples. Panel A reports the data for spinoff parents that reduce the business segment number 
subsequent to spinoffs. Panel B reports the data for spinoff parents that have increased analyst coverage 
subsequent to spinoffs. ERROR is the ratio of the absolute difference between the mean forecast earnings for the 
current year and actual earnings per share to the stock price at the beginning of the last month of the fiscal year. 
DISP is the standard deviation of all analysts’ earnings forecasts for the current year made in the last month of the 
fiscal year divided by the stock price at the beginning of that month. RESD is the dispersion in the market-adjusted 
daily stock returns to a firm in a year. BIDASK is the difference between ask price and bid price divided by the 
mid point. ACOV is the number of following analysts over the one-year period prior to the spinoff announcement 
for pre-spinoff parents and over the one-year period subsequent to the spinoff completion for post-spinoff firms. In 
parentheses are the t-statistics (mean) or Wilcoxon test z-statistics (median) for the difference in information 
asymmetry variables between spinoff firms and control firms. b indicates the 5% significance level. 
 Spinoff firm (1) Control firm (2) Group difference (1 -2) 
Variable Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Panel A: Spinoff parents that reduce the business segment number following spinoffs 
ERROR 0.10 0.009 0.01 0.006 0.09b  0.003a 
No. of obs. 60 60 (2.29) (2.65) 
DISP 0.02 0.008 0.01 0.004 0.01  0.004b 
No. of obs. 66 58 (1.02) (2.48) 
RESD 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00  0.00 
No. of obs. 67 67 (0.04) (0.62) 
BIDASK 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 -0.01  -0.00 
No. of obs. 52 52 (-1.03) (-0.48) 
ACOV 16.48 13.00 13.72 9.00 2.76c 4.00b 
No. of obs. 67 67 (1.91) (2.53) 
Panel B: Spinoff parents that divest lowly related divisions through spinoffs 
ERROR 0.08 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.06c 0.05 
No. of obs. 60 60 (1.85) (1.34) 
DISP 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.08 
No. of obs. 53 53 (0.18) (1.52) 
RESD 0.02 0.22 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.20 
No. of obs. 78 78 (0.05) (0.43) 
BIDASK 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 
No. of obs. 59 59 (0.09) (0.71) 
ACOV 10.15 6.50 9.68 4.00 0.47 2.50 
No. of obs. 78 78 (0.52) (0.78) 
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Table 8.9 Information asymmetry proxies of pre-spinoff parent and post-spinoff parents by sub-samples 
This table reports comparative statistics of information asymmetry proxies for pre-spinoff and post-spinoff parents 
by sub-samples. Panel A reports the data for parents that reduce the business segment number subsequent to 
spinoffs. Panel B reports the data for parents that divest lowly related subsidiaries through spinoffs. ERROR is the 
ratio of the absolute difference between the mean forecast earnings for the current year and actual earnings per 
share to the stock price at the beginning of the last month of the fiscal year. DISP is the standard deviation of all 
analysts’ earnings forecasts for the current year made in the last month of the fiscal year divided by the stock price 
at the beginning of that month. RESD is the dispersion in the market-adjusted daily stock returns to a firm in a year. 
BIDASK is the difference between ask price and bid price divided by the mid point. ACOV is the number of 
following analysts over the one-year period prior to the spinoff announcement for pre-spinoff parents and over the 
one-year period subsequent to the spinoff completion for post-spinoff firms. In parentheses are the t-statistics 
(mean) or Wilcoxon test z-statistics (median) for the difference in information asymmetry variables between pre-
spinoff and post-spinoff parents. a, b indicates the significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
 Pre-spinoff (1) Post-spinoff (2) Group difference (1 -2) 
Variable Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Panel A: Spinoff parents that reduce the business segment number following spinoffs 
ERROR 0.10 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.06  -0.002 
No. of obs. 60 59 (1.28) (0.37) 
DISP 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.002  0.001 
No. of obs. 66 56 (-0.70) (0.62) 
RESD 0.021 0.019 0.024 0.021 -0.003a  -0.002a 
No. of obs. 67  66 (-2.75) (-2.77) 
BIDASK 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 -0.01  -0.00 
No. of obs. 52 56 (-1.61) (-1.14) 
ACOV 16.48 13.00 11.72 8.00 4.76a 5.00a 
No. of obs. 67 67 (6.85) (7.14) 
Panel B: Spinoff parents that divest lowly related divisions through spinoffs 
ERROR 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 -0.01c 
No. of obs. 63 67 (0.89) (-1.65) 
DISP 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.002c 
No. of obs. 56 57 (-1.30) (-1.76) 
RESD 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.003b -0.001b 
No. of obs. 78 78 (-2.33) (-2.48) 
BIDASK 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.02 -0.01b 0.00 
No. of obs. 59 61 (-2.08) (-0.31) 
ACOV 10.15 6.50 8.53 4.00 1.63b 2.50b 
No. of obs. 78 78 (2.30) (2.46) 
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Table 8.10 Regression of announcement period (-1, 1) CARs based on the world market model on the 
information asymmetry proxies of pre-spinoff parents 
Regression coefficients for announcement period (-1, 1) cumulative abnormal returns calculated with the world 
market model for the 157 completed spinoffs by 144 European companies from January 1987 to December 2005. 
ERROR is the ratio of the absolute difference between the mean forecast earnings for the current year and actual 
earnings per share to the stock price at the beginning of the last month of the fiscal year. DISP is the standard 
deviation of all analysts’ earnings forecasts for the current year made in the last month of the fiscal year divided by 
the stock price at the beginning of that month. RESD is the dispersion in the market-adjusted daily stock returns to 
a firm in a year. BIDASK is the difference between ask price and bid price divided by the mid point. The t-statistic 
based on White heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors is reported in parentheses. a, b, and c indicates the 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept -6.85b (-2.56) -4.24c (-1.66) -7.53a (-2.72) -6.71b (-2.60) 
ERROR 7.77 (1.22)       
DISP   16.49c (1.82)     
RESD     137.12c (1.66)   
BIDASK       -9.47 (-0.53) 
FOCUS 4.05a (2.98) 3.28b (2.22) 4.14a (3.13) 3.88b (2.62) 
GROWTH 0.15 (0.81) 0.08 (0.50) 0.16 (1.00) 0.12 (0.65) 
ROA 11.30 (1.64) 13.43 (1.58) 6.06 (1.04) 3.83 (0.63) 
RELSIZ 16.41a (3.28) 12.65b (2.48) 15.00a (3.21) 20.24a (3.17) 
ANTIDIR 0.24 (0.44) -0.25 (-0.49) -0.12 (-0.25) 0.33 (0.69) 
HOTTIME 1.95 (1.46) 2.07c (1.66) 2.13 (1.58) 2.16 (1.31) 
No. of obs. 136  123  157  119  
Adj. R2 0.19  0.15  0.18  0.16  
F statistic 5.52  4.10  6.02  4.29  
Sig. level <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  
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Table 8.11 Regression of 3-year industry- and size-adjusted BHARs to post-spinoff combined firms on the 
information asymmetry proxies of pre-spinoff parents 
Regression coefficients for 3-year industry- and size-adjusted BHARs for post-spinoff parent/subsidiary combined 
firms from the 129 spinoffs completed from January 1987 to December 2002. ERROR is the ratio of the absolute 
difference between the mean forecast earnings for the current year and actual earnings per share to the stock price 
at the beginning of the last month of the fiscal year. DISP is the standard deviation of all analysts’ earnings 
forecasts for the current year made in the last month of the fiscal year divided by the stock price at the beginning 
of that month. RESD is the dispersion in the market-adjusted daily stock returns to a firm in a year. BIDASK is the 
difference between ask price and bid price divided by the mid point. The t-statistic based on White 
heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors is reported in parentheses. a, b, c indicates the significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively.  
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept 0.08 (0.20) 0.02 (0.08) 0.11 (0.33) 0.23 (0.56) 
ERROR -0.90a (-2.70)       
DISP   0.59 (1.32)     
RESD     -6.34 (-1.04)   
BIDASK       -4.11b (-2.13) 
FOCUS 0.22 (1.14) 0.20 (1.20) 0.19 (1.08) 0.33c (1.70) 
GROWTH -0.002 (-0.13) 0.01 (0.59) 0.002 (0.13) -0.02 (-1.24) 
ROA -2.03a (-2.78) -1.44b (-1.99) -1.50 (-2.28) -2.22b (-2.59) 
RELSIZ 0.24 (0.61) -0.18 (-0.51) 0.14 (0.38) -0.24 (-0.57) 
ANTIDIR 0.04 (0.55) 0.04 (0.80) 0.03 (0.42) 0.06 (0.84) 
HOTTIME -0.18 (-0.89) -0.18 (-1.02) -0.13 (-0.69) -0.06 (-0.26) 
No. of obs. 114  103  129  91  
Adj. R2 -0.01  -0.01  -0.02  0.02  
F statistic 0.87  0.93  0.62  1.21  
Sig. level 0.53  0.49  0.74  0.31  
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Table 8.12 Regression of 3-year industry- and size-adjusted BHARs to post-spinoff combined firms on the 
change of information asymmetry proxies following spinoffs 
Regression coefficients for 3-year industry- and size-adjusted BHARs for post-spinoff parent/subsidiary combined 
firms from the 129 spinoffs completed from January 1987 to December 2002. ERROR is the ratio of the absolute 
difference between the mean forecast earnings for the current year and actual earnings per share to the stock price at the 
beginning of the last month of the fiscal year. DISP is the standard deviation of all analysts’ earnings forecasts for the 
current year made in the last month of the fiscal year divided by the stock price at the beginning of that month. RESD is 
the dispersion in the market-adjusted daily stock returns to a firm in a year. BIDASK is the difference between ask 
price and bid price divided by the mid point. Δ ERROR is the difference in ERROR between post-spinoff parents and 
pre-spinoff parents. ΔDISP is the difference in DISP between post-spinoff parents and pre-spinoff parents. ΔRESD is 
the difference in RESD between post-spinoff parents and pre-spinoff parents. Δ BIDASK is the difference in BIDASK 
between post-spinoff parents and pre-spinoff parents.  The t-statistic based on White heteroskedasticity-adjusted 
standard errors is reported in parentheses. a, b, c indicates the significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept -0.03 (-0.07) 0.03 (0.11) 0.02 (0.06) 0.10 (0.24) 
Δ ERROR 1.08a (3.95)       
ΔDISP   4.36 (1.21)     
ΔRESD     3.56 (0.24)   
ΔBIDASK       9.85 (1.45) 
FOCUS 0.30 (1.53) 0.25 (1.56) 0.20 (1.06) 0.34c (1.97) 
GROWTH 0.00 (0.04) 0.01 (0.54) 0.00 (0.01) -0.01 (-0.85) 
ROA -2.01b (-2.49) -1.35c (-1.85) -1.46 (-2.29) -1.45b (-2.21) 
RELSIZ 0.34 (0.89) 0.04 (0.11) 0.02 (0.06) -0.77c (-1.89) 
ANTIDIR 0.03 (0.49) 0.01 (0.20) 0.02 (0.31) 0.01 (0.23) 
HOTTIME -0.13 (-0.63) -0.16 (-0.89) -0.12 (-0.67) 0.09 (0.35) 
No. of obs. 106  97  128  91  
Adj. R2 0.01  -0.01  -0.03  0.10  
F statistic 1.02  0.88  0.53  2.42  
Sig. level 0.42  0.53  0.81  0.03  
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Chapter 9 Conclusions  
 
9.1 Introduction 
Corporate spinoffs are a special type of corporate restructuring activities. Through a 
spinoff, the stocks of a subsidiary (or several subsidiaries) are offered on a pro-rata 
distribution basis to the existing shareholders of the parent. As shown in the literature 
review in Chapter 2, there is extensive evidence that stock markets react to corporate 
spinoff announcements positively. However, the precise source of spinoff announcement 
gains is still a subject of debate. In addition, Chapter 3 summarises the literature on the 
stock market efficiency and shows that conclusions drawn from long-run event studies 
must be based on robust abnormal return calculation methodologies. In Chapter 4, I 
identify the gap in extant literature of corporate spinoffs and propose the following 
related research questions: 
1. Do corporate spinoffs really create shareholder value? 
2. What are the determinants of spinoff value effects? 
 
Using a sample of 170 spinoffs completed by European companies between the years 
1987 and 2005, I test the relative validity of behavioural, governance-based and 
information-based models to explain spinoff value effects. Chapter 5 analyses the stock 
and operating performance of post-spinoff firms with robust long-run abnormal return 
measurement methodologies. Chapter 6 explores whether investor irrationality affects the 
spinoff value effects. Chapter 7 examines whether the spinoff value effects are related to 
the improvement of corporate governance in post-spinoff firms. Chapter 8 investigates 
the validity of the information asymmetry for spinoff value effects.  
 
In this final chapter, a summary of findings of four empirical chapters is presented in 
section 9.2. Then section 9.3 discusses the limitations of these results and offers 
recommendations for future research on corporate spinoffs. Section 9.4 outlines the 
contributions to the literature and practical implications for practitioners.   
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9.2 Summary of Empirical Findings 
This section summarises the key findings reported in the preceding four empirical 
chapters.  
 
First, Chapter 5 documents evidence that European spinoffs have positive and significant 
abnormal stock returns over the announcement period. The positive spinoff 
announcement abnormal returns do not substantially differ across sample countries. This 
evidence is consistent with the findings of earlier empirical studies (e.g. Daley et al., 
1997; Desai and Jain, 1999; Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 1999; Veld and Veld-
Merkoulova, 2004).  
 
Second, Chapter 5 reports evidence consistent with the efficient market hypothesis. In 
general, there are no significant long-run abnormal returns to post-spinoff firms for my 
sample. The conclusion holds for long-run returns measured with different methodologies 
to adjust for the cross-sectional return-dependence problem (Jegadeesh and Karceski, 
2004; Lyon et al., 1999; Mitchell and Stafford, 2000). Regressions on the Fama and 
French (1993) three-factor model and Carhart (1997) four-factor model indicate that post-
spinoff firms generally earn insignificant abnormal returns in the long-term. Using the 
calendar-time abnormal portfolio approach as advocated in Mitchell and Stafford (2000) 
produces qualitatively similar results. Given that the measurement of long-run abnormal 
stock returns is controversial, I then examine the operating performance of post-spinoff 
firms. Results show that post-spinoff firms do not have an improvement in the accounting 
returns. Taken together, my findings indicate that European stock markets are generally 
efficient in valuing corporate spinoffs.  
 
Third, Chapter 6 provides evidence of the relationship between investor sentiments and 
the market reaction to spinoff announcements. There is a significant and positive 
association between investor demands for corporate focus (and glamour stocks of 
offspring) and the spinoff announcement returns. The strong association holds even after 
controlling for the value factors suggested in prior studies such as corporate focus and 
information asymmetry. Hence, my results show that investor sentiment is an additional 
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factor for the positive market reaction to spinoff announcements.  
 
Fourth, Chapter 6 further explores whether investor sentiment affects the managerial 
decision to spin off. I propose the catering theory of corporate spinoffs that some spinoffs 
are not undertaken for efficiency-related reasons. In contrast, managers may cater to 
irrational investor demand by spinning off overvalued subsidiaries. I conjecture that 
managers of unvalued parent firms have strong incentives to cater to investor demands by 
spinning off overvalued subsidiaries in order to maximise the short run share prices. I use 
three different measures to indicate such catering spinoffs. I find that the announcement 
returns to catering spinoffs are significantly higher than those to other types of spinoff.  
However, offspring following spinoffs that cater to investor demand for glamour stocks 
have lower long-run stock performance those from other types of spinoff. This evidence 
confirms that investors react to spinoff announcements for non-fundamental factors. A 
cautionary note should be made here. The number of catering spinoffs is small and 
offspring emerging from non-catering spinoffs still have positive long-run abnormal 
returns over a three-year post-spinoff period. Based on results in Chapters 5 and 6, 
European stock markets can be regarded as generally efficient and may only misvalue 
some types of spinoff.   
 
Fifth, Chapter 7 tests a governance-based model that spinoffs create value by 
strengthening the corporate governance of post-spinoff firms (Chemmanur and Yan, 
2004). I find that firms with a controlling family shareholder have lower spinoff 
announcement returns and long-run post-spinoff performance than firms without a 
controlling family shareholder. I also observe that controlling family shareholders 
generally reduce their equity holdings but still keep control of post-spinoff firms, 
indicating that these family owners may undertake a spinoff to reshuffle their wealth 
portfolios. The long-run underperformance of post-spinoff firms may be because that 
controlling family shareholders still retain a tight control on these post-spinoff firms and 
the agency conflicts between family owners and minority shareholders are not alleviated 
in the post-spinoff period. On the other hand, I find that post-spinoff firms with an 
improvement in the corporate governance structure earn higher long-run stock returns 
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than those without an improvement in the corporate governance structure. Therefore, my 
evidence is generally consistent with the governance-based model of spinoff value effects 
that the gains from spinoffs represent the mitigation of agency conflicts.   
 
Sixth, Chapter 8 documents no evidence for the information asymmetry hypothesis. The 
spinoff announcement returns are positively associated with the information asymmetry 
measures. Nevertheless, there is no improvement in the information asymmetry proxies 
and the analyst coverage following a spinoff. A further examination reveals that the 
information asymmetry measures does not improve for sub-samples of spinoff parent 
firms which are likely to have significant information benefits from spinoffs. Thus, it is 
unlikely that a European spinoff is motivated by reducing the information asymmetry 
problem. On the other hand, I find that the information asymmetry problem may be 
exacerbated following a spinoff when the organisational complexity of spinoff parents is 
reduced. This evidence supports the argument of Goldman (2005) that a spinoff may 
exacerbate the information asymmetry problems when the liquidity of a post-spinoff firm 
is reduced. 
 
9.3 Limitations and Recommendations 
Like other empirical studies in corporate finance, this thesis is subject to several 
limitations and my results should be treated with caution. Future research on corporate 
spinoffs should tackle these issues in order to report more robust and fruitful results.  
 
First, my sample size is quite small since there are only 157 completed spinoffs over the 
period 1987 to 2005. This is due to fact that spinoffs have only become popular in Europe 
in recent years. Therefore, my results will be subject to the small sample size problem. In 
addition, I cannot conduct detailed analysis of the spinoff value effects for individual 
countries because of the data availability problem. Future research employing a larger 
sample of spinoffs should deliver more unbiased and interesting results.  
 
Second, there are several important differences across European countries, which I have 
not controlled in my empirical analysis. For instance, European countries differ 
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substantially with regard to accounting standard, stock exchange regulations, and creditor 
right protection, all of which are likely to affect the spinoff value effects and the spinoff 
decision. Subsequent studies should consider these issues in the cross-country analysis of 
spinoff value effects. 
 
Third, the return methodologies employed in Chapter 5 are still subject to statistical and 
model misspecification problems. The adjusted t-statistics advocated in Lyon et al. (1999) 
and Mitchell and Stafford (2000) do not fully resolve the cross-sectional dependence 
problems. The serial correlation and heteroskedsticity-consistent t-statistics proposed in 
Jegadeesh and Karceski (2004) may have a lower power to test the long-run abnormal 
returns for a small sample, such as the spinoff sample used in this study. In addition, the 
Fama and French (1993) three-factor model and the Carhart (1997) four-factor model are 
an imperfect approximation of asset pricing models. There is evidence that these models 
have limited powers in explaining cross-sectional stock returns. For instance, Cremers et 
al. (2005) find a significant impact of takeover likelihood on firm valuation. Using 
estimates of the likelihood that a firm will be acquired, they create a takeover-spread 
portfolio that longs firms with a high likelihood of being acquired and shorts firms with 
low likelihood of being acquired. They find that the Fama-French (1993) three-factor 
model cannot explain the returns to the takeover-spread portfolio and thus propose an 
asset pricing model including the takeover factor. Therefore, future research can use 
better asset pricing models, such as the takeover-augmented factor model, to examine the 
significance of long-run abnormal returns to post-spinoff firms. Moreover, I only examine 
whether a simple investment strategy that buys all post-spinoff firms at the completion 
date can earn superior long run abnormal returns. Future research may examine whether 
other investment strategies can provide superior long-run returns as claimed in the Press. 
 
Fourth, the accuracy of proxies for catering spinoffs used in Chapter 6 may be improved. 
A spinoff with a substantial difference in industry-based market valuation between 
different divisions may not necessarily indicate that managers are exploiting market 
misvaluation to spin off. In addition, the market valuation of a division’s industry do not 
necessarily relate to the real market valuation of the division. Future studies can design 
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better proxies to measure the managerial incentives to exploit the market misevaluation in 
order to test the value impact of catering spinoffs. For instance, future research may 
consider the intensity of stock-based compensation for managers, which should be 
positively related to managerial incentives to exploit market misevaluation. Denis, 
Hanouna, and Sarin (2006) have reported a significant positive association between the 
likelihood of securities fraud allegations and a measure of executive stock option 
incentives. They argue that managerial stock options increase the incentive to engage in 
fraudulent activity. An extension of their argument is that managerial stock options could 
increase the incentive to engage in other non-value-maximisation corporate transactions, 
such as spinoffs aiming to exploit market misevaluation.  
 
Fifth, the measurements of agency problems in Chapter 7 may contain biases. For 
example, I measure the effectiveness of board monitoring based on the proportion of 
independent directors in the corporate board. However, the actual working of corporate 
board may be another important factor in measuring the monitoring effectiveness, such as 
the frequency of board meeting (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006). In addition, I classify 
independent directors and institutional blockholders based on my own assessment of the 
information provides in sample firms’ financial reports. Therefore, the classification 
results for board independence are likely to be biased. Furthermore, my corporate 
governance variables do not consider several important aspects of corporate governance 
mechanisms, such as director accountability, information disclosure quality, and anti-
takeover provisions. These governance practices will also have significant impact on the 
spinoff value effects and the spinoff decision.  
 
Future research should use better sources of corporate governance data to examine the 
relationship between the corporate governance structure of post-spinoff firms and spinoff 
value effects. Some professional firms such as Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia and 
Manifest have begun to provide firm-level corporate governance data, which are used in 
the recent finance literature. For example, Durnev and Kim (2005) use the survey data 
compiled by Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA) to measure the firm-level corporate 
governance strength for 494 firms in 24 countries. The CLSA survey provides scores on 
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the quality of corporate governance practices that are based on responses from financial 
analysts to 57 questions covering six categories of governance, i.e. discipline (managerial 
incentives and discipline towards value-maximising actions), transparency (timely and 
accurate disclosure), independence (board independence), accountability (board 
accountability), responsibility (enforcement and management accountability), protection 
(monitory shareholder protection), and social awareness (social responsibility). The 
corporate governance score based on the CLSA survey will be a good proxy to measure 
the corporate governance strength.     
 
Sixth, the analyses in Chapter 8 only investigate the validity of the information 
asymmetry hypothesis. It is not clear whether other information-based models can 
explain the change or no change in the information asymmetry problems following 
spinoffs. For instance, the information asymmetry problem may become worse because 
the focused post-spinoff firms lose the informational benefits resulting from the 
aggregated segment reports (Thomas, 2002) or because of the reduced liquidity of 
focusing post-spinoff firms (Goldman, 2005).  
 
Finally, this study has not controlled the endogeneity issue in the research methodology. 
Corporate spinoffs are self-selection events and firms involved in spinoffs are non-
random. Thus, any conclusions drawn from a non-random sample have to be treated with 
caution and appropriate econometric modes of self-selection should be employed (Li and 
Prabhala, 2006). For instance, Chapter 7 documents evidence that firms with a controlling 
family shareholder earn lower spinoff announcement returns than those without a 
controlling family shareholder. My explanation in Chapter 7 is that family firms generally 
have higher agency costs than non-family firms and a spinoff decision made by family 
firms may be not value-maximising. However, this evidence is also consistent with a self-
selection explanation that family firms with severe agency problems are more likely to 
undertake spinoffs than non-family firms. It is possible that, in general, family firms do 
not have higher agency costs than non-family firms. Future research should model the 
managerial decision to spinoff with the Heckman selection model as argued in Lasfer 
(2006) to control this self-selection problem.   
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9.4 Contributions to the Theory and Practice 
This thesis conducts a comprehensive examination of the sources of spinoff value effects 
and provides empirical evidence of the relative validity of different models to explain 
spinoff value gains. This study makes a number of contributions to the existing literature 
of corporate divestiture and has several important practical implications for investment 
professionals and corporate managers.  
 
First of all, Chapter 5 examines the long-run performance of post-spinoff firms with 
different robust return methodologies. The long-run abnormal stock returns of post-
spinoff firms are insignificant when the adjusted t-statistics are used to control the cross-
sectional return dependence problem. The long-run operating performance of parent and 
offspring is also insignificant. Regressions on the multi-factor models also provide 
similar conclusions. My results also suggest that the significant long-run abnormal 
returns of post-spinoff firms in earlier US studies should be re-examined with robust 
return methodologies to account for the cross-sectional return-dependence issue. 
Furthermore, investment professionals should be aware that a simple investment strategy 
of buying post-spinoff firms upon spinoff completion dates will not necessarily deliver 
superior long-run returns as claimed in the Press.   
 
Second, Chapter 6 demonstrates a positive association between investor sentiment and 
the spinoff value gains. This evidence is consistent with the argument of a growing 
literature of behavioural finance that investors tend to react to non-fundamental factors. 
My analysis further shows that some spinoffs are undertaken to exploit the market 
misevaluation of different divisions of a diversified firm. This finding suggests that not 
all focus-increasing spinoffs create shareholder values in the long run. Assessing the 
value creation from a spinoff transaction should take into account the managerial 
incentives to cater to investor demand for corporate focus and glamour stocks. Barberis 
and Thaler (2003) review the recent empirical finance papers and propose that investor 
irrationality affects financing and investment decisions. For instance, they observe that 
firms with high valuation issue equity while those with low valuation repurchase their 
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shares. My work adds to this literature by showing that investor irrationality has an 
impact on corporate restructuring decisions.  
 
This chapter also provides evidence that stock market may be inefficient in some cases 
since glamour spinoffs earn significant positive announcement period abnormal returns 
while significantly underperform other types of spinoff in the long run. I have used 
extensive methodology to test the market efficiency in the spinoff context and obtained 
consistent results. Thus, my conclusion is unlikely to be subject to the variable 
construction biases. My evidence adds to the past literature on market inefficiency and 
highlights the importance of relaxing traditional assumption that markets are efficient 
when examining value effects of corporate transactions.  
 
The evidence presented in Chapter 7 further shows a positive association between the 
reduction of agency costs and spinoff value gains. In particular, post-spinoff firms that 
have an improvement in the board independence have better long-run stock returns than 
post-spinoff rims that have no improvement in the board independence. Therefore, it is 
important for corporate managers to design a more effective governance system in post-
spinoff firms in order to enhance the performance of post-spinoff firms. 
 
Finally, the results in Chapter 8 indicate that spinoffs do not resolve information 
asymmetry problems and the long-run performance of post-spinoff firms is unrelated to 
the change of information asymmetry proxies around a spinoff. Further, I document 
evidence that firms that are likely to suffer from severe information asymmetry problems 
do not have an improvement in the information transparency level following spinoffs. 
Hence, whether a spinoff alleviates the information asymmetry problem remains 
questionable. Allen (2001) observes that managers have private information about the 
prospect of post-spinoff firms and the change of their equity holdings around spinoffs is 
significant related to post-spinoff stock returns. For instance, Allen observes that net 
insider sales in offspring are significantly related to the likelihood that these firms will 
cease trading because of insolvency or bankruptcy in the 5-year period subsequent to the 
spinoff completion. Therefore, his evidence suggests that a spinoff can also occur when 
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insiders have information that a division is overvalued. Collectively, investors should be 
cautious about the desirability of spinoff transactions when managers claim that the 
spinoff firm is undervalued by investors and the spinoff is undertaken to alleviate the 
information asymmetry problems.  
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